MACK - Top 28 Prospects - #6 - RHRP - Dylan Ross

 

The excitement about the Mets' prospect pipeline has been building year over year as the team improves their domestic and international scouting.  Many of the Mets' picks are being discussed throughout baseball, so Mack has boiled it down to the top 28 to give the readers a glimpse into the team's future.  This series will run for 28 days, counting down from #28 to #1.  The entire list can be viewed by clicking "2026 Top 28 Prospects" on the top menu bar.

6.     Dylan Ross

2025:          A+/AA/AAA –

       49-APPS, 2-0, 2.17, 1.15, 19-GF, 7-SV, 54-IP, 80-K, 33-BB

GROK -

Dylan Ross is a 25-year-old right-handed relief pitcher for the New York Mets organization, known for his overpowering fastball and swing-and-miss breaking stuff.

Standing at an imposing 6'5" and weighing 251 pounds, he's a physical presence on the mound with a high-three-quarters arm slot that generates elite velocity.

Born on September 1, 2000, in Statesboro, Georgia, Ross has quickly risen through the Mets' farm system after a challenging path marked by injuries, culminating in his major league call-up in late September 2025.

Ross began pitching at Eastern Kentucky University in the 2020 season (shortened by COVID-19), where he made three relief appearances with a 2.25 ERA over four innings.

He transferred to Northwest Florida State College (a junior college) in 2021, posting a strong 6-2 record with a 3.88 ERA in 12 starts, including two complete games, 77 strikeouts, and just 28 walks in 60.1 innings.  This performance earned him All-Panhandle Conference Second Team honors.

In 2022, Ross moved to the University of Georgia, where he went 1-0 with a 3.00 ERA in two starts before undergoing Tommy John surgery, which sidelined him for the rest of the year and the entire 2023 season (including a UCL revision).

Draft and Pro Debut:

Despite the injuries, the Mets selected him in the 13th round (389th overall) of the 2022 MLB Draft out of Georgia, signing him for $125,000.  He didn't pitch professionally until a brief September 2024 debut in the minors.

2025 Breakout: Ross exploded onto the scene, starting in High-A Brooklyn (10 appearances, 23 strikeouts in 11⅔ innings, allowing just 5 hits), earning promotions to Double-A Binghamton (11 appearances, 18 strikeouts) and Triple-A Syracuse by June.

His pitches generate elite whiff rates, with opponents struggling to make contact (e.g., just 11 hits across his early 2025 minor league outings).

Four-Seam Fastball

Hard, explosive heater with significant ride and life up in the zone; his primary pitch for overpowering hitters.

97-102 mph (peaks at 102 mph in 2025)

High usage (~50-60%); generates weak contact and sets up breaking stuff. Flirts with triple-digit velocity, making it a true separator.

Splitter

Devastating off-speed pitch with sharp drop, variable movement (some cut, others with run/sink), and late tumble; mimics his fastball out of the hand for tunneling.

86-90 mph

Key swing-and-miss offering (49.4% whiff rate in minors); thrown ~25-30% of the time. Often described as his "best secondary" for inducing chases below the zone.

Slider

Tight, late-breaking slider with gyro spin for horizontal snap; complements the splitter by attacking right-handed hitters inside.

85-88 mph

~20% usage; elite 67.3% whiff rate at Triple-A Syracuse in 2025. High-spin version creates awkward angles and empty swings.

Ross occasionally mixes in a curveball or changeup in lower-leverage spots, but his core three pitches form a "fantastic arsenal" that has fueled his rapid ascent.

Scouts project him as a high-leverage reliever (think 7th/8th inning fireman).

 

David Stearns on Dylan Ross:

"Dylan's a guy who's going to come to camp with a chance to make our team. We would expect him to contribute throughout the season next year"

 

11-6-2025

Tom Brennan/MM

16. RHP Dylan Ross

Ross  is a high power reliever. K Machine. In his first 3 pro years, in 2022-2024, the hulking fireballing righty threw one inning, total, and fanned the side. In 2025, he made up for lost time, finishing up in AAA.  54 innings, 80 Ks, 2.17 ERA.  7 of 9 in saves, 9 holds.  Clocked at over 100 MPH.

Control needs tightening, but it is hard to envision him not being a major bullpen piece in 2026.

 

11-7-2025

Just Baseball

https://www.justbaseball.com/prospects/new-york-mets-top-15-prospects/  

Dylan Ross – RHP – (MLB): A 13th round pick in 2022, Ross did not make his pro debut until the end of the 2024 season after requiring UCL revision surgery to rectify the initial Tommy John surgery he underwent just two starts into his 2022 season. After his brief cameo in 2024, Ross burst onto the scene in 2025, climbing from High-A to Triple-A, pitching to a 2.17 ERA in 54 innings with 80 strikeouts.

Ross’s fastball averages 98 MPH with a wipeout splitter working off of it in the low 90s. Across all three levels in 2025, opponents hit below .100 against Ross’s split. He’ll also mix in an above average slider. Ross has big league leverage stuff if the command can improve (he walked 15% of batters in 2025).

Needing to protect him from the Rule 5 Draft anyway, the Mets added Ross to the big-league roster at very the end of the season, but he never made it into a game. Now on the 40, Ross should be squarely in consideration for big league opportunities early in 2026.

 

1-12-2026

ANGRY MIKE/MM

DYLAN ROSS ->  PHASE ONE

Ross is the closest to being MLB-ready and is one of the hardest throwers in the organization, with a 65-scouting grade, 4-seam Fastball that sits 96-99 MPH and tops out at 102 MPH. His best off-speed pitch is a 60-scouting grade Splitter, which he uses in conjunction with an above average slider (55-scouting grade). 

Ross’ command has been his Achilles’ heel, as he simply walks too many batters at times, which can get him into hot water rather quickly in the Majors. Ross worked extremely hard to resurrect his career from the injuries that plagued him early in his career, everyone knows the stuff is elite. Mets Brass’ are hoping he can maintain the consistency he exhibited during the 2025 season, outside of a rough June.

If he is able to limit the walks, maximize pitch count efficiency, he has the talent to secure a spot in the Mets bullpen sooner rather than later during the 2026 season, he represents phase 1, of the three-headed monster the Mets hope to develop in their bullpen.

 

1-17-26

MACK/MM

Dylan Ross – my particular favorite. Has a fastball that was clocked at 102. Every time I say that Brennan yells out a Whoop. Ross will open up 2026 as the Syracuse closer, waiting for the phone to ring in the manager’s office. Or, the manager’s cellphone. I’m not sure there even is a hard line there anymore. Anyway. It’s not a question of IF you will see Ross in Queens next season, just WHEN.

Alex Rubinson - Why Soto's Move to Left Field has been Long Overdue

Baseball is in full swing. Spring Training is over a week old, and the World Baseball Classic kicked off last night. The regular season is right around the corner. As March 26th continues to creep closer, top prospect Carson Benge has been turning heads since the team headed to Port St. Lucie. 

The young outfielder has started the preseason 4/13 with a stolen base and a couple of runs scored. Since MLB implemented a new rule where teams can be awarded a compensatory pick if a rookie starts the season with the big league club and finishes at or near the top in rookie of the year voting, more teams have chosen to let their promising phenoms head north with the big league club. Benge could be the next name that follows suit, which means a change for superstar outfielder Juan Soto.

Soto started his big league career with the Washington Nationals as the everyday left fielder but moved to right field permanently only a few short years into his career. The Mets paid Soto $765 million for his bat and not his glove, but at just 27 years old, the team is hoping it can squeeze at least a little value out of the corner outfielder or at the very least ensure he won’t be a liability in left field. 

In 2019, when Soto won the World Series with the Nationals, he was named a gold glove finalist in left field. It’s fair to say we have better defensive measurements than the award, but the nomination shouldn’t be thrown away entirely. When Soto was a rookie in 2018, his defensive value according to Baseball Savant was a poor negative-five and just in the 20th percentile. 

Fast forward a year later, and Soto became league average with a zero defensive value. Although it still ranked below the 50th percentile (47th percentile to be exact), it showed Soto had taken monumental steps in improving his outfield defense. Last season, when Soto was in right, he was in the first percentile with a -13 defensive run value in first season in Queens.  

Over the years, Soto has actually shown he can be an asset when it comes to his arm. It might not be the most consistent, which is why his arm value numbers will fluctuate, but the strength is there. Where Soto has always been plagued is his range. Not even the biggest Soto homer would disagree that his range has been a weak point of his game. In 2019, when Soto was patrolling left field, he actually posted a plus-five Outs Above Average (OAA), which ranked in the 88th percentile. OAA is a metric used to measure a fielder’s range. For context, Jackie Bradley Jr. recorded an OAA of six during the same season. 

One aspect of Soto’s game that has left a lot to be desired is his jumps. Last year, Soto tied for just inside the top 80 with over a -1.5 foot versus the average jump. One foot is a significant difference, which shows how far away he was from just being average. It helps explain why his range has been poor over the years as well. What was his foot versus average jump in 2019 you ask? 

In left field, Soto just missed the top 15 with a positive 1.5 foot jump compared to the average. This was better than many notable defensive outfielders such as Lorenzo Cain, Jarrod Dyson, Jason Heyward and even his own teammate at the time, Victor Robles, among many other well-known defensive stalwarts. That is a three whole foot difference between his jump in right field compared to his jump in left. This more than answers the question as to why his OAA was so much better as a left fielder. It also calls into question why the Nationals ever moved Soto to right field to begin with. 

Now let’s turn our attention to Soto’s aforementioned arm strength. In 2025, Soto barely ranked in the top 60 in right fielders with an average velocity of 86.6 MPH, which was in the bottom quarter of MLB. If we were to use those same metrics and shift everything over to the other corner outfield spot, those numbers look a lot better. 

Soto’s arm strength would be in the top 40 in the league. This still isn’t anything to go home bragging about, but it does represent an improvement. He actually would be ahead of the outfielder he was traded for in James Wood with the Nationals. Wood still might have a higher ceiling as an outfielder with more potential in his arm, but that wasn't the case based on last season’s data. 

Juan Soto will almost certainly never become a gold glove caliber of player in any defensive spot. The Mets will probably shade Luis Robert Jr. over to Soto’s side to help ensure he won’t need to cover nearly as much ground as normally a corner outfielder would be forced to. In all likelihood, Soto is still destined to become a full time designated hitter down the line. 

What this does show is that the rise of Carson Benge might cause positive ripple effects across the entire roster, even to the most expensive baseball player to walk on the face of the earth. If Soto does revert back to his 2019 metrics, the only question to Mets fans and across the majors at large will be why was Soto ever moved from his primary home and why wasn’t he moved back sooner. 

Paul Articulates - The invisible man

I will begin by saying that I am a baseball fan that writes about baseball.  My experience in coaching and player evaluation ends at too low a level to consider me an “expert”.  I have studied the game for many years and see the finer points of the game, but I am not in line for a front office job just yet.

With that said, and with deference to the Mets’ front office and their strategic objectives, I have to say that I am completely confounded by what they are doing about first base this spring season.

When Jorge Polanco was acquired during the off-season, it was made clear that he was going to be option number one for first base.  Polanco has an infielder pedigree and has been a very good baseball player during his twelve year MLB career.  He is a former all-star (2019), a most-improved player award recipient (2021 Twins), and a heart and hustle award nominee much like new teammates Francisco Lindor and Marcus Semien.  

With 596 MLB innings playing middle infield positions, it is implicit that he has some quickness and glove talent.  However, he has played a total of 1/3 inning at first base in his career and spent all of the 2025 season as a designated hitter.  This is not what I consider a “plug-and-play” first baseman.

Fast forward to spring training.  My expectation was that the Mets would provide tons of coaching and former player expertise to train Polanco on the subtleties of playing first base.  Basics, fundamentals, advanced techniques, and a graduate course from Keith Hernandez seemed appropriate.  From the outside looking in we can’t see how the process is going, but we can see one very alarming indicator: Polanco has not played an inning at first base throughout the spring training season which is now ten games old.  In fact, he was not seen on a competitive ballfield until Tuesday’s game against Nicaragua, and for that game he was the DH.

Polanco was interviewed about the process he was going through and said there was more to learn than he expected but now felt “comfortable” in what he knew.  That is certainly what we wanted to hear, but he may have just been saying it because that is what we wanted to hear.  

First base is a very unique position in the infield, and it requires habitual skills that are not common to the other infield positions.  For example, an infielder’s instinct on any ball not hit directly at them is to range hard after the ball and exert whatever effort it takes to go get that ball.  However, on a ground ball between first and second, the first baseman’s habit must be to defer to the second baseman on any ball that is not easily within reach.  

Understanding what that range is to make the decision on “move right” versus “move left” takes many, many on-field reps.  I am talking about in-game reps with a second baseman that is going all-out to reach balls in the hole.  Other than one intra-squad contest, Polanco has seen none of those in-game reps.  He has not seen the errant throw from the other corner that forces some quick, instinctive footwork to avoid the runner and still get the out.  Or the leaping catch-spin-tag when you know (by experience) that you can’t keep your foot on the bag and catch the ball based upon its trajectory.

I could go on but hopefully you understand my concern by now.  A position that requires the creation of habit through many, many in-game experiences is not being manned by the guy that has been designated to play that position.  Who has been in the position?  A long list of candidates, none of which have played a significant majority of the innings available.  So number one isn’t getting any experience, and number two has not risen from the pack.

Let’s take stock of what has occurred at the position through Tuesday:

Nine players have played in the ten games through Tuesday.  Jose Rojas, with a MLB total of two games (4 innings) at first base, leads the pack with just under 27% of the innings.  Vientos, Baty, and Young represent guys with the best shot at making the team, and in total they have about a third of the innings.  The rest is spread out among players that are “just getting a look”.

There is plenty of spring to go (19 more games if you include split squads). Despite that, my opinion is that the team has not moved out of the starting gate on the truth test for their primary first base candidate with a little over half the pre-season games behind them.

Are you worried too?

RVH - The Blueprint for 93: Mastering the Starting Rotation

 

Preamble: The Starting Rotation as a Strategy of Stability

The 2026 Mets don’t need a rotation that looks pretty in March. They need one that survives June.

This season starts with building a floor that can’t collapse, because championships are usually decided by the pitchers you’re forced to use in the fourth and fifth spots. The games where bullpen seasons go to die. We can debate velocity and strikeout ceilings all day, but the most important rotation metric over 162 games is the one nobody puts on a highlight reel: availability.

In the NL, 93 wins is typically the line where you stop sweating Wild Card math and start thinking about October matchups. The cleanest path there is simple: stop living in “scramble mode,” reclaim the innings that get lost to short starts, and keep the bullpen from being asked to cover structural deficits for six months.

This year, the Mets are building a rotation tree, a 9–11 man plan designed to cover almost the entire season from inside the organization’s depth chart, not via emergency spot-start chaos. The goal is straightforward: reclaim the lost innings that tax the bullpen, and make sure the best arms aren’t running on fumes when the calendar turns.

That’s the point of The Blueprint for 93.

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Part I: The Strategy – Ending the Starting Rotation Scramble

As the Mets prepare for Opening Day 2026, the organizational focus has shifted from “survival” to “strategy.” The most critical metric for 2026 isn’t strikeout rate or velocity. It’s how often the rotation can hand the game to the bullpen in a normal shape, not an emergency one.

A “scramble season” is what happens when the rotation loses structural integrity. Injuries hit, starters can’t turn a lineup over a third time, pitch counts spike early, and suddenly the bullpen is covering the same deficit every night. That’s not just tiring. It’s compounding. Once the bullpen is overused, the manager starts chasing leverage earlier, the soft innings disappear, and the season turns into a slow bleed you can’t quite stop.

If the Mets want to hit a 93-win outcome, the rotation has to stop being five separate careers and start functioning like one machine.

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The North Star: The 1986 “Iron Five”

No modern team can recreate the individual 250-inning seasons of the mid-80s. But the 1986 Mets rotation remains the North Star for one reason: they owned the mound.

That staff was the opposite of a scramble. It was possession baseball, on a pitcher’s mound. They essentially used only six pitchers to start games the entire year.

1986 Mets Rotation: The “Iron Five”

Pitcher	GS	IP	Avg IP/GS	W–L	ERA	WHIP
Dwight Gooden	33	250.0	7.58	17–6	2.84	1.11
Bob Ojeda	30	217.1	7.24	18–5	2.57	1.09
Ron Darling	34	237.0	6.97	15–6	2.81	1.20
Sid Fernandez	31	204.1	6.59	16–6	3.52	1.22
Rick Aguilera	20	141.2	7.08	10–7	3.88	1.28
Core 5 Totals	148	1,050.1	7.10	76–30	2.97	1.16
% of Season	91.4%	72.0%	—	—	—	—

Sources: Baseball-Reference, Baseball Almanac.

Those five arms accounted for 91.4% of all starts. By covering 72% of the season’s innings, they relegated the bullpen to a supporting role instead of an emergency service. In 1986, the bullpen only had to cover an average of about 2.4 innings per game. Because the rotation owned the game through the 7th or 8th inning, the relief arms stayed elite and rested.

That’s not nostalgia. That’s a structural advantage.

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The 2026 Standard: The 5.4 Benchmark

In 2026, the Mets’ rotation strategy is built around a simple benchmark: 5.4 innings per start (IP/GS).

A typical scramble season sees starters averaging roughly 4.9 innings. That doesn’t sound like a crisis until you multiply it by 162.

• Add just one out per start (0.33 innings), and you reclaim about 54 innings over a season.

• Move from 4.9 to 5.4 IP/GS, and you reclaim roughly 80–82 innings.

That’s the equivalent of “adding” a high-end reliever’s workload without signing one. More importantly, it changes the shape of the season. It means fewer bullpen games in June, fewer cascading leverage burns in July, and fewer September weeks where you’re trying to win with arms that have been overrun since Memorial Day.

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Part II: The Talent – The Top End and the Depth

A blueprint is just lines on a page until you assign the talent. For the 2026 Mets, the rotation is organized into a system designed to manage fatigue, survive inevitable IL stints, and still keep enough “stuff” to win games against good teams.

The October-Capable Tier: Front-Line Profiles and Emerging Ceiling

To win in the regular season, you need depth. To win in October, you need at least two starters who can beat great lineups, and one who can absorb innings without drama. The ordering will depend on who’s peaking and who’s healthy, which is exactly why the rotation has to be built like a system, not a prayer.

• Freddy Peralta (Front-line profile): Contract year or not, this is the strikeout-driven arm who can neutralize good lineups. You don’t need 200 innings. You need danger.

• Nolan McLean (Emerging ceiling): This is the kind of arm that can out-duel anybody on the right night. If there’s an October shift coming, it usually starts with a pitcher like this becoming real.

• David Peterson (Innings floor): The quiet backbone. He’s the guy who prevents the month-to-month rotation from buckling, because he can take the ball and keep the game stable.

The Stabilizers: Keeping the Floor from Buckling

This is the structural core that prevents the rotation from collapsing into scramble mode.

• Clay Holmes: Ground-ball profile and efficiency. If he’s living in the 6th regularly, it changes the bullpen workload math.

• Kodai Senga: In a managed role, he’s a force multiplier. The Mets don’t need 200 innings. They need the version of Senga that is sharp, healthy, and capable of being dominant in the windows that matter.

• Sean Manaea: Veteran stability. He’s the bridge that keeps you from turning every depth day into a crisis.

Practically, that means the Mets are operating with a 6-man cadence in mind, using the aggregate tier to create built-in breathers, skip turns when needed, and keep the rotation’s weekly workload from turning into a bullpen tax.

The Aggregate Mix: Building the “Lungs”

The 2026 rotation has to function like a lung: expand through quality depth when injuries hit, then contract later when the calendar demands sharper edges. That’s where the next tier matters.

This group, including Tobias Myers, Christian Scott, Jonah Tong, Justin Hagenman, and Jonathan Pintaro, exists for one job: make sure the “next man up” is still a competitive MLB-caliber start, not a bullpen tax event disguised as a game.

And that “Tong / Others” line in the projection isn’t a panic button. It’s planned inventory, roughly 10–15 starts that keep the machine calibrated when real life hits, without turning July into a bullpen emergency.

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2026 Mets Starting Rotation Projections

Structural Model for a 93-Win Outcome

Group	Pitcher	GS	IP	Avg IP/GS	Proj. ERA	Proj. WHIP
Engine	Freddy Peralta	30	176	5.87	3.65	1.10
Engine	Nolan McLean	28	149	5.32	3.71	1.15
Engine	David Peterson	30	170	5.67	3.65	1.25
Core	Clay Holmes	29	154	5.31	3.88	1.30
Core	Kodai Senga	24	123	5.13	3.89	1.31
Core	Sean Manaea	26	136	5.23	3.88	1.34
Aggregate	Tobias Myers	10	55	5.50	4.10	1.28
Aggregate	Christian Scott	10	52	5.20	4.05	1.24
Depth	Tong / Others	15	75	5.00	4.25	1.35
Totals	The Unit	162	890	5.49	~3.80	1.23

Sources: FanGraphs (Steamer, ZiPS, Depth Charts).

That “Depth” block is intentional. It’s the difference between a rotation plan and a rotation scramble.

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The Takeaway

Winning 93 games is about availability over accolades. The Mets don’t need a rotation that wins the projection wars. They need one that wins the calendar.

The regular-season version of this staff is built to expand, absorb injuries, and keep the bullpen from getting crushed. The October version is built to contract. Same ecosystem, different shape.

Part 2 is where we talk about what that contraction looks like, how the pecking order can shift, and why that matters when the games stop being about “getting through the week” and start being about beating the best lineups in baseball on purpose.