11/19/26

RVH — The Cohen–Stearns Assignment Building a Sustainable Winner | Part 5

 


In Parts 1–4, we examined what Milwaukee has built, how it replenishes talent, what Stearns contributed and how the Brewers compare with the Mets.
The finding was clear: Milwaukee has combined sustained winning with affordable production and continued replenishment. New York has expensive stars and an emerging young core, but has yet to turn that combination into dependable contention.

We closed by asking how much of New York’s roster took shape under David Stearns.

Answering that requires examining the larger assignment he inherited. Stearns was expected to stabilize an organization trying to accomplish several difficult things simultaneously, while making it more successful on the field.

Four jobs at once

From the beginning of Steve Cohen’s ownership, the Mets faced four connected assignments:


Assignment

What it required

Win now

Field competitive MLB teams and reach the playoffs.

Build durable leadership and infrastructure

Establish continuity and capability in baseball operations, scouting, analytics, coaching and development.

Build and develop the farm system

Accumulate talent and turn successive groups into productive major leaguers or useful trade assets.

Continually replenish bridge talent

Replace departing, declining or injured players while waiting for internal solutions to develop.


The season would not pause while the organization rebuilt itself.

Cohen could authorize spending immediately. Developing players, establishing leadership and improving organizational decisions would take longer.

Experienced major leaguers helped bridge that gap. But the bridge itself required constant maintenance. Contracts expired. Players aged. Injuries created openings. Successful acquisitions became more expensive to retain.

Whenever an internal replacement was unavailable, the Mets needed another external answer.

The investment was sustained. Leadership kept changing.

The ownership-era record captures both the financial commitment and the changes among those responsible for turning it into wins.

Dollar figures in millions.


Season

GM / POBO

Manager

Record

Postseason

CBT payroll

Tax

Payroll + tax

2021

Alderson / Scott¹

Luis Rojas

77–85

Missed

$207.7

$0.0

$207.7

2022

Billy Eppler

Buck Showalter

101–61

Wild Card exit

$299.8

$30.8

$330.6

2023

Billy Eppler²

Buck Showalter

75–87

Missed

$374.7

$100.8

$475.5

2024

David Stearns

Carlos Mendoza

89–73

Reached NLCS

$347.7

$97.1

$444.8

2025

David Stearns

Carlos Mendoza

83–79

Missed

$346.7

$91.6

$438.3

2026³

David Stearns

Mendoza / Green

74–88

Missed

$358.1

$100.9

$459.1

Total



499–473

Two appearances

$1,934.7

$421.3

$2,355.9


¹ Alderson was team president; Scott served as acting GM. Porter departed before the season; Alderson resumed GM duties in September.

² Stearns assumed control after the 2023 regular season.

³ Financial figures remain estimates. Andy Green replaced Carlos Mendoza in June.

CBT payroll uses tax-accounting values, including contract AAVs and benefits. Payroll plus tax is not actual cash spending. Totals use unrounded figures.

Four field managers and several front-office arrangements accompanied that commitment. Turnover alone does not explain the results. It does mean the people making evaluations, setting priorities and communicating expectations repeatedly changed.

Cohen was pursuing immediate success while still establishing the leadership capable of sustaining it.

Stearns was supposed to connect the pieces

Stearns’ arrival offered the prospect of a more durable arrangement.

His Milwaukee experience suggested he understood how to compete while developing players, replenishing talent and managing difficult roster decisions.

The expectation in New York was compelling: combine those capabilities with Cohen’s financial resources.

That would give the Mets greater capacity to retain successful players, purchase coverage and absorb mistakes.

It also raised the pressure. Stearns was the experienced executive expected to bring stability while winning. Organizational development and immediate competition remained simultaneous obligations.

Some progress is tangible

The emerging young group gives the Mets something substantial to build around.

As Part 4 discussed, Benge, McLean, Scott and Ewing supplied affordable production. Fair attribution still matters: McLean, Scott and Ewing entered the organization before Stearns; Benge was drafted under his administration.

Developing inherited talent deserves credit. So do acquisition, rehabilitation, promotion and deployment decisions.

But those contributions must be evaluated alongside the surrounding roster.

The 2024 run demonstrated that the Mets could compete deep into October. The next two seasons demonstrated that they had not established a dependable way to return.

Stearns’ teams have gone 246–240, with one postseason appearance.

Stabilizing through change

There is a tension here. Stearns was expected to stabilize the organization while changing its players.

Some turnover was necessary. Continuity cannot mean preserving an unsuccessful roster indefinitely.

However, every new player, position and role creates adjustment work. A collection of individually defensible moves still has to function together.

That is where my own preseason assessment was too confident. I underestimated how many favorable outcomes needed to align for the 2026 roster to work.

The same scrutiny belongs in evaluating management: how much uncertainty did the construction require the team to overcome?

Where the assignment stands

Cohen supplied financial capacity. The organization has developed useful young players. Stearns has provided continuity at the top of baseball operations.

Those are meaningful ingredients.

The unfinished work is making them reinforce one another: better decisions, more productive players, credible replacements and winning teams.

Milwaukee demonstrated that organizational strength could survive a leadership transition. New York is still trying to demonstrate that its current leadership can make competitive seasons dependable.

The final installment returns to the question that opened this series: how effectively does an organization turn its resources into sustained winning?

For the Mets, the next proof needs to come in the standings.

Sources: MLB records and leadership announcements; final CBT assessments reported by AP/ESPN; FanGraphs’ November 18, 2026 payroll estimate.


Paul Articulates - The calculated risk


You read some opinions about the Rule 5 draft protections (or the lack thereof) yesterday in a couple of the posts, but I have a different viewpoint, so I will weigh in with my thoughts.

The deadline has passed for teams to protect players from being chosen in the Rule 5 draft by placing them on the Mets' 40-man roster.  Only one player was protected in that way - #1 prospect Jefferson Rojas.  It was a nail biter for me, because Rojas was not added until very late.  The fact that he was the only one protected amongst a sizable number of prospects who had met the service requirement means that David Stearns was willing to take a calculated risk with his roster.

Risk number one was that the Rule 5 draft will actually happen.  If the owners issue a lockout order on December first with the expiration of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), then the Rule 5 draft would not occur on December 5th as planned - it would be either postponed or cancelled.  Cancellation, of course, would eliminate any risk that the Mets would lose a player.  Postponement until a new CBA is in pace kicks the can down the road quite a bit, but it also brings with it the opportunity to set new rules and deadlines on protection, giving teams a second chance at protection.  The probability of a lockout is extremely high, and therefore the probability of losing a player (or players) on December 5th is very low.  Good calculation David.

Risk number two was that another team would choose an eligible player in the Rule 5 draft.  Given the quantity and quality of players unprotected in the Mets system (here is the list), the risk seems substantial.  

However, one has to look deeper into the specifics of the Rule 5 deal.  If a player is chosen, that player must be put on the choosing team's active roster (26-man, not the 40) and remain there for the entire season.  If not, that player is returned to the original team.  

So for the Mets to truly lose a prospect, that player would have to be ready to contribute enough at a MLB level to hold a roster spot for a year.  They can't be optioned back to the minors to work on improvements.  If it is a position player, they have to be among the top 13 players in the receiving organization to hold a spot.  If it is a pitcher, given the number of arms teams go through during a season, that pitcher had better contribute regularly, because hiding him is like reducing the number of pitchers on the active roster to 12.

With that in mind, Risk number two becomes much lower.  Sure, Jefferson Rojas showed signs last year that he could handle any minor league level.  Much like Benge and Ewing and Thornton last year, it would be likely that Rojas would stick to a MLB roster.  That is why he was protected.  But the others that were left hanging out there are far less likely to stick for a full season and therefore would not be lost to the Mets forever - just one season.  And during that season, they would become a valuable MLB test case with no impact to the Mets' roster.  Let's look at the names:

Jack Wenninger - he looked like a solid pitcher when he sailed through the minor league organization, but then stalled somewhat in AAA Syracuse posting a 5-8 record with a 4.54 ERA with a 1.46 WHIP.  Not exactly a lock to spend the year with an MLB roster.

Chris Suero - a favorite of mine because of his versatility.  I have seen him catch one game and play center field the next.  But last season he had a .201 batting average and a .742 OPS for a AA team.  Would you give up one of your 13 position player roster slots on an MLB team for a season for that?

Gary Gill Hill - another favorite of mine since he came over from the Rays in the Peralta deal.  But he has seen five innings in a single game on a AAA mound.  For a team to select a player with that little experience and keep him among the 13 pitchers on their MLB roster for a full season is quite a gamble.  Personally, he is the one other Met I would have liked to see protected, but it is only a medium risk that he is poached.

Jacob Reimer - a rising star in the Mets minors due to his powerful bat, but he was a defensive liability and had a high strikeout rate before he lost considerable time due to injury.  Many writers put him among the top 10 prospects, but to me he is a questionable bat without a position.  Low risk of losing him and high probability he is returned in 2028 if selected.

D'Andre Smith - a versatile player with both infield and outfield skills that has been around in the Mets' development system for years.  He finally had somewhat of a breakout last year, hitting .294 in the last 32 games of the season in AAA Syracuse.  He is a medium risk of being selected, but with the Mets loaded with middle infield prospects and all set with their MLB outfield, this is a risk worth taking.

I could go on, but I think you get my point.  David Stearns was not cavalier with his decisions Tuesday.  He took some very calculated risks, and it appears to me that it was a sound choice.

11/18/26

Tom Brennan - Injured Prospects; The Unprotected Prospects



JACOB REIMER - HURT A LOT, AND LEFT OFF OF THE 40 MAN ROSTER

 

INJURIES CAN MESS UP A TEAM’S PROSPECTS REPORT CARD
Lots of guys in my Top 50 (which actually turned into roughly 55) prospects experienced significant injuries in 2026, impacting their rankings. Using a benchmark of missing at least 20% of the season with an injury to qualify for the Injured Contingent, which ones landed there, and which ones were healthy for most or all of the year?
 A third category will be newly drafted players, who have not had enough time to establish a pro health or injury record.
Thirty percent (approx.) of my Top 55 missed a significant portion of the season with injuries, with most missing a half-season or more. How that compares to other organizations, I don’t know, but it can’t be favorable.
INJURY-IMPACTED PLAYERS (16) - in top 50 ranking order
7) Wandy Asigen
11) Jacob Reimer
12) Billy Stafura
13) Aidan Smith
14) Cole Mathis
16) D’Andre Smith
17) Trey Snyder
18) Boston Baro
27) Marco Vargas
30) Peyton Prescott
33) Randy Guzman
35) Irving Cota
39) Will Watson
40) Ryan Lambert
42) Eli Serrano
48) Bruin Agbayani
Those 16 missed an incredible number of games… and lots of development.
MOSTLY HEALTHY PLAYERS (33) (not in ranking order)
  1. Jefferson Rojas
  2. Mitch Voit
  3. Billy Amick
  4. Jonathan Santucci
  5. Emilien Pitre
  6. Elian Peña
  7. Jack Wenninger
  8. Nick Morabito
  9. Cleiner Ramirez
  10. Gary Gill Hill
  11. Garrett Stratton
  12. Gabe Davis
  13. Jefry Yan
  14. Dylan Ross
  15. Ryan Dollar
  16. Bryce Jenkins
  17. Yovanny Rodriguez
  18. Chris Suero
  19. Corey Collins
  20.  Yonatan Henriquez
  21. Kevin Parada
  22. Daiverson Gutierrez
  23. Brendan Girton
  24. Daviel Hurtado
  25. John Bay
  26. Bryan Metoyer
  27. Nick Lorusso
  28. Ryan Tayman
  29. Zach Franklin
  30. Saul Garcia
  31. Chase Meggers
  32. Ronald Hernandez
  33. Ryan Clifford – only his stats were sickly in 2026
NEWLY DRAFTED PLAYERS (5) - with their ranking in my top 30 - barely played
6) Aiden Robbins
9) Carson Wiggins – 2025 TJS, missed 2026 college ball, ready for 2027
25) Shane Sdao – pitcher
26) Luke McNeillie – pitcher
29) Alex Petrovic – pitcher
Four of these five were newly drafted pitchers who probably combined for five pro innings, so there is nothing to judge them on. Excluding the latter five draft newbies, 32% (16 of 50) of the others missed substantial time. Twelve of the 16 were position players, which is a very high rate, IMO. The Mets ought to evaluate that epidemic carefully, with an eye on a healthier 2027 for Mets minor league prospect hitters. Were a number of those 16 injuries avoidable? Missing a ton of games slows prospects’ progression—and lowers their trade value.

According to AI, there were other organizations whose systems were impacted more adversely by minor league injuries:
The Detroit Tigers and the San Francisco Giants experienced some of the heaviest and most impactful injury-ravaged farm systems and major league organizations during the 2026 season:
  • Detroit Tigers: Baseball America highlighted the Tigers as seeing the largest drop in midseason farm system rankings because "injuries have utterly ravaged the farm system," …and, at the major league level, Detroit also accumulated over 2,200 days lost on the injured list.
  • San Francisco Giants: Led Major League Baseball with the highest overall team injury severity score (126) and had 20 players spend time on the 60-day injured list, accumulating nearly 2,377 total days lost across the organization.
  • Other Heavily Impacted Systems: The Los Angeles Dodgers (2,274 IL days), Toronto Blue Jays (2,241 IL days), and the Oakland Athletics also faced severe developmental setbacks in their minor league pipelines.

OVERVALUING THE QUALITY OF YOUR INVENTORY
The Mets added Jefferson Rojas to their 40-man roster, but a real dose of realism hit yesterday. Guys were left off, and surprisingly so, in terms of how many: Jacob Reimer, Ryan Clifford, Chris Suero, Jack Wenninger, Gary Gill Hill, and Jose Chirinos—who were prospect-ranked at No. 6, No. 14, No. 17, No. 8, No. 16, and No. 26, respectively.
Six Top-30 ranked fellas. All had some flaws in their 2026 seasons, whether injury, poor performance, or both. They won’t all get claimed in the Rule 5 draft, so some will stay in the organization. Still, it has to be a wake-up call for them.
And Dylan Ross DFA…SMH…OMG.