11/6/26

MACK – Let’s Revisit - RHSP - Calvin Ziegler

 


MACK – Let’s Revisit - RHSP - Calvin Ziegler


Calvin Ziegler (often spelled Ziegler) is a right-handed pitcher in the New York Mets’ minor league system. Born October 3, 2002, in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada (hometown Heidelberg, a small town nearby), he is 6'0", 205 lbs, and bats/throws right-handed. 

The Mets selected him very highly (in the second round, 46th overall) of the 2021 MLB Draft out of TNXL Academy in Florida (he relocated from Canada during COVID restrictions to gain exposure). 

He signed for $910,000 (underslot). He has been a high-upside but injury-plagued prospect. Early on, he ranked as high as around the top 10–15 in the Mets system (e.g., Amazin’ Avenue No. 11 in 2023). 

Injuries, however, have limited his development significantly:

  • 2022 (Low-A St. Lucie): First pro season — 16 starts, 46.2 IP, 4.44 ERA, 70 K / 35 BB (strong strikeout rate but high walks). Missed time with biceps tendinitis.
  • 2023: Limited to 1 inning after offseason elbow bone spur removal and a torn right quad.
  • 2024 (High-A Brooklyn): Dominant early (6 IP, 0 ER, 13 K, 2 BB in 2 starts, including a strong outing with 9 K), then Tommy John surgery in April. Missed the rest of 2024 and all of 2025.
  • 2026: Returning from TJ. Rehab assignments, then activated with Brooklyn (High-A). Limited work (13.1-IP). 
Headed to the Arizona Fall League to supplement his MILB 2026 innings, where his control has been shaky.

Career minors totals (through available 2026 data): roughly 0-7, 4.62 ERA in about 64 IP with a high K rate but elevated walks. FanGraphs rates him around a 35+ FV prospect with ETA ~2027 and org rank outside the top tier due to the injuries and substandard command. RepertoireZiegler has shown mid-90s velocity with swing-and-miss potential, though command has been the biggest hurdle (high walk rates historically). Mechanics feature a high three-quarters arm slot with a loose, fluid delivery and good extension.

  • Fastball: Sits 91–95 mph (averaging ~93 in 2022 pro debut), has touched 96–97. Features arm-side run/ride up in the zone and some sink lower; effective due to approach angle and extension more than elite spin. Graded around 55 present / 60 future on some scales. High strikeout pitch when located.
  • Curveball / spike curve (his primary breaking ball): Low-80s (around 80–83 mph, averaging ~82). 11-5 to near 12-6 shape with sharp bite and depth; not a pure horizontal slider (he has described it as tighter and more curve-like). Strongest secondary in many reports for whiffs and weak contact; graded ~55. Command has been inconsistent (often outside the zone).
  • Slider: Some scouting reports and FanGraphs list a distinct slider (50/60 grades), low-80s with horizontal action. Earlier amateur looks sometimes labeled the curve as a slider/slurve hybrid.
  • Changeup / splitter: Mid-80s (83–86). Shows fade, tumble/sink, and arm speed maintenance. Developed more in pro ball (including a split-finger variation); still a work in progress for consistency and usage but flashes promise as a third pitch.
Overall profile: 

High-strikeout arm with above-average to plus stuff potential (especially FB + curve), but raw command and lack of durability have held him back. 

Pre-injury looks suggested possible mid-rotation upside if the control improves and he stays healthy; the TJ recovery and limited 2026 innings leave his current trajectory more uncertain (potential starter or power reliever path). He attacks hitters aggressively when healthy.






Reese Kaplan --- An Under the Radar First Base Option to Consider


So for all of the brouhaha over the prospect of luring Teruaki Sato to the Mets and converting him to play first base it would seem that the alternatives are not exactly exciting.  Many available Jared Young platoon partners are available but they are not star quality by any stretch.  

Some might make the case that World Series winner Jake Bauers is a late bloomer and a lock to hit 25-30 HRs for his new employer but that signing would warrant well over $23 million in salary for one good year and a draft pick compensation to the Brewers who extended him a QO.  That seems an awfully high price to pay for a career .223 hitter who will be 31 for the 2027 season.  

The others on the list include decent but not stellar players like Ty France.  Josh Bell is available as a free agent but he’s not had a great answer either.  He’s been splitting time between 1B and DH.  You can pencil him in for over 20 HRs and a .256 bating average but the Twins felt he was not worth his $10 million option going into his age 34 season.  

One recent Pacific posting was announced by the Korean team called the Hanwha Eagles in Daejeon.  Seeking to transition to MLB the Eagles made slugger Si Hwan Roh available to interested bidders.  Unlike Sato, Roh is pretty much flying under the radar.  Let’s take a brief look at him.

Now at age 25 Roh has been playing for Hanwha since debuting in 2019 as an 18 year old rookie.  

Twice during this tenure he eclipsed the 30 HR mark and interestingly unlike most power hitters he does not fan at an alarming rate.  

This past season his worst mark with 147 Ks, but to accompany that he hit 29 HRs and drove in 96 while hitting .283.  


While he’s primarily been a third baseman, he’s also logged 84 games playing first and surprisingly 42 games at shortstop.  At 6 feet tall and 211 pounds he doesn’t profile on paper as a middle infielder.  His high water mark in stolen bases was in 2025 with 14.  Defensively the best aspect of his game is his throwing arm but one metrics site has him at a D- for how he handles his glove.  Moving him to 1B or DH would likely be appropriate.

So what would he cost?  Right now Roh is in the middle of an 11 year contract worth $23 million in US dollars.  At a current rate of just over $2 million per season it would not take a major investment to lure him over to the more lucrative and high profile major league baseball.

Everyone knows that taking chances on unproven ballplayers from the Asian leagues is always fraught with some trepidation upon adjustment periods and better daily pitching to battle.  Given his young age you would think he would still have room to improve his game and matching his current contract over a shorter period of time could prove a starting point for negotiations.  

If you proposed paying him $6 million per year for 4 years it would not bankrupt the team and would ensure he had a long term shot at performing in MLB.  Of course he would want more money but he’s nowhere near what Sato would command. 


11/5/26

MACK – STRIKE NEWS UPDATE

 


No active strike or lockout is underway yet, but a lockout by MLB owners is widely expected once the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expires on December 1, 2026 (at 11:59 p.m. ET).⁠

The main dispute centers on economics. Owners are pushing for a hard salary cap and floor (the first serious proposal of this kind since the 1994-95 strike that canceled the World Series). The MLB Players Association (MLBPA) has firmly rejected any salary cap and views it as a non-starter.⁠

Latest developments

MLB made a new proposal: a projected salary cap of about $258.2 million and a floor of $180.2 million, with implementation delayed until the 2028 season (to give teams time to adjust payrolls). It framed this as roughly a 50-50 revenue split (with some notes on how amateur bonuses factor in). The current competitive balance tax system would remain for 2027 under this plan.⁠

The MLBPA quickly rejected it, stating that owners continue to propose “blowing up the current system and replacing it with one designed to line their pockets and increase their franchise values.” Players have counter-proposals focused on higher minimum salaries, expanded free agency/arbitration rights, a higher competitive balance tax threshold, increased revenue sharing, and other benefits without a hard cap.⁠

Negotiations have been ongoing since earlier in 2026, but little substantive progress has been reported on the core economic divide. A lockout is viewed as nearly certain, with the key question being its length.⁠

Context and potential impact

The current five-year CBA was agreed to in March 2022 after a 99-day owner lockout that delayed the start of that season (but preserved a full schedule once resolved).

Free agency is open now, but a lockout would freeze major-league transactions, player-club contact (for 40-man roster players), and use of team facilities.

The 2027 season is scheduled to start around March 24; spring training is set for mid-to-late February. A prolonged stoppage could delay or shorten it. Experts note the risk of lost games if talks drag on, similar to historical work stoppages.⁠

In short, the sides remain far apart primarily over the salary cap issue. Expect a lockout to begin in early December unless a surprise agreement is reached in the coming weeks. Talks are led by MLB Deputy Commissioner Dan Halem (with Commissioner Rob Manfred) and MLBPA interim Executive Director Bruce Meyer.

RVH - Building a Sustainable Winner: Part 3: The Stearns Inheritance

 

Milwaukee’s success raises an obvious question for Mets fans: 

How much of what we see today was built by David Stearns?

My assessment is that Stearns left a substantial foundation for sustained success. Matt Arnold and the organization continued developing it, made important additions and produced results that deserve their own credit.

Understanding that distinction matters. If we want Milwaukee’s experience to help us evaluate the Mets, we need to identify what Stearns actually contributed, what he inherited and what happened after he stepped aside.

Start with the right handoff date

Stearns relinquished control of baseball operations on October 27, 2022. Arnold took over, while Stearns remained in an advisory role. mlb.com

That makes the end of the 2022 season our primary handoff point. His continued presence in the organization during 2023 should not cause us to assign that year’s decisions automatically to him.

There is another complication: Arnold had worked alongside Stearns since 2015. This was a leadership transition within an established organization. mlb.com

We can reasonably identify who held final responsibility for a decision. We usually cannot determine how much each scout, coach, analyst or executive contributed to it.

What did the results show?

The three-year comparisons provide a useful starting point:

Period

Regular-season record

Winning percentage

Postseason achievement

Stearns’ first three seasons: 2016–2018

255–232

.524

One appearance; reached the 2018 NLCS

Stearns’ final three seasons in charge: 2020–2022

210–174

.547

Two appearances; no series wins

Arnold’s first three seasons in charge: 2023–2025

282–204

.580

Three division titles; reached the 2025 NLCS

Latest three-season window: 2024–2026

293–193

.603

Three division titles; won the 2026 NL pennant

Totals calculated from annual results. The shortened 2020 season makes winning percentage more useful than raw win totals. The final two rows overlap and are not independent comparisons. The 2026 World Series remains ahead as of this writing. StatMuse

The record supports two conclusions.

First, Milwaukee became a recurring contender during Stearns’ tenure. Second, the organization continued improving after the leadership transition.

Those later results are consistent with a strong inheritance and effective subsequent management. The standings alone cannot tell us how to divide the credit.

The inheritance included players at different stages

The organization Stearns left contained established major leaguers, developing players and prospects whose best seasons were still ahead.

That mix is central to the story. A successor inherits more than the opening-day lineup.

Player or asset

Acquisition under Stearns’ leadership

What carried forward

Brice Turang

First-round pick, 2018

A developing player who became part of the current core

Garrett Mitchell

First-round pick, 2020

An outfielder whose major league career was just beginning at the handoff

Jackson Chourio

International signing, 2021

Significant young talent requiring further development and a retention decision

Jacob Misiorowski

Second-round pick, 2022

A newly drafted pitcher with most of his development still ahead

Robert Gasser and Esteury Ruiz

Acquired in the 2022 Hader trade

Pitching talent and an asset available for a subsequent trade

Acquisition history: FanGraphs RosterResource and MLB transaction reporting. FanGraphs Baseball

These examples make the Stearns connection tangible. Several players central to our current roster analysis entered the organization while he was in charge.

They also demonstrate why acquisition credit should not become exclusive credit. Selecting Misiorowski in 2022 and turning him into a major league contributor involved work across both leadership periods.

Chourio presents the same distinction. The initial signing belonged to one period; his continued development, major league opportunity and long-term contract extended into another.

Stearns also inherited important talent

A fair assessment must apply the same standard backward.

Brandon Woodruff was drafted in 2014. Devin Williams was drafted in 2013. Both entered Milwaukee’s system before Stearns arrived. Baseball-Reference.com

Josh Hader also arrived before Stearns, through Milwaukee’s 2015 deadline trade with Houston. mlb.com

Their subsequent development and use became part of the Stearns-era success. Their original acquisition belongs to the preceding administration.

That does not diminish Stearns’ contribution. Developing and retaining inherited talent is an essential part of running a baseball organization. It does establish that Milwaukee’s success spans more than one executive’s tenure.

The same principle applies to Arnold today.

The Hader transaction connects three administrations

The Hader sequence is particularly useful because it shows how value can travel through an organization.

Milwaukee acquired Hader before Stearns. Stearns later traded him in a package that included Gasser and Ruiz. After Arnold assumed control, Ruiz became the outgoing asset in the transaction bringing William Contreras and two pitchers. mlb.com

The credit therefore has several components:

Stage

Contribution

Original acquisition

The preceding administration brought Hader into the organization

Development and major league use

Milwaukee converted that talent into substantial production

Stearns’ 2022 decision

Exchanged Hader for a package including future assets

Arnold’s subsequent decision

Converted Ruiz into a different package suited to Milwaukee’s needs

Calling Contreras simply a “Stearns acquisition” would obscure Arnold’s decision. Treating the transaction as unrelated to Stearns would ignore the asset Arnold used.

This is also where hindsight requires restraint. The eventual return does not settle every question about the timing of the Hader trade or its immediate effect on a contending team.

Milwaukee finished 2022 outside the playoffs. That outcome belongs in the evaluation alongside the later benefits.

Arnold’s contribution goes beyond managing inherited players

The current roster contains meaningful acquisitions made after the handoff.

Bauers and Trevor Megill arrived in 2023. Joey Ortiz arrived in the 2024 Burnes trade. Chourio’s extension was another consequential decision made after Stearns stepped aside. FanGraphs Baseball

The prospect system has continued changing as well. Jesús Made and Luis Peña signed in January 2024. mlb.com

Their presence matters to our assessment. The next generation includes talent acquired after Stearns’ departure, alongside prospects inherited from his tenure.

Organizational continuity can help explain that success. It cannot justify assigning every subsequent good decision to the former leader. Arnold’s staff still had to evaluate players, allocate resources, manage setbacks and make choices.

What can we reasonably conclude?

The evidence supports a strong, qualified judgment: 

Stearns helped build an organization capable of sustaining contention beyond his own tenure.

His contribution is visible in players acquired under his leadership, assets available to his successor and the competitive position at the handoff.

The record also shows that Milwaukee continued progressing under Arnold. The successor’s work added value to what was inherited.

There is no defensible basis here for assigning Stearns a precise percentage of the current team’s success. Acquisition dates can be counted. Coaching, development, judgment and organizational continuity cannot be divided that neatly.

For Mets fans, the useful question is whether Stearns can create similar advantages in New York: productive acquisitions, a continuing supply of young talent, useful trade assets and enough depth to keep the club competitive through change.

Cohen’s resources give him additional options. Those resources still need to translate into production and sustained results.

Our next installment will compare Milwaukee and the Mets as they stand today: 

The quality of their players, the depth behind them, the cost of the roster and the years of control still available.

That comparison will help us assess how far New York has progressed toward the kind of organizational strength Milwaukee has demonstrated.


Paul Articulates - Run the option


The MLB deadline for teams and players to exercise contractual options has now passed, and there is a substantial list of names because contracts now are frequently negotiated with options to use flexibility as an enticement.

With the CBA expiration date of December 1st looming, the decision to exercise or decline an option becomes more complicated.  

Will things like salary caps and floors change the dynamics of the free agent market?  Of course!  So if you are a free agent and the rules change, you head into uncertainty.  This did not necessarily sway the bulk of the decisions though, as there were more declined options (21) than exercised options (17).  

There also was one unique option, which was a vesting option that goes into effect if the player meets certain performance criteria.  This was accomplished by Yandy Diaz of the Rays who earned his $13M salary for next year by achieving 500 at-bats and ending the year healthy.  Personally I like this type of option because it incentivizes performance and health maintenance.  Take note, David Stearns!

The following list of players and options gives more insight into the names that have just entered the free agent market and those that have shut the door.  

Many starting pitchers are on the list, which may be intriguing to a Mets front office that needs to add in that category.  Unfortunately, Sandy Alacantra, Corbin Burnes, and Drew Anderson were opt-ins so they are not available as FAs.  Michael King, Sonny Gray, Lucas Giolito, Dustin May, Nick Pivetta, Nick Martinez, and old friend Griffin Canning were opted out and are now available.


Other interesting names included on the list were the expected team option declines on former Mets Ryne Stanek, Luis Robert Jr., Gary Sanchez, and Canning.   Eugenio Suarez had his $16M option declined by the Reds, which would have been interesting news had Bo Bichette not passed on his opt-out.

Of the 21 names that did not have their options exercised and have returned to the greater free agent market, there are not many other than King and Gray that look like big plays for the Mets’ needs.  

Stearns may see others as potential depth pieces, but with the current crop of almost-ready minor league players in the system at middle infield and outfield positions, the only need for “depth” would be at first base or a relief pitcher.

Keep your eye on the market, as the dominoes will begin to fall as soon as the top of the market (Skubal) makes a decision.