Run prevention, not offense, was the binding constraint in the 2025 season
The Business Case for Run Prevention
The Mets didn’t lose in 2025 because they failed to score. They lost because when run prevention broke, it broke catastrophically.
That distinction matters. Teams don’t win by maximizing every input. They win by identifying the binding constraint and allocating resources accordingly. For the 2025 Mets, offense wasn’t the constraint. Volatility in run prevention was.
Once you look at the season through that lens, both the results and the offseason strategy make a lot more sense.
Offense Is a Threshold, Not a Lever
Let’s start with runs scored.
When the Mets scored six or more runs, they won roughly 86 percent of the time. Push that to nine or more runs and the win rate climbed above 94 percent. In other words, once the offense cleared a basic threshold, additional runs added diminishing marginal value.
That’s what a plateau looks like. The sixth run matters a lot. The seventh and eighth matter far less. By the time you get to nine, you’re mostly piling on insurance.
This isn’t a critique of the offense. It’s an acknowledgement that the Mets already crossed the offensive threshold often enough. Scoring more was not the fastest way to add wins.
Run Prevention Is a Cliff
Now look at runs allowed.
When the Mets allowed two runs or fewer, they won 93 percent of the time. At three to five runs allowed, games became coin flips. But once runs allowed hit six, win probability collapsed. Allow six to eight runs and the Mets won barely one out of five. Allow nine or more and wins nearly disappeared.
That is not a plateau. That is a cliff.
Here’s the asymmetry that defines the season: the marginal value of the seventh run scored is far smaller than the marginal cost of the seventh run allowed. One operates on a smooth curve. The other operates near a failure threshold.
In a compressed win curve, that difference dominates everything else.
Why “Six Runs and Still Lose” Isn’t a Mystery
This is where frustration usually sets in. Fans remember games where the Mets scored six, seven, even nine runs and still lost, and conclude something went wrong.
But the structural map tells a different story.
When the Mets scored six to eight runs and allowed six to eight runs, they won only about one-third of the time. When they allowed nine or more runs, even elite offense stopped mattering. There is no scoring level that reliably rescues a defensive collapse.
Those games aren’t flukes. They’re predictable outcomes once run prevention crosses a narrow tolerance band.
High-scoring losses feel shocking only if you assume offense and defense trade off symmetrically. They don’t.
The Rational Allocation Problem
This is where baseball starts to look like any other business operating under nonlinear risk.
If your downside costs accelerate faster than your upside gains, the rational strategy isn’t to chase more upside. It’s to insure the downside.
For the Mets, that means:
Fewer blow-up innings
Fewer cascading failures
Fewer games that spiral from competitive to unwinnable in two batters
Turning a collapse game into a coin-flip game is worth more than turning a win into a bigger win. That’s the business case for run prevention.
Reading the Offseason Through This Lens
Seen this way, the Mets’ offseason doesn’t look like a retreat from offense or star power. It looks like a deliberate reallocation toward system stability.
Power hitters matter — but not once you’ve already cleared the scoring threshold. Elite closers matter — but not if volatility upstream keeps pushing games into collapse zones before they ever enter.
Defense, durability, bullpen depth, and damage containment don’t always show up in highlight reels, but they directly reduce exposure to the most expensive outcomes on the win curve.
This isn’t about winning prettier. It’s about losing less violently.
The Real Goal for 2026
The objective isn’t to score fewer runs. It’s to break less.
If the Mets can shave even a handful of games out of the “six-plus runs allowed” bucket, the math says the wins will follow. Not because the team suddenly got more talented, but because it stopped stepping off a cliff.
That’s what disciplined organizations do. They don’t chase noise. They fix constraints.
In a league where the margins are thin and the curves are compressed, run prevention isn’t philosophy. It is a strategy.
A very logical approach that likely mirrors what Stearns and his staff did to decompose last year's failings and come to the conclusion that the off-season would address run prevention. One big caveat: the data shown was based upon many factors - some of which are the players involved that are now being traded/released/lost, and some is the effect of managerial decisions like lineups and how much to (over)work the pitchers. I personally believe that we lost some very good relievers this off-season that could have performed better if not over-stressed. That 3-5 run data could have been very much different if last year's cast of players were used differently.
ReplyDeleteBad defense can help a spiraling team cascade faster, no doubt.
ReplyDelete2025 primarily was a pitching disaster over the last 97 games.
Secondly, bad clutch hitting hurt them. Part of that, IMO, was due to guys who shouldn’t be taking first strikes, because they sucked at 2 strikes.
Thirdly, weak defense. The Phillies allowed 41 unearned runs, whilethe Mets allowed 71 unearned runs. And there is no category I am aware of called “earned runs that would have not happened if defense was better.” I am sure the Mets did poorly there, too. So, maybe a much better defensive team in 2026 would surrender 50 fewer runs based on superior D alone. Stearns is on to something.
Great article once again RVH, as it certainly took quite a while to put all this together. Nothing can ruin effort like exasperation. If the other team is constantly thwarted by foiled attempts on the bases, by hitting the ball hard but having those become outs, or by not getting an abundance of walks, they may even become demoralized. It is my contention that some teams can lose the game before they even take the field. Right after the deadline, it seemed to be the case for the Mets and even a win against the Cardinals that they were winning big and held on for a 11-9 win felt like a loss.
ReplyDeleteI believe Paul and Tom nailed it as taking it to the next level and questioning management and situational results - both offensively and defensively. It is my belief that Mendoza’s is a smart man. Not because I know him but because I study his interviews. He lacks confidence in his pitchers and so they are maligned. He needs to clean that up.
All great points. Bad things happen to teams that are playing badly…. Pressure created dust or diamonds. We all saw it before our own eyes last season. The upshot, there are many potential wins on the margins. Hopefully Stearns can build a roster that actually can execute better. There is a reason Keith Hernandez keeps harping on the “fundies”.
ReplyDeleteExcellent work, RVH.
ReplyDeleteI am an old school type who appreciates when a team focuses on fundamentals (base running, defense, situational hitting, pitchers who avoid walking a small village each game). Think of the 1980's Cardinal teams that were a complete pain in the arse to play against. On paper, they should not have been as good as they were.
Are good fundamentals the only key to winning? Of course not, because talent is also an important factor (ideally you pair the two). But if you don't execute the basics well, even the best teams on paper won't be successful on the field (as evidenced by the most recent edition of the Mets).
With better fundamentals, I am confident that the 2025 version of the Mets would have been a playoff team, despite their injuries and poor second half.
Moving forward, I am intrigued by what DS is doing and I am patient enough to withhold judgement until the offseason is finished.