In Part 1, we examined the quality, depth and cost of Milwaukee’s roster. The striking finding was how much production the Brewers received from an inexpensive group of core players.
That raises the next question: How do they keep finding those players?
A productive, affordable roster can create a competitive window. Keeping that window open requires another group to arrive as established players become more expensive, get injured or move elsewhere.
Milwaukee’s roster offers a useful look at that process. It also gives Mets fans a framework for evaluating what David Stearns is trying to build in New York.
Several years of decisions coming together
Consider four members of the Brewers’ current core:
Player | How Milwaukee acquired him | Acquisition year |
Brice Turang | First-round draft pick | 2018 |
Garrett Mitchell | First-round draft pick | 2020 |
Jackson Chourio | International amateur signing | 2021 |
Jacob Misiorowski | Second-round draft pick | 2022 |
These acquisitions span five years and two different entry routes into professional baseball. Their eventual overlap on the major league roster illustrates why organizational development requires patience. (fangraphs.com)
The scouting decision starts the process. Coaching, health, adjustments, playing opportunities and roster decisions determine how much value eventually reaches Milwaukee.
We should be careful about assigning all that credit to the executive who authorized the original acquisition. Identifying a player and helping him become a productive major leaguer are related accomplishments, with different people often contributing along the way.
That distinction will matter when we examine Stearns’ Milwaukee legacy.
A trade can keep producing value through another trade
Some of Milwaukee’s most instructive moves are connected.
The Josh Hader return included Robert Gasser and Esteury Ruiz. (mlb.com) Milwaukee subsequently traded Ruiz in the deal that brought William Contreras and two pitchers. (mlb.com)
That sequence illustrates why evaluating a transaction only by the players who remain from its original return can miss part of the outcome.
An acquired player can contribute directly. He can also become the means of acquiring someone who better fits the roster.
There is a cost, of course. Trading an established player removes production and creates uncertainty immediately. A later payoff does not erase that earlier risk. A fair evaluation needs to consider both periods.
The Corbin Burnes trade offers another example: Milwaukee received Joey Ortiz, DL Hall and a draft pick. (mlb.com)
The broader roster-building idea is to distribute the return across multiple opportunities and additional seasons of control. Whether that exchange succeeds depends on what those opportunities actually produce.
For our series, the relevant question is whether these decisions sustain the quality of the entire roster over several years.
Finding value after another organization moves on
Milwaukee also acquires players who have already spent time elsewhere.
Jake Bauers arrived from the Yankees in November 2023. Trevor Megill came from Minnesota earlier that year. Both became useful contributors in our current roster analysis. (fangraphs.com)
These moves require a different judgment from drafting a teenager. The organization must identify something it believes can translate into greater production: a skill, a role, an adjustment or simply an opportunity.
We cannot establish the precise cause of every improvement from a depth chart. Better results after a trade do not, by themselves, prove that coaching caused the improvement.
But these players demonstrate why an acquisition strategy should extend beyond established stars and highly ranked prospects.
The failures belong in the accounting, too. Our payroll review included Lance McCullers Jr., whose Milwaukee stint ended in a release. That is a reminder that acquiring experience does not guarantee useful innings.
And a successful season from a player such as Bauers creates another decision: How much of that performance should the club expect to repeat, and at what price?
The original bargain and the next contract are separate evaluations.
Keeping selected players is part of the approach
Replenishment also involves deciding whom to retain.
Before his major league debut, Chourio signed an eight-year, $82 million contract with two additional club options. (mlb.com)
The logic is straightforward. The player receives substantial financial security before proving himself in the majors. The club accepts that early risk in exchange for predictable costs and the opportunity to retain more of his productive years.
That agreement can become extremely favorable when the player develops as hoped. It can also become expensive if he does not.
For Milwaukee, the important principle is selective commitment. A sustainable roster still needs players worth building around, and keeping those players can be as consequential as identifying their eventual replacements.
The next group is already taking shape
Our October prospect snapshot provides another part of the picture.
Jesús Made and Luis Peña lead the list. Other prominent prospects include Brady Ebel, Tyson Hardin and Jeferson Quero. The acquisition routes extend beyond premium draft selections: Hardin was a 12th-round pick, while Bishop Letson was selected in the 11th round.
That variety matters. An organization needs opportunities to find talent throughout the draft and internationally.
The 2026 draft class is also already represented in the top 30 used for this series:
Player | 2026 selection | Rank in our October snapshot |
Trey Ebel | First round, No. 25 overall | 17 |
Sawyer Strosnider | Second round, No. 66 overall | 18 |
Julian Garcia | Fourth round | 24 |
Rankings are from our saved FanGraphs prospect snapshot; draft selections are confirmed by MLB reporting. (mlb.com, mlb.com)
These players are already included in that inventory. We should not count the draft class again as an additional layer of talent.
Nor should we treat three rankings as three future major league contributors. Their presence adds possibilities. Development will determine how many become useful players, when they arrive and whether their greatest value comes in Milwaukee or in a trade.
For the same reason, an estimated arrival date should never become a roster promise. A team still needs alternatives when a prospect’s timetable changes.
What should the Mets take from this?
The most useful lesson for New York is the value of having choices.
A productive farm system can supply inexpensive contributors, support trades and make injuries easier to absorb. It can also allow the front office to be more selective about which needs require a major financial commitment.
Steve Cohen’s resources create additional possibilities. The Mets can seek the same benefits from scouting and development while having greater capacity to retain successful players and supplement the roster.
That combination is the opportunity we should evaluate throughout this series.
Milwaukee’s current roster suggests several connected strengths: acquisitions spread across multiple years, development that turns some of those players into contributors, trades that create further options, and selective commitments to players the organization wants to keep.
Those strengths still have to produce wins. Prospect rankings and favorable contracts are useful evidence, but sustained major league performance remains the test.
The next installment turns to the attribution question: How much of Milwaukee’s current position traces to David Stearns, and how much reflects what Matt Arnold and the organization built afterward?
We will separate the players Stearns acquired, the assets his successors inherited and the decisions made after his tenure. That should give us a more useful comparison with his work in New York.
