What has to stop and why?
Lots of things have to stop. Playing minor league quality baseball. Doing so listlessly and without shame. Pretending that it's not what it appears to be or as bad as it looks to be on the surface. (It is exactly what it appears to be, and it is exactly as bad as it appears to be. There is no glossing over the mess). Stop playing individuals who haven't earned the playing time. (That's called 'accountability'). Defending the situation as 'part of the process.' Embarrassment is never a part of plan for success. It is a sign of the urgency of the situation.
Why stop? Because the organization has to be intentional, accountable and transparent. Admit the obvious: the existing strategy for putting a team together that can compete now while setting up for long term sustained success has failed spectacularly. If anything, admit that the plan to compete over the next two years while the prospects high in the organization are groomed as replacements for those traded away or let go in free agency, has been completely and unequivocally, a disaster. Admit moreover that the development of the 'replacements' has taken a giant step backwards.
If you don't come out and admit it, you will lose fan support and trust. Both are essential elements of a sustained relationship between the organization and its fan base. Why would you want to pretend the fan base isn't seeing what they are seeing. This is a sophisticated fan base. Respect their intelligence. Give the fans a reason to trust you. Not possible if you are trying to deceive them about what they see-- what we all see.
Why stop? Because you don't want to develop your rising stars in a losing environment, and not just because losing can be contagious. Losing can be draining and dispiriting, which is worse. Moreover, your rising stars need to learn how to win; they need to cultivate winning habits and attitudes. You are counting on them to be leaders at some point, and you will want them to mentor the coming waves of rising players. You want them to help those that follow cultivate winning habits, take pride in their performance and hold themselves and others to high standards of conduct and performance. How can you expect them to do that growing up in an environment that not only tolerates losing, but expects it.
Why stop? Because you don't want your generational talent superstar to feel that he made a mistake and look for ways to leverage his way out of the situation. You need him to be committed more than you need anyone else to be. If he is committed that's the sort of leadership by action that has a positive influence on everyone else. If he begins to look for reasons to take days off, walks around the clubhouse in a dour mood, stays entirely to himself, etc. it exacerbates and legitimates poor behavior and indifference among others.
A losing atmosphere that adversely impacts your young stars and your superstar can lead to a toxic environment that will set the organization back years.
You can't risk either, let alone both.
And you don't have a fan base willing to give you the benefit of the doubt, because you've done nothing to earn it.
You have to be clear that you are being intentional about putting an end to this unacceptable dumpster fire. Why? Because you have no choice.
Don't even try to point out the good things that have occurred even during this fallow (to put it mildly) period. Everyone knows there has been some good, but the point is not to take an accounting of debits and assets as if this were some sort of accounting exercise. It's an exercise in accountability, not account. Own up then shut up.
Act don't talk! That's the only way everyone will see that you are cutting ties with the past and owning the future.
The three step to do list: one down, two to go.
1. Relieve the manager of his duties.
Done. Mendoza is a likable person and by all accounts a good baseball man. This is a game of outcomes, however, and Mendoza did not add value. Adding value is part of the job. Mendoza will not be the first first-time manager whose career has not gotten off to the start he, the FO and the fan base had hoped for. He will land on his feet as a bench coach somewhere and hopefully in time have another opportunity to establish himself as a major league manager. This is not a blame game. He didn't succeed. Period. I wish him well and hope he gets another opportunity and learns from this one. That's all he wants. If he earns it, good for him.
2. Add a GM to the FO.
It's easy to underestimate the organizational issues that David Stearns faced since taking over. The organizational operations have improved dramatically, but it has not been reflected in performance on the field at either the major or minor league levels. Creating a sustained winning organization requires both baseball and non-directly baseball related oraganizational and structural changes. The Mets have made real strides on the structural side under Stearns, but far fewer, if any, on the performance side.
They have, however, improved their drafting/signing of young talent -- especially international players. I think it fair to say that Stearns' record on free agents and trades has not been good. His roster construction techniques and strategies have not borne fruit, largely, on my view, because they have been ill-conceived.
It doesn't help matters that he has come as disingenuous in explaining what the strategy has been and why it has not worked.
When he says he believes in the players they have, it is because he believes in the back of their 'trading cards'. They are who their trading cards say they are.
But he has surely relied on a very odd interpretive theory to assess what the back of the trading cards reveals about who various players are! After all, the back of their trading cards would tell you that Montas, Robert, Polanco, are injuries waiting to happen; that Polanco has never played meaningful minutes, let alone games, at 1B. that in contrast: that Peralta is a 5 inning pitcher, and so on,
And by the way, that Alonso's card says he always shows up, cares, works to get better, and gives what he has every day, injured or healthy. It screams that, if his performance diminishes at all as he ages through a five year contract, it won't be because of lack of effort or commitment, and it won't be because of injury; and if he diminishes at all, which he almost certainly will, it will be at a slower rate than the norm. If he isn't a safe bet to succeed, what on earth would make you think that Polanco is, or that you will get Alonso performance from others at a lower cost.
He has also put together a mismatched team. I am not alone in thinking that you don't move players around to fill gaps when doing so makes two positions less high performing. I totally get versatility and optionality, but how many players are you willing to play out of position in the name of run reduction. I mean, does that even make any sense at all?
IMHO, it comes down to the fact that Stearns is not a 'baseball man.' He hasn't played the game, and has only a fans' feel for it. He is not a student of it. He has no developed sense of the real importance of fit -- in all of its many dimensions.
And I say that as a big fan and supporter of Stearns. He is very good at what he is good at, and that does not mean that he is good at everything that is involved in baseball.
The solution here is for Cohen to take the initiative and insist that the team hire a GM who is above all else a baseball man. His explanation for doing so is not that he is demoting Stearns, just increasing the number of voices and perspectives within the front office.
This should be an early off-season priority, and because Stearns' record on trades is very spotty at best, there is a concern, not unfounded, that the Mets may lose opportunities or make poor decisions at the trade deadline.
I get it. It's a legitimate concern, but trades will have to be made: some, I hope are additive as well. It's a risk, but I think Stearns is well aware of how his previous decisions have been received. I expect that he has been suitably chastened by the criticism.
3. Translating Technology into Performance:
A 'baseball man/woman' as GM is necessary, but not sufficient, to cure what ails the Mets front office. A baseball first GM would fill a void that Stearns is not capable of filling himself.
I have been impressed by listening to Andrew Green in various press conference circumstances since he has taken on the Interim Manager role. He has a feel for the game, a very positive and supportive attitude but prepared to call out shortcomings -- even with a bit of an edge, but not harshly. I admire those skills.
It's a plus that he will also be part of the FO as Vice President of Player Development, joining a GM with baseball experience. Even with two baseball voices joining an organizational expert in Stern, there is still a gap that needs to be filled.
It is important to note that the development of the Mets minor league prospects under Green's watch has been noteworthy for all the wrong reasons.
My colleagues at Mack's Mets have done a great job pointing out how dismal the hitting and pitching has been this year; hitting has been notoriously poor in Brooklyn and Binghamton, and starting pitching hasn't been much better at Syracuse and Binghamton. Worse, the pitching and hitting of players whose performance last year pushed them to the top of the list of Mets' prospects has been especially disappointing.
Something is clearly wrong with the talent development program.
Here's my take on what that is. I have no visibility into the talent development strategies that the Mets are deploying. But I do have some thoughts about the limits of technology, and the science of learning movement patterns.
Translating Technology into performance: understanding what the data tells us
It is very easy to become enamored of technology in most areas, includin sports. I have seen it happen in soccer and especially in golf. It is now happening in baseball as many of the tools employed by golf coaches for years have found their way into hitting and pitching labs. Spin rates and ground reaction forces which have become the meat and potatoes of much golf instruction are now attaining near-biblical status in pitching and hitting labs.
Force plates can measure how players use the ground, the peaks of lateral, rotational and vertical force the player generates and in what sequence. Trackman can determine spin rates, and the optimizer function can be deployed to identify optimal spin rates at various speeds, and so on. Sportsbox Ai apps can identify pelvic sway and Hackmotion can identify changes in wrist flexion/extension throughout a motion. And so on. It's downright overwhelming what can be measured.
The value of what is being measured is of course an entirely different matter.
Still, once measurements can be attained, the next step is the development of averages, norms and baselines -- among tour golfers, or high quality hitters and pitchers. Then, once averages are identified, invariably, a player is evaluated in terms of the extent to which his numbers fall within 'tour average' If not, a correction or change is called for.
It's fancier because numbers are attached, but the underlying flaw with this approach is no different than the flaw associated with the period of teaching that was based on slow motion videos of the best hitting and pitching motions.
Put up a picture of lefty Brennan throwing his curveball and fastball alongside a slow motion video of Sandy Koufax doing the same. Notice the positions Koufax hits as he moves through steps from the beginning of his motion through his release of the ball. Catch a look at his grip, the angles of his left wrist, when he lands on his bracing front foot, and everything else you want to look at. Then compare his picture, treating it as a model of excellence, with the young lefty Steve Brennan. Just like Koufax here and there, but...... We have to get him looking more like Koufax.
Really? I could work like crazy and make my motion look more like Nolan Ryan's or Tom Seaver's to no avail, since the numbers and the pictures don't tell me anything about the movement pattern, including, especially whether it is an effective movement pattern for me.
The fact is that everything being measured is an outcome of a movement. It does not identify what the cause of that outcome is. And it most definitely does not do three things of paramount importance. It doesn't tell either the coach or the player whether the player is capable of creating the motion that produces the desired numbers, nor how to do so -- including whether the way is healthy for the player. After all, there are many ways of producing the same outcome, not all of which are healthy, not all of which are consistent with the player's general movement patterns. Nor does it tell us whether hitting those numbers improves my actual performance.
If that weren't bad enough, the technology tells us nothing about how the requisite motions and movements are to be learned.
I can provide numerous simple examples. Just think on this. Let's suppose there is an optimal launch angle for every hitter, for every speed at which they swing, that will increase the number of home runs they could hit while swinging at that speed. Figure that number out for every player in baseball.
Doesn't tell you whether making that adjustment is right for any player at all, given its consequences on other parts of his game. We all saw how changing Nimmo's launch angle completely changed the kind of hitter he became. He was an on base machine before the change, working counts, driving pitcher's nuts. Not so much since the change. After all the pitchers will adjust and he will not see the pitches as often that he can do damage with given his new launch angle. And he will be able to do less damage with the pitches he sees now than he once was able to do.
And to be honest, the bat speed increase may come at the expense of reducing the extent to which a hitter can barrel up pitches. Alvarez is a good example of this. Given the way he gets bat speed (through his upper body early rotation and the movement of his arms, that affects his path in ways I have demonstrated in my videos on him, it is clear that it has an impact on his barreling balls, which, alas, has had an impact on his home run production, and not a good impact either. Poor impact on the bat; poor impact on home runs.
So I am skeptical about how the numbers get used for several reasons, not the least of which is that the game being played is not like golf. The pitcher and hitters are not static objects like a golf ball that has no job other than to respond to how the club interacts with it. The pitchers interact with the hitters in way the golf ball can't and vice versa.
We cannot assume that because a player's numbers are suboptimal when measured against an optimized set of numbers that the player should change what they are doing. Sometimes we can make that inference, i.e. when the movement pattern is wildly inefficient, adversely impacts the path of the swing of a hitter, the delivery slot of a pitcher, or is unhealthy for either.
Under other circumstances, various major changes are likely to lead to the need for new compensations elsewhere in the chain. The outcomes can and often are more harmful than beneficial on balance.
Translating Technology into Performance: How people learn movement patterns
But even when a change is called for and worth the costs of undertaking a movement pattern change, there remains the question of how to teach it. And this is the second area in which development programs can go all wrong. New patterns do not stick if the fundamental change one is asked to make is not major enough for the player to experience it as fundamentally different and uncomfortable.
But if it is fundamentally uncomfortable, players will have difficulty sticking to it especially if early outcomes of it are unsuccessful. Time is of the essence for professional athletes whose careers are short to begin with.
Real developmental success is also not a matter of teaching. I can give you all the information in the world, but you won't learn any of it, if I fail to do it in a way that is consistent with the way you learn and what we know about how people learn in general.
Learning is a form of discovery: sometimes mutual discovery between player and coach, sometimes self discovery.
I could go on -- as I often do, but I think I've made the point I want to.
If the Mets hope to make optimal use of technologies that they have bought into and use in their labs, they need individuals who can interpret the data -- no data interprets itself; they need to personalize the plans for each player, and they need movement pattern instructors in their system. Otherwise they are more likely to see regression and despair than progress and genuine excellence emerge.
The technology is a tool, but whether it is a useful or destructive tool is a matter not just of how it is used, but in the first instance on understanding what the data actually shows.
These devices are valuable, but they are oversold on what they actually tell us. Treating the computer print-outs as sacred texts is not only unwarranted; it can prove to be an impediment to improvement.
Conclusion:
1. You can't create winners in a losing environment, especially one in which losing is expected.
2. The team has to win to create habits and expectations of winning.
3. To get there the Mets have to put a stop to the path they have been on, acknowledge the error of their ways and take steps to show that they have given thought to what went wrong and rather than dwell on the past, they are taking a fresh start.
4. The first step in that action plan is to relieve the manager of his duties.
5. The second is to bring in a baseball man/woman as the GM/
6. The third is to reorient the approach to player development, by bringing in individuals who can help the coaches and players assess accurately what the data actually shows, and can assess what the best way forward is for each particular player, and help devise plans that each player and coach can execute.
7. Executing these plans for each player who needs to make changes requires time being spent with pattern movement specialists and creating discovery or learning environments.
Then we can talk about roster construction!
