11/7/26

MACK - ROBERT STOCK

 


The New York Mets signed Robert Stock to a one-year major-league contract, adding depth to their 40-man roster now at 41 players. The veteran pitched in eight games for them in 2026, going 1-3 with a 5.93 ERA over 30.1 innings, including seven starts, before a finger injury sidelined him. Despite the surface numbers, his 3.92 FIP hints at some tough luck on balls in play, and fans see it as solid organizational depth even if his long-term role points to the bullpen.

GROK –

Robert Stock is a right-handed pitcher (throws R, bats L) known as a journeyman who has adapted his arsenal extensively using analytics, arm-slot changes (including a lower three-quarters slot), and data-driven adjustments. He is an early adopter of pitch modeling and has refined offerings like his sinker and changeup over time.⁠

2026 MLB pitch usage

He throws a six-pitch mix:

Cutter: ~31.6% (most-used), avg. ~91.1 mph (tops ~95), ~2,391 RPM. Primary pitch; short horizontal break.

4-Seam Fastball: ~23.8%, avg. ~95.8 mph (tops ~98), ~2,285 RPM. Thrown more up in the zone; solid velocity and ride relative to release.

Sinker: ~22.3%, avg. ~94.1 mph (tops ~98), ~2,193 RPM. Strong armside run (often high teens of inches of horizontal break) with low/near-zero induced vertical break in prior looks; used for ground balls/weak contact, especially down in the zone.

Sweeper: ~12.1%, avg. ~80.9 mph (tops ~84), ~2,500 RPM. Significant horizontal sweep (often ~15–19+ inches); primarily vs. righties as a bat-misser.

Changeup: ~8.6%, avg. ~80.9 mph, lower spin (~1,579 RPM). Used mostly vs. lefties; features fade/run and has been refined (e.g., vulcan-style grip adjustments for spin axis).

Curveball / Knuckle Curve: ~1.6% (rarely used), avg. ~79–80 mph, higher spin.

Usage notes: Higher cutter/sinker rates vs. right-handers; more 4-seam and changeup vs. left-handers. Velocities and shapes can vary slightly by year/level (e.g., he has touched triple digits earlier in his career). His arsenal emphasizes movement differentiation (especially horizontal between sinker and sweeper) and modern “stuff” profiles rather than pure velocity.

Context

In 2026 he made 7 starts + 1 relief appearance for the Mets (1-3, 5.93 ERA in 30.1 IP) after thoracic outlet syndrome surgery earlier that year, then re-signed on a one-year deal.⁠

Career MLB: mostly relief early on (high-velo 4-seam/slider focus), later expanded into a more starter-oriented mix with sinker, cutter, and sweeper.

Tom Brennan - Outlawed Delivery

 

Major Leaguers Who Have Normal Deliveries Are Fine
…EVEN Submariners Like Tyler Rogers and Dan Quisenberry Are Fine
…But Some Delivery Styles Are OUTLAWED

 

OUTLAWED DELIVERY
I watched an old video of Eddie Feigner the Softball King fanning major league all stars. So, I asked AI the rules:
Rules & Mechanics
  • Underhand Restrictions: MLB rules do not completely ban underhand or sidearm throwing motions in general (submarine pitchers like Brad Ziegler or Darren O'Day throw with a low arm angle), but the full underhand softball windmill motion with a release point below the waist violates official pitching and delivery constraints.
  • Foot Contact Rules: The forward skip, leap, or hop common in a fastpitch softball delivery breaks MLB rules requiring the pivot foot to maintain continuous contact with the pitching rubber until the ball is released (similar to violations called on leaping/hopping MLB pitchers like Carter Capps).
Biomechanical Differences: Softball pitching relies on a continuous full-circle arm swing driven by hip and leg coordination specific to fastpitch mechanics, whereas baseball pitching is structured around overhand or low-arm-slot shoulder and elbow rotation from a 60-foot 6-inch elevated mound.

    So, if you didn’t know, now you do, Magoo.

    Baseball Reference had this dandy list - of some very effective, and legal, but quite funky, pitchers:

    A chronological List of Submarine/Underhand/Low-Sidearm Pitchers

    Reese Kaplan -- Should the Mets Avoid a 2nd Marcus Semien Issue?


    What does the Marcus Semien 2026 season for the Mets suggest as a course of action for the team roster as it currently exists? 

    Obviously the defensive and offensive skills are nowhere near what they once were and Semien is benefiting greatly from the long term contract he signed while he was still a productive player delivering All Star worthy output on both sides of the field. 

    Today, however, he’s a shell of his former self and has become a cautionary tale regarding the risk of these guaranteed deals that linger into a formerly great player’s latter stages as he inches towards retirement.  People have seen this trend happen before with others when frequent injuries and diminished output underscore why the deal was not a particularly good long term strategy for the roster nor the payroll budget.

    While there is no ready made answer as to how to address the water under the bridge problem with Semien still on payroll or 2027 and 2028, it does open up the same question about others on the Mets roster.  For the moment we will ignore Juan Soto and his unheard of 15 year contract signed while in his 20s as he is a true star caliber player with the bat.  He may have to shift to DH at some point given his defensive challenges and the desire to keep him off the IL.  For now, however, he is close to earning his annual pay rate.

    The one instead that draws some consideration is the very long term deal signed before David Stearns was a part of this organization.  In this case look back to the off-season of 2021 when the club in Queens gave Lindor a 10-year $341 million contract that would run from then through the 2031 season.  Given Lindor’s bat-to-ball skills, his strong defense, his base running ability and his leadership, it was a deal very few questioned at the time. In fact, it was a red letter day for new owner Steve Cohen who signaled to the fan base that the penny pinching ways of the Wilpon era was over and things would indeed be different under his stewardship. 

    Injuries aside (as well as the rumored rift between he and Soto), no one has wasted a single week as a Mets fan regretting that decision in any way.  When he’s on the field and in the lineup he demonstrates a rare combination of formidable skills that indeed anchor both the infield and the lineup. 

    Fast forward to the close of the 2026 season and realize that you are now halfway through that monster deal with the good still far outweighing the bad.  It is now, however, we need to take a page from the Branch Rickey managerial manual and recount his oft quoted philosophy that sometimes it’s best to "Trade a player a year too early rather than a year too late." 

    So what does that mean for the Mets and their future with Lindor?  Right now going into the 2027 season the shortstop has seemingly lost a bit of range defensively while he struggled after his injuries to produce as he had in the past.  While no one is saying he is clearly over the hill, the Semien handwriting is still on the wall and it is is reasonable to question if Lindor during his ages 33 through 37 seasons will produce at the same level as he had earlier in his career.  Given his annual hit for $34.1 million, a solid player earning All Star money is a less robust value to the roster and maybe it is time to consider his long term value to the Mets.

    Right now in the minors the Mets have some interesting middle infielders making their way up the ladder but no one is suggesting any of them is a direct WAR replacement for Lindor.  The issue here is about spending effectively during someone’s latter years in a contract and you have to consider what Branch Rickey said. 

    Is it time to begin consideration of a Lindor trade elsewhere and letting another club live with the Semien like decline that is likely to occur while freeing up a lot of payroll capital?

    11/6/26

    MACK – Let’s Revisit - RHSP - Calvin Ziegler

     


    MACK – Let’s Revisit - RHSP - Calvin Ziegler


    Calvin Ziegler (often spelled Ziegler) is a right-handed pitcher in the New York Mets’ minor league system. Born October 3, 2002, in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada (hometown Heidelberg, a small town nearby), he is 6'0", 205 lbs, and bats/throws right-handed. 

    The Mets selected him very highly (in the second round, 46th overall) of the 2021 MLB Draft out of TNXL Academy in Florida (he relocated from Canada during COVID restrictions to gain exposure). 

    He signed for $910,000 (underslot). He has been a high-upside but injury-plagued prospect. Early on, he ranked as high as around the top 10–15 in the Mets system (e.g., Amazin’ Avenue No. 11 in 2023). 

    Injuries, however, have limited his development significantly:

    • 2022 (Low-A St. Lucie): First pro season — 16 starts, 46.2 IP, 4.44 ERA, 70 K / 35 BB (strong strikeout rate but high walks). Missed time with biceps tendinitis.
    • 2023: Limited to 1 inning after offseason elbow bone spur removal and a torn right quad.
    • 2024 (High-A Brooklyn): Dominant early (6 IP, 0 ER, 13 K, 2 BB in 2 starts, including a strong outing with 9 K), then Tommy John surgery in April. Missed the rest of 2024 and all of 2025.
    • 2026: Returning from TJ. Rehab assignments, then activated with Brooklyn (High-A). Limited work (13.1-IP). 
    Headed to the Arizona Fall League to supplement his MILB 2026 innings, where his control has been shaky.

    Career minors totals (through available 2026 data): roughly 0-7, 4.62 ERA in about 64 IP with a high K rate but elevated walks. FanGraphs rates him around a 35+ FV prospect with ETA ~2027 and org rank outside the top tier due to the injuries and substandard command. RepertoireZiegler has shown mid-90s velocity with swing-and-miss potential, though command has been the biggest hurdle (high walk rates historically). Mechanics feature a high three-quarters arm slot with a loose, fluid delivery and good extension.

    • Fastball: Sits 91–95 mph (averaging ~93 in 2022 pro debut), has touched 96–97. Features arm-side run/ride up in the zone and some sink lower; effective due to approach angle and extension more than elite spin. Graded around 55 present / 60 future on some scales. High strikeout pitch when located.
    • Curveball / spike curve (his primary breaking ball): Low-80s (around 80–83 mph, averaging ~82). 11-5 to near 12-6 shape with sharp bite and depth; not a pure horizontal slider (he has described it as tighter and more curve-like). Strongest secondary in many reports for whiffs and weak contact; graded ~55. Command has been inconsistent (often outside the zone).
    • Slider: Some scouting reports and FanGraphs list a distinct slider (50/60 grades), low-80s with horizontal action. Earlier amateur looks sometimes labeled the curve as a slider/slurve hybrid.
    • Changeup / splitter: Mid-80s (83–86). Shows fade, tumble/sink, and arm speed maintenance. Developed more in pro ball (including a split-finger variation); still a work in progress for consistency and usage but flashes promise as a third pitch.
    Overall profile: 

    High-strikeout arm with above-average to plus stuff potential (especially FB + curve), but raw command and lack of durability have held him back. 

    Pre-injury looks suggested possible mid-rotation upside if the control improves and he stays healthy; the TJ recovery and limited 2026 innings leave his current trajectory more uncertain (potential starter or power reliever path). He attacks hitters aggressively when healthy.






    Reese Kaplan --- An Under the Radar First Base Option to Consider


    So for all of the brouhaha over the prospect of luring Teruaki Sato to the Mets and converting him to play first base it would seem that the alternatives are not exactly exciting.  Many available Jared Young platoon partners are available but they are not star quality by any stretch.  

    Some might make the case that World Series winner Jake Bauers is a late bloomer and a lock to hit 25-30 HRs for his new employer but that signing would warrant well over $23 million in salary for one good year and a draft pick compensation to the Brewers who extended him a QO.  That seems an awfully high price to pay for a career .223 hitter who will be 31 for the 2027 season.  

    The others on the list include decent but not stellar players like Ty France.  Josh Bell is available as a free agent but he’s not had a great answer either.  He’s been splitting time between 1B and DH.  You can pencil him in for over 20 HRs and a .256 bating average but the Twins felt he was not worth his $10 million option going into his age 34 season.  

    One recent Pacific posting was announced by the Korean team called the Hanwha Eagles in Daejeon.  Seeking to transition to MLB the Eagles made slugger Si Hwan Roh available to interested bidders.  Unlike Sato, Roh is pretty much flying under the radar.  Let’s take a brief look at him.

    Now at age 25 Roh has been playing for Hanwha since debuting in 2019 as an 18 year old rookie.  

    Twice during this tenure he eclipsed the 30 HR mark and interestingly unlike most power hitters he does not fan at an alarming rate.  

    This past season his worst mark with 147 Ks, but to accompany that he hit 29 HRs and drove in 96 while hitting .283.  


    While he’s primarily been a third baseman, he’s also logged 84 games playing first and surprisingly 42 games at shortstop.  At 6 feet tall and 211 pounds he doesn’t profile on paper as a middle infielder.  His high water mark in stolen bases was in 2025 with 14.  Defensively the best aspect of his game is his throwing arm but one metrics site has him at a D- for how he handles his glove.  Moving him to 1B or DH would likely be appropriate.

    So what would he cost?  Right now Roh is in the middle of an 11 year contract worth $23 million in US dollars.  At a current rate of just over $2 million per season it would not take a major investment to lure him over to the more lucrative and high profile major league baseball.

    Everyone knows that taking chances on unproven ballplayers from the Asian leagues is always fraught with some trepidation upon adjustment periods and better daily pitching to battle.  Given his young age you would think he would still have room to improve his game and matching his current contract over a shorter period of time could prove a starting point for negotiations.  

    If you proposed paying him $6 million per year for 4 years it would not bankrupt the team and would ensure he had a long term shot at performing in MLB.  Of course he would want more money but he’s nowhere near what Sato would command. 


    11/5/26

    MACK – STRIKE NEWS UPDATE

     


    No active strike or lockout is underway yet, but a lockout by MLB owners is widely expected once the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expires on December 1, 2026 (at 11:59 p.m. ET).⁠

    The main dispute centers on economics. Owners are pushing for a hard salary cap and floor (the first serious proposal of this kind since the 1994-95 strike that canceled the World Series). The MLB Players Association (MLBPA) has firmly rejected any salary cap and views it as a non-starter.⁠

    Latest developments

    MLB made a new proposal: a projected salary cap of about $258.2 million and a floor of $180.2 million, with implementation delayed until the 2028 season (to give teams time to adjust payrolls). It framed this as roughly a 50-50 revenue split (with some notes on how amateur bonuses factor in). The current competitive balance tax system would remain for 2027 under this plan.⁠

    The MLBPA quickly rejected it, stating that owners continue to propose “blowing up the current system and replacing it with one designed to line their pockets and increase their franchise values.” Players have counter-proposals focused on higher minimum salaries, expanded free agency/arbitration rights, a higher competitive balance tax threshold, increased revenue sharing, and other benefits without a hard cap.⁠

    Negotiations have been ongoing since earlier in 2026, but little substantive progress has been reported on the core economic divide. A lockout is viewed as nearly certain, with the key question being its length.⁠

    Context and potential impact

    The current five-year CBA was agreed to in March 2022 after a 99-day owner lockout that delayed the start of that season (but preserved a full schedule once resolved).

    Free agency is open now, but a lockout would freeze major-league transactions, player-club contact (for 40-man roster players), and use of team facilities.

    The 2027 season is scheduled to start around March 24; spring training is set for mid-to-late February. A prolonged stoppage could delay or shorten it. Experts note the risk of lost games if talks drag on, similar to historical work stoppages.⁠

    In short, the sides remain far apart primarily over the salary cap issue. Expect a lockout to begin in early December unless a surprise agreement is reached in the coming weeks. Talks are led by MLB Deputy Commissioner Dan Halem (with Commissioner Rob Manfred) and MLBPA interim Executive Director Bruce Meyer.

    RVH - Building a Sustainable Winner: Part 3: The Stearns Inheritance

     

    Milwaukee’s success raises an obvious question for Mets fans: 

    How much of what we see today was built by David Stearns?

    My assessment is that Stearns left a substantial foundation for sustained success. Matt Arnold and the organization continued developing it, made important additions and produced results that deserve their own credit.

    Understanding that distinction matters. If we want Milwaukee’s experience to help us evaluate the Mets, we need to identify what Stearns actually contributed, what he inherited and what happened after he stepped aside.

    Start with the right handoff date

    Stearns relinquished control of baseball operations on October 27, 2022. Arnold took over, while Stearns remained in an advisory role. mlb.com

    That makes the end of the 2022 season our primary handoff point. His continued presence in the organization during 2023 should not cause us to assign that year’s decisions automatically to him.

    There is another complication: Arnold had worked alongside Stearns since 2015. This was a leadership transition within an established organization. mlb.com

    We can reasonably identify who held final responsibility for a decision. We usually cannot determine how much each scout, coach, analyst or executive contributed to it.

    What did the results show?

    The three-year comparisons provide a useful starting point:

    Period

    Regular-season record

    Winning percentage

    Postseason achievement

    Stearns’ first three seasons: 2016–2018

    255–232

    .524

    One appearance; reached the 2018 NLCS

    Stearns’ final three seasons in charge: 2020–2022

    210–174

    .547

    Two appearances; no series wins

    Arnold’s first three seasons in charge: 2023–2025

    282–204

    .580

    Three division titles; reached the 2025 NLCS

    Latest three-season window: 2024–2026

    293–193

    .603

    Three division titles; won the 2026 NL pennant

    Totals calculated from annual results. The shortened 2020 season makes winning percentage more useful than raw win totals. The final two rows overlap and are not independent comparisons. The 2026 World Series remains ahead as of this writing. StatMuse

    The record supports two conclusions.

    First, Milwaukee became a recurring contender during Stearns’ tenure. Second, the organization continued improving after the leadership transition.

    Those later results are consistent with a strong inheritance and effective subsequent management. The standings alone cannot tell us how to divide the credit.

    The inheritance included players at different stages

    The organization Stearns left contained established major leaguers, developing players and prospects whose best seasons were still ahead.

    That mix is central to the story. A successor inherits more than the opening-day lineup.

    Player or asset

    Acquisition under Stearns’ leadership

    What carried forward

    Brice Turang

    First-round pick, 2018

    A developing player who became part of the current core

    Garrett Mitchell

    First-round pick, 2020

    An outfielder whose major league career was just beginning at the handoff

    Jackson Chourio

    International signing, 2021

    Significant young talent requiring further development and a retention decision

    Jacob Misiorowski

    Second-round pick, 2022

    A newly drafted pitcher with most of his development still ahead

    Robert Gasser and Esteury Ruiz

    Acquired in the 2022 Hader trade

    Pitching talent and an asset available for a subsequent trade

    Acquisition history: FanGraphs RosterResource and MLB transaction reporting. FanGraphs Baseball

    These examples make the Stearns connection tangible. Several players central to our current roster analysis entered the organization while he was in charge.

    They also demonstrate why acquisition credit should not become exclusive credit. Selecting Misiorowski in 2022 and turning him into a major league contributor involved work across both leadership periods.

    Chourio presents the same distinction. The initial signing belonged to one period; his continued development, major league opportunity and long-term contract extended into another.

    Stearns also inherited important talent

    A fair assessment must apply the same standard backward.

    Brandon Woodruff was drafted in 2014. Devin Williams was drafted in 2013. Both entered Milwaukee’s system before Stearns arrived. Baseball-Reference.com

    Josh Hader also arrived before Stearns, through Milwaukee’s 2015 deadline trade with Houston. mlb.com

    Their subsequent development and use became part of the Stearns-era success. Their original acquisition belongs to the preceding administration.

    That does not diminish Stearns’ contribution. Developing and retaining inherited talent is an essential part of running a baseball organization. It does establish that Milwaukee’s success spans more than one executive’s tenure.

    The same principle applies to Arnold today.

    The Hader transaction connects three administrations

    The Hader sequence is particularly useful because it shows how value can travel through an organization.

    Milwaukee acquired Hader before Stearns. Stearns later traded him in a package that included Gasser and Ruiz. After Arnold assumed control, Ruiz became the outgoing asset in the transaction bringing William Contreras and two pitchers. mlb.com

    The credit therefore has several components:

    Stage

    Contribution

    Original acquisition

    The preceding administration brought Hader into the organization

    Development and major league use

    Milwaukee converted that talent into substantial production

    Stearns’ 2022 decision

    Exchanged Hader for a package including future assets

    Arnold’s subsequent decision

    Converted Ruiz into a different package suited to Milwaukee’s needs

    Calling Contreras simply a “Stearns acquisition” would obscure Arnold’s decision. Treating the transaction as unrelated to Stearns would ignore the asset Arnold used.

    This is also where hindsight requires restraint. The eventual return does not settle every question about the timing of the Hader trade or its immediate effect on a contending team.

    Milwaukee finished 2022 outside the playoffs. That outcome belongs in the evaluation alongside the later benefits.

    Arnold’s contribution goes beyond managing inherited players

    The current roster contains meaningful acquisitions made after the handoff.

    Bauers and Trevor Megill arrived in 2023. Joey Ortiz arrived in the 2024 Burnes trade. Chourio’s extension was another consequential decision made after Stearns stepped aside. FanGraphs Baseball

    The prospect system has continued changing as well. Jesús Made and Luis Peña signed in January 2024. mlb.com

    Their presence matters to our assessment. The next generation includes talent acquired after Stearns’ departure, alongside prospects inherited from his tenure.

    Organizational continuity can help explain that success. It cannot justify assigning every subsequent good decision to the former leader. Arnold’s staff still had to evaluate players, allocate resources, manage setbacks and make choices.

    What can we reasonably conclude?

    The evidence supports a strong, qualified judgment: 

    Stearns helped build an organization capable of sustaining contention beyond his own tenure.

    His contribution is visible in players acquired under his leadership, assets available to his successor and the competitive position at the handoff.

    The record also shows that Milwaukee continued progressing under Arnold. The successor’s work added value to what was inherited.

    There is no defensible basis here for assigning Stearns a precise percentage of the current team’s success. Acquisition dates can be counted. Coaching, development, judgment and organizational continuity cannot be divided that neatly.

    For Mets fans, the useful question is whether Stearns can create similar advantages in New York: productive acquisitions, a continuing supply of young talent, useful trade assets and enough depth to keep the club competitive through change.

    Cohen’s resources give him additional options. Those resources still need to translate into production and sustained results.

    Our next installment will compare Milwaukee and the Mets as they stand today: 

    The quality of their players, the depth behind them, the cost of the roster and the years of control still available.

    That comparison will help us assess how far New York has progressed toward the kind of organizational strength Milwaukee has demonstrated.