10/22/26

MACK – Let’s Revisit - Justin Armbruester

 


MACK – Let’s Revisit - Justin Armbruester

Justin Armbruester is a right-handed pitcher in the New York Mets organization (currently with Double-A Binghamton Rumble Ponies). Background and Path to the Mets
  • Born October 21, 1998 (age 27), in Bellevue, WA. 6'4", 235 lbs. Throws/bats right.
  • Drafted by the Baltimore Orioles in the 12th round (347th overall) of the 2021 MLB Draft out of the University of New Mexico (Mountain West Pitcher of the Year in 2021). Signed for $100,000. Earlier college time at Pacific Lutheran.
  • Progressed through the Orioles system (High-A Aberdeen, Double-A Bowie, Triple-A Norfolk). Was a mid-tier Orioles prospect (top ~20-30 at peaks) known for strike-throwing and a developing arsenal, but struggled in a full Triple-A season in 2024 (5-11, 7.54 ERA in 119.1 IP).
  • Underwent right lat surgery in April 2025 after a brief strong start in relief for Norfolk; missed most of 2025.
  • Selected by the Mets in the Triple-A phase of the Rule 5 Draft on December 10, 2025, and assigned to Syracuse. Spent early 2026 on the IL recovering, then rehabbed through St. Lucie (A), Brooklyn (A+), and Binghamton before being assigned to Double-A Binghamton in mid-June 2026 (primarily in a relief role).
2026 - AA/Binghamton - 
  • 14-apps, 1-0, 0.59, 0.85, 15.1-IP, 3-BB, 20-K
Pitch Repertoire / ArsenalArmbruester has a multi-pitch mix that has evolved over time (four-seam heavy, with added cutters, sweepers/sliders, curve, and occasional changeup). Recent/tracking data and team notes highlight:

  • Primary: Four-seam fastball (typically 91–93 mph, can touch higher in short outings; rides with good vertical break/hop and plays up due to arm action/deception).
  • Cutter (mid-80s, ~85–87 mph range noted in team notes; effective vs. lefties).
  • Sweeper / slider variants (upper-70s to mid-80s; sweeper often ~78–83 mph with significant horizontal break; a tighter slider also appears in some tracking).
  • Curveball (mid-to-high 70s, ~76–78 mph).
  • Changeup (used less frequently, mid-80s).

Earlier scouting (Orioles years) graded the fastball and slider/cutter around average-to-plus potential (especially the slider), with the curve and change as developmental pieces for lefties. 

He has shown good spin aptitude and willingness to refine shapes (e.g., adding sweep, cutter, curve, and experimenting with splitter-like options in the past). Stuff+ metrics in tracking data have generally been around average or slightly above across the mix. 

He profiles more as a potential multi-inning reliever or back-end starter type depending on command and secondary consistency, with a history of filling the zone when healthy.


RVH - Building a Sustainable Winner — Part 1

 

What Milwaukee Has Built and Why Mets Fans Should Care

For Mets fans, Milwaukee is a useful place to begin a discussion about sustained winning. David Stearns provides an obvious connection, but the more interesting question extends beyond any one executive: how does an organization assemble enough talent to win today while preserving the ability to compete tomorrow?

The Brewers offer a compelling case. They have combined an excellent major-league team with affordable core production and a prospect pipeline that still contains significant upside. They also have injuries, uneven depth and expensive decisions ahead.

That combination deserves a closer look. Before assigning credit for how Milwaukee reached this point, we should establish what it actually possesses.

Start with the results

Over the past three regular seasons, Milwaukee has won 293 games and lost 193, a .603 winning percentage and an average of nearly 98 wins. All three seasons produced division titles.

Season

Record

Run differential

Postseason result

2024

93–69

+136

Lost Wild Card Series to the Mets

2025

97–65

+172

Reached the NLCS

2026

103–59

+214

Reached the World Series; outcome pending

The run differential is particularly useful. Milwaukee’s margin between runs scored and allowed has increased each year. That strengthens the argument that the team’s success reflects sustained quality rather than simply a favorable run of close games.

October matters, too. The Brewers have progressed from an early exit to consecutive trips beyond the Division Series, including this year’s pennant. The World Series remains ahead at this article’s October 18 cutoff.

Sources: MLB standings, historical records and 2026 NLCS result.

Affordable talent creates room to compete

The clearest illustration of Milwaukee’s roster economics is a group of six contributors.

Player

2026 FanGraphs WAR

Listed salary ($M)

Estimated market value ($M)*

Jacob Misiorowski

6.6

$0.79

$56.5

Brice Turang

5.9

$4.15

$50.2

Jackson Chourio

4.6

$7.25

$39.4

Jake Bauers

3.6

$2.70

$30.9

Garrett Mitchell

3.1

$0.95

$25.9

William Contreras

3.0

$9.40

$25.8

Combined, before rounding

26.9

$25.24

$228.7

WAR estimates a player’s contribution above replacement-level performance. It is imperfect, but useful for comparing production across different roles.

Estimated market value applies an illustrative $8.5 million per WAR to unrounded 2026 production, the midpoint of an $8–9 million range. This values the completed season’s output; it is not a forecast of what these players would receive in contracts. FanGraphs’ 2026 free-agent analysis found higher prices for stronger projected performers, so $8.5 million is a conservative comparison benchmark rather than a universal market rate.

Milwaukee paid approximately $940,000 per WAR for this six-player core. At our $8.5 million benchmark, its $25.2 million in listed salaries supported approximately $228.7 million of production value, an implied $203.5 million above salary. That is extraordinary value. Across the $8–9 million range, the production value is approximately $215–242 million.

These figures illustrate the value of the core’s realized performance. The comparison covers listed major-league salaries and excludes acquisition and development costs. It is also a deliberately selected group of successful players, so the roughly $1 million per WAR figure should not be mistaken for the cost efficiency of the entire Brewers roster.

The broader point is that affordable production gives an organization room to absorb injuries, disappointing contracts and other mistakes. Milwaukee’s estimated 2026 payroll is approximately $141.9 million. How that spending is distributed matters as much as the total.

Sources: FanGraphs RosterResource and payroll database.

Depth requires more than names

Our inventory covers 38 occupied 40-man roster spots, four additional pitchers on the 60-day injured list and the organization’s top 30 FanGraphs prospects. After removing overlap, that represents 70 players.

The useful question is how many can fill a particular need when it arises.

Milwaukee has several routes to starting innings behind Misiorowski. Logan Henderson and Robert Gasser have contributed, while Kyle Harrison, Shane Drohan and Chad Patrick offer further possibilities. However, moving a pitcher into the rotation also removes him from the bullpen pool. Injured pitchers such as Brandon Woodruff and Quinn Priester cannot simply be penciled into a healthy rotation.

The position-player picture has similar distinctions. There are alternatives behind the primary catchers, infielders and outfielders, but the quality of those alternatives varies. Having another outfielder available does not necessarily replace the offense lost when a productive starter is unavailable.

My assessment is that Milwaukee has useful depth, with pitching availability and offensive replacement quality deserving the closest attention.

The next wave still has value

FanGraphs’ top 30 includes five prospects graded at 50 future value or better: Jesús Made, Luis Peña, Brady Ebel, Tyson Hardin and Jeferson Quero. Made leads the group with a 65 grade. These are scouting assessments of future value, not guarantees of major-league production.

That is an important asset for a team already winning at the highest level. Milwaukee has potential contributors developing behind its current roster.

The timing is less certain. Made, Peña and Ebel concentrate considerable upside in young shortstop prospects. Their development could eventually create positional choices or trade opportunities. Hardin and Quero offer nearer-term possibilities at pitching and catcher.

The organization cannot assume every prospect arrives on schedule or fills the position that happens to need help. The value lies in having multiple opportunities to develop useful players, then making sound decisions as those opportunities become clearer.

Source: FanGraphs Updated Board, retrieved October 18.

Winning today changes tomorrow’s decisions

The six-player core will not remain equally inexpensive, and its production will not move in a straight line.

Turang and Mitchell face arbitration. Contreras has a club-option decision. Bauers is approaching free agency. Milwaukee must decide how much to pay for future production after benefiting from excellent current results.

Bauers and Mitchell illustrate why those evaluations require care. Mitchell’s 2026 offensive production was close to his career rate; increased playing time helped make the season more valuable. Bauers’ offensive performance was substantially above his career level. Their risks differ, even though both delivered excellent returns on their salaries.

Chourio provides contractual continuity. Misiorowski provides exceptional pitching upside. Neither removes the need for alternatives when a player gets hurt or falls short of his best season.

Sources: Mitchell, Bauers and contract status.

What this means for the Mets

My initial conclusion is that Milwaukee has built a credible foundation for sustained contention. The evidence is the combination of results, affordable major-league talent and remaining prospect upside.

The organization still has work to do. It needs dependable innings, sensible retention decisions and successful player development. A strong farm system becomes useful to the major-league team when prospects contribute or help acquire players who do.

For the Mets, the question is how greater financial resources can strengthen those same capabilities. Spending can retain valuable players, purchase depth and reduce the number of uncertainties a team must accept. The eventual comparison should assess what those resources produce in both present performance and future strength.

That gives us the central question for this series: 

How effectively does an organization turn its resources into sustained winning?

Milwaukee’s current position is an encouraging answer. Understanding how it replenishes that position is the next step.

Next: How Milwaukee keeps replenishing its roster, and which decisions have made the greatest difference.


Paul Articulates – Will the Mets go Long?


There are rumors from multiple sources that the New York Mets are interviewing former hitting coach Kevin Long for a position within the team.  The Mets current hitting coach, Troy Snitker is not rumored to be leaving, but the director of hitting Jeff Albert is not returning.

Kevin Long was the Mets’ hitting coach from the 2015 season through the 2017 season, and in my book he was one of the best hitting coaches this team has had.  When he left, the Mets hitting seemed to drop while the Nationals who hired Long began to improve.  

Long was recently the hitting coach with the Phillies, who we know could slug with the best teams.  

Take a look at the graph below which shows team performance in four different categories across the seasons with Kevin Long as hitting coach.  Each team that hired him had a positive trend in performance once he was onboard.


Does Kevin Long become the solution to the long-anemic Mets’ offense?  That is a difficult question to answer.  In 2015 when Long seemed to be working wonders with a Mets’ offense that propelled them to a World Series berth, the science of hitting was very much different than it is today.  

The team’s current struggles seem to reflect the inability to wrap their heads around how to use the new technology and maybe Long could bring some new perspective.  He seems to have evolved with the game because everywhere he goes, hitters improve.  

With the technology, budget, and staff that is available in the Cohen era, it would be easy to project that Long could do tremendous things.


10/21/26

MACK – Let’s Revisit - LHRP - Nate Lavender

 


MACK – Let’s Revisit - LHRP - Nate Lavender

Nate Lavender (New York Mets LHP, #94) is a left-handed reliever with a funky/deceptive delivery and a four-pitch mix centered on a high-usage four-seam fastball. 

He debuted in MLB on August 4, 2026, and has posted strong early results (1.88 ERA, 0.98 WHIP, 17 K in 14.1 IP through mid-September). 2026 MLB Pitch Mix (Statcast / Pitcher List data)
  • Four-seam fastball: ~68–69% usage, averages ~92.3–92.4 mph (tops out in the mid-90s).
    Induced vertical break (IVB) around 18 inches with some arm-side run. Below-average velocity for a modern reliever but generates above-average whiffs (especially up in the zone) due to deception, extension, lower release/approach angle, and “rising” action. Hitters often swing under it. Strong run value so far.
  • Slider: ~15–16% usage, averages ~84.8–85.0 mph.
    Glove-side break; more traditional/shorter break than the sweeper.
  • Sweeper: ~8% usage, averages ~79.3 mph.
    Bigger horizontal (glove-side) break.
  • Changeup: ~7–8% usage, averages ~81.1–81.2 mph.
    Arm-side fade/run with solid velocity separation from the fastball; used as a complement, particularly vs. righties.
Overall secondary usage is only about 31%. He leans heavily on the fastball (historically 60%+ even in the minors). Key Traits
  • Deception over pure velocity: Soft-tossing “funky lefty” profile. He has used a hesitation/pause in his delivery (inspired by Nestor Cortes) and a slingy three-quarters arm slot that creates a lower release and natural movement. This helps the fastball play up significantly.
  • Stuff quality: Average-to-slightly-above Stuff+ in available models (around 100–101 overall in recent samples; fastball and secondaries grade near or slightly above average). High strikeout rates in the minors (often 40%+ K%) have translated early in MLB (~31% K%). Good ground-ball tendencies at times and excellent command/strike-throwing in his debut stretch (very low walk rate).
  • Background notes: Drafted by the Mets in the 14th round (2021) out of Illinois. Rose quickly as a high-K reliever prospect before UCL/elbow issues (missed most of 2024–2025, including a Rule 5 stint with Tampa Bay). Returned to the Mets organization and earned the 2026 call-up after strong Triple-A numbers.
2026 - 

In short, it’s a classic crafty lefty repertoire that relies on deception, location, and the fastball’s unexpected effectiveness rather than elite velocity or pure “stuff.”

2026 - MLB/METS - 21-apps, 1-0, 1.66, 0.73, 21.2-IP, 4-BB, 26-K

Early MLB results have been excellent in a high-leverage/setup role for the Mets.