5/2/26

RVH - A Mea Culpa on the 2026 Mets: Where I Got It Wrong

 

There are times in a season where analysis becomes less about explanation and more about reflection.

This is one of those times.

I spent much of the offseason and early part of the year framing the New York Mets through a systems lens. I believed in the logic of the build — the shift toward run prevention, athleticism, depth, and a more balanced roster construction.

And I still believe that logic has merit.

But I was too confident in how cleanly that logic would translate to reality.

Where My Thinking Fell Short

Looking back, the issue wasn’t that the model made no sense. It did.

The issue is that I didn’t fully appreciate how many things needed to go right at the same time for it to work.

I treated the roster like a collection of solid parts that would collectively produce stability.

What it really was, in practice, was a system that relied on multiple outcomes aligning — health, timing, and performance — all at once.

That’s a very different level of risk.

The Assumptions I Smoothed Over

Some of these were easy to justify individually:

  • Expecting stability or rebound from parts of the rotation

  • Believing depth would absorb inevitable injuries

  • Assuming defensive gains would offset offensive inconsistency

Each of those, on its own, is reasonable.

What I didn’t properly account for was how interconnected they were.

When the rotation wavers, the bullpen absorbs it.
When the bullpen is stretched, the defense is exposed.
When the offense isn’t consistently producing, there’s no margin to recover.

At that point, small issues don’t stay small.

They start to stack.

Where I Was Too Dismissive

This is the part I take more seriously.

There were concerns being raised — not always cleanly articulated, but directionally right:

  • Questions about rotation reliability

  • Questions about offensive consistency

  • Questions about how thin the margin for error might be

My instinct was to filter those through the framework — to trust the structure, the design, the idea that over 162 games things would normalize.

In doing that, I was too quick to discount what was really being identified:

The number of things that had to go right for this team to function the way it was designed.

That’s not noise. That’s risk.

On the Offense — A Needed Correction

I also need to be precise about something I didn’t frame correctly.

This team did not lack offensive anchors.

With players like Juan Soto, Bo Bichette, and Francisco Lindor — along with support from Jorge Polanco — the capacity was clearly there.

The issue wasn't the absence of talent.

It was an absence of alignment.

Slow starts, injuries, and inconsistency meant that group never really existed at the same time in a stable way. The offense didn’t fail because it lacked pieces. It failed because those pieces never came together.

That’s a distinction I didn’t make clearly enough.

What I’ll Carry Forward

If there’s one lesson I take from this, it’s this:

A system can be well designed on paper and still be fragile in practice if too many of its outcomes are dependent on one another.

I leaned into the structure — maybe too much.

Going forward, I’ll spend more time asking a different question:

Not just “Does this make sense?”
But “How many things have to go right for this to hold?”

Because that’s where the real risk lives.

Final Thought

This isn’t a reversal of how I think about roster construction.

It’s a refinement.

The goal isn’t to be right from the start. It’s to get closer to the truth as the season reveals itself.

Right now, the 2026 Mets are doing exactly that — revealing where the assumptions held, and where they didn’t.

And for me, that starts with acknowledging where I didn’t see it clearly enough.


11 comments:

Rds 900. said...

Your points make sense. When I predicted a solid season for the Mets, the caveat was maintaining good health. Clearly that hasn't happened.

Jules C-- The Cautious Optimist said...

This is what accountability by a journalist looks like.
That said, a feature of risk associated with non-independent events is that its impact is not additive. Its impact is closer to geometric.
In the old days people used to put it in terms of 'how many question marks have to be answered positively' before you can feel good about your chances?
I don't think there is anything wrong at all about taking a look at and assessing a team's likelihood of success by whether it has a sound structure in place. The only thing I would add is that you need an anchor, something you can count on that is the foundation on which the rest is built. If you look, there were serious concerns everywhere:
Starting rotation; bullpen; defense (so many players at new postition), base running; getting on base; power; in game management; integrating the parts. There was no one core element that you could confidently rely upon being there day in day out. In fact, if you look at the team on OD, there would have been questions in each of these categories: unknown what to expect from Manaea, Peterson, Senga from among the starters; loss of Diaz, uncertain what others would bring; players with ability to get on base as compared to inordinate number of unproductive outs (strike outs); and so on.
Runners don't get on base, they can't steal. If you are not getting runners on throughout the game, people are risk averse when they do get on base reducing the likelihood of trying. And so on.
In short, I am a believer in having something that you can count on that is at the core of every game: my preference would be starting pitching; followed by back of bullpen. Look at the Yankees, e.g. When they lost starting pitching due to injury, they went out and got more of it at as close to the level they lost as they could find. Same with Dodgers. There's a reason the best starters get paid in dollars and years even in spite of the risks of injury: that's because they can demand it and get it; and that's because it is foundational and the most important thing to feel confident about. Think about how different things would look if Peralta is your number 2a or 2b interchagable with McLean and you have a Skubal as your 1; a Scott or Tong or others as your 4 or 5. You know you are going to have at least 80% of your games well pitched and of the ones you lead after 7 you will have 80% of those closed out successfully.
Then you can ask how do I complement this defensively and score enough runs to put me in that position after 6/7 innings 80% of the time. That depends on your home park and style of ball that you favor playing, etc. You build using the structural approach once you solve for the anchor and the complementary components. Until you build the foundational component, you are forced to play mix and match, hope you get enough of the pieces at a high enough level and getting them all working together often enough to win enough

aptoklas said...

In many ways the 2026 Mets as constructed bare resemblance to the 1962 Mets.

Like the 1962 expansion team, they are relying upon veterans past their prime and young players who are unable to play on the major league level.

1962 Mets had some great veterans- Gil Hodges, Gus Bell, Richie Ashburn, Frank Thomas, Don Zimmer. Charlie Neil, Don Zimmer - in its prime thats quite a crew- some Hall of Famers and all stars. They had 2 young promising outfielders- Jim Hickman and Joe Christopher.

They were relying of veteran Roger Craig, who had some good years for the Dodger, and some very promising young pitchers - Jay Hook, Al Jackson, Craig Anderson, Bob Miller- these were young pitchers well though of.

Despite this promise they only won 40 games. Turns out vets were injury prone and had their best years behind them. With exception of Al Jackson the young pitchers were not able to translate their talent into major league success. Similar to our present 2026 Mets.

Bichette, Lindor, Robert, Polanco, Semien have all shined in the past- they are playing terrible now and or they are injury prone. The young promising players Vientos, Baty, Alvarez and Benge and not translated their promise into success.

The bullpen is filed with soft tossers. The pitching is in disarray. Other than McLean the young pitchers have not had success. The veterans, except Holmes and Peralta, are injury prone and are not competitive against major league pitching. Peterson, Senga and Manaea have ERA’s of 6.53, 9.00 and 6.55.

The parallel is remarkable. 64 years post expansion and here we are

RVH said...

Health issues very early have definitely compounded & accelerated the fall.

RVH said...

Jules, excellent points. Ironic that my “systems” approach missed this basic point - the non-independent events compound & destroy the floor. It is remarkable how many events have turned negative - it is a lesson in risk assessment for sure.

This is the second season we’ve seen a version of this - the starting pitching / bullpen collapse last year has the same characteristics. Something to think about Mr Stearns…

RVH said...

So similar in structure & unfortunately results to the ‘62 team. Unbelievable.

TexasGusCC said...

RVH, you are way too kind to the Mets and they don’t deserve it. I used to waive the pom poms until about three weeks ago. It’s not the losing that bothers me, it’s the direction. I asked myself why the manager still yanks starters early; I asked myself why the RF of the future is playing LF, and Baty would play RF on those days; I asked myself why Mauricio was being yo-yo’d and who did they have that was better on the roster, Tommy Pham? I asked myself why two outfielders in the minor leagues with NLB experience in Christian Pache and MJ Melendez were being passed over for similar players in Pham, Slater, Ibanez, etc. Why are we collecting other teams’ castoffs like our organization sucks and we are first going to the players that signed with us first this past winter and are doing well? Why would another minor league free agent sign with these clowns?

I see the plan without direction, and without conviction. I understand injuries can hurt, but the message your players are seeing plays a role. A role that makes me say Stearns needs a GM because he has failed in that role. He can build a very good organization, but he lacks backbone. He wants a puppet in the dugout and as long as there is a puppet there - whether it’s the present puppet or a different one - this team will never win.

You could not foresee nor expect this kind of weakness to be shown by the president of an organization worth $4B.

TexasGusCC said...

Two corrections:
1. Benge should be in RF, no matter what…
2. What AREN’T we using similar players IN our organization already but going outside of it?

Paul Articulates said...

That is a stunning comparison that I never would have made, but it holds true. Hopefully it doesn't take another 7 years to realize the success that was envisioned.

Paul Articulates said...

I think there was more strength in the roster construction than what this analysis portrays. It was more of a total collapse of the parts than just an interdependent set of assumptions. If at least some of the offense performed, enough runs would have been scored to grab some victories. This hit me when I looked at the pre-game brief yesterday and saw that the top hitter in the lineup was Marcus Semien with a .230 average (Soto did not yet qualify with his number of at-bats). A team with the entire lineup batting less than .230 does not succeed in many games unless the starters are pitching shutouts. It is impossible to pitch a shutout when your manager yanks you the first time there are baserunners after the fifth inning.

Tom Brennan said...

RVH, it happens to the best of us. We have a tendency to overrated the abilities of the Mets. Then the season starts, and we realize we were too optimistic.