ARIZONA FALL BALL:
A LEAGUE THAT
FORMER METS WILD MAN
BRYCE MONTES DE OCA
WOULD HAVE FIT RIGHT INTO
ARIZONA FALL BALL:
A LEAGUE THAT
FORMER METS WILD MAN
BRYCE MONTES DE OCA
WOULD HAVE FIT RIGHT INTO
The stages of complex negotiations
Any classification of the stages of negotiations is going to be somewhat arbitrary. I break down the stages as follows:
* Awareness
* Clarification
* Signaling
* Negotiation
* The Paper Agreement
* Interpretation of Agreement (Reframing by both sides of what they have agreed to: this is where both parties claim victory and at the same time enter into a reconciliation period)
* The Living Agreement
I will have something to say about each of these phases as I cover the negotiations from a game and decision theory perspective as they proceed in the coming months.
This week marks the end of the Signaling stage of the negotiating process, so that is where we start in this post.
MLB and MLBPA have been in the Signaling stage for past few months. During this phase, parties moving to actual negotiations use media forums and public spaces to send signals. The questions are: to whom are they sending the signals, and what are they signallng?
It may surprise you, but for the most part, the representatives of each side are signaling to the parties they are ostensibly working for. In situations like the current one, they are signaling to the public as well. Only at the end of this period are they signaling directly to the other side.
The message is different in all three cases.
They are signaling to their clients that they (the reps) will do all the talking, that the owners should keep quiet in order to maintain a unified front; that achieving the clients' goals depends on displaying no fractures or substantial differences of opinion. The public will take differences as a lack of discipline or preparedness. The other side will take it as vulnerabilities to be exploited. The others within the group, for example, owners, will take it as reason to pursue their own interests and not agree to limits imposed on how they can use their own comparative asset advantages.
Secondarily they use the media to amplify their message to the public, which is designed to garner support and to help shape the way in which negotiations are framed in the public eye.
In the Signaling stage, MLB has a distinct advantage since so many of the teams have contracts with radio and TV stations they own (more on this in the next post) and others who have sports talk shows.
The owners must 'win' this stage because, let's be frank, not many fans' lives have much in common with the lives owners live. The owners are trying to secure a cushion of good will likely to erode as the negotiations proceed.
The signaling stage reaches its peak when one or the other side firmly sets the line beyond which they will not go: the bridge too far. They explicitly do this in a way that makes it clear that they intend this to be a signal to the other side. In other words, no more talking to ourselves. It's time to talk to one another; and just so you know.
This is where we are prepared to make our stand.
(Signaling to one's own side that you should trust us/me is real and important. Signaling to the public is required PR. Signaling to the other side is neither; it is pure theater, designed to heighten the drama, and, whatever the intention, able to accomplish little else.)
The past week the Signaling stage peaked and soon will pass altogether
But in a way that MLB has ample reason to and should regret.
This week Rob Manfred turned to the media to make two announcements.
First, that a salary cap is non-negotiable.
Second, according to Manfred, polling of the fans has established that 70% of them are in favor of a salary cap. And that MLB felt something akin to a moral obligation to give the fans what they overwhelmingly want. It would be repugnant to serve the interests of a mere 30% at the expense of an overwhelming number of fans who crave a salary cap.
And so he came to deliver the message that the salary cap is not an item on which they will compromise and they do so not because it provides them with additional revenue, but because it is a moral imperative -- a duty ownership owes the fans.
Really?
Need I point out that the fans would strongly favor free hot dogs and beer, and would vote overwhelmingly to have the owners fund their stadiums themselves instead of being subsidized by city residents through a variety of different means.
There is probably no end to the number of things MLB might find itself morally compelled to do were they to rely on answers fans would give to poorly formulated questions presented by pollsters.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Four things caught my eye about Manfred's action, three of which I discuss here; the fourth in my upcoming Monday post.
It is one thing when the representatives of MLB assert that a salary cap is non-negotiable. It is quite another when Das Kommisar does.
There is no additional signaling that owners could offer now that would be any more clear or precise once the Commissioner has spoken.
His announcement effectively means the Signaling stage has run its course and the transition to actual negotiations is officially underway.
(Notice the spat of FA signings that have occurred since midweek! Notice as well that just yesterday, MLBPA released to the public its own 'proposal')
If putting an end to signaling dance was the owners' intent, they achieved that goal as soon as Manfred took to the microphone.
On the other hand, having Manfred play this role will backfire, if it hasn't already. After all, owners have long benefitted from the fact that most people think of the Commissioner as a neutral figure representing equally the interests of all the main participants in professional Major League Baseball in the US.
Why risk reminding everyone that he is chosen by the owners to run their business, serving at their discretion.
Baseball may be America's Pastime, but it is the owner's business -- collectively speaking. And while it couldn't proceed without the players, that just means that owners have to treat the players well enough to make it an attractive way to make a living for enough of them to populate enough entertainment worthy teams.
Players well being is a constraint on owners' ability to maximize revenue and the value of their asset.
But isn't the better view -- the one that both sides should endorse -- that baseball is committed to a set of personal and collective moral values, that are not constraints on profit or value maximization, but worthy ends in their own right: including the values associated with treating others, including especially those with whom one jointly works to achieve collective goals, with dignity and respect.
That all actions undertaken by either side should reflect this conception of a relationship guided by shared norms, and not a naked reflection of self-interest.
But then again, owners are constrained by any number of factors beyond their control. They price in those constraints and manage the risks those factors present as best they can. And yet, constrained though they be, the value of owning a team continues to grow as do the number of individuals anxious to buy their way into the business.
But make no mistake. Players benefit when baseball flourishes.
My point here is very different.
The Commissioner is the owners' man in NYC, not the players; nor the players and the owners' jointly. Never was, and likely never will be.
In one fell swoop, the Mighty Manfred, (apologies to Little Steven's Underground Garage mainstay) has reminded baseball fandom who he works for, whose interests he represents; and who, for 20M+/year he is a messenger for, and on whose behalf he has presented a ludicrous moral case for a salary cap.
Leader, spokesperson and moral philosopher. Not my Linkedin page. His?
C'mon, it's disingenuous and worse, but...
You all know me by now. I am always looking for the positives in every situation, however grim it may appear on the surface, to the naked eye.
Were I representing the MLBPA, I would do as they have done in response.
Let Manfred's action speak for itself.
On the other hand, the owners have signaled to the players that they are in fact willing to compromise on just about every other potentially disputed issue. I would take that as an invitation I might want to cash in on at some point during the negotiations.
That's the best I can do on the bright side of the road -- for now.
One question I can't get out of my head, and a teaser
First the question.
At some point during a conversation I had today about this post with my editor, Paul, he said something along the lines of, "I wonder what the polling results would have been had the question been put differently: 'Would you support ownership insisting on a salary cap were that to result in no baseball in 2027?' Good question Paul. Which one? Both actually.
Now the teaser
Months ago I wrote that I would be covering the CBA negotiations focusing less on particular issues and more on the underlying structural features of the negotiations.
In one of the few papers I have written that I still fully embrace, I argued that in complex group interactions, whether negotiations or joint activities, so much of the difficulty in finding success comes from the fact that at least one of the groups, and more often all of them, are trying to externalize the costs of problems that are endogenous to their group to other groups, who are themselves in a similar boat trying to do the same.
In other words, the deep structure of issues that on the surface appear to be between Groups A and B, are often times best understood as issues internal to group A or group B (or both) that neither group can solve internally and wants instead to have those costs borne in part or whole by the other group.
That is precisely what is happening in the current situation. Most of the really hard problems facing MLB and the MLBPA are internal to the respective groups .i.e. the owners face problems that arise among the ownership group itself -- problems that may fracture them if they are not resolved. The same holds for MLBPA. In the next post I argue that this is in fact the deep structure of the problems that are being cast in terms of a salary cap.
Hopefully, I might convince you that the salary cap demand has far less to do with a problem traceable to any real issue between players and owners and has everything to do with a series of issues endogenous to the owners group.
Do you doubt this conclusion? Well, think back to the “minor league haul” the Mets received in the last great sell off. How’s Ryan Clifford doing? How about the rest of them? Now no one can definitively state that Jefferson Rojas is or is not going to be a solid major leaguer, but there is most certainly an element of risk.
In the interim they still are two starting pitchers, more relief pitchers, a first baseman, a second baseman and perhaps a catcher short of improving the current roster. The lockout is scheduled to begin in December, so November is your last chance to make these kinds of personnel changes.
Now waiting until the very last day permissible for action is one way to approach building a roster but it also could mean missing out on the vast majority of prime selections and instead winding up with the leftovers in the scratch and dent bin.
Now, to be fair, a great amount of planning has to do with whether or not they need to factor in the salary for Tarik Skubal into the payroll budget. If so then a great many other transactions will either necessitate jettisoning current payroll obligations or relegating yourself to picking up the bargain basement fill-ins who do not cost very much. Sometimes it works out — think Carson Benge over Mike Tauchman — but most often it does not.
Anthony
DiComo - @AnthonyDiComo
The Mets signed left-hander Justin
King to a two-year minor league contract, per source, and invited him to
MLB camp. If he's on the roster, the deal is worth a pro-rated $1m next year
and $1.1m in 2028.
King spent the last three seasons in the Marlins' system
with a 13.1 K/9.
GROK
–
Justin King (LHP, born
Dec. 19, 1997 in Lloydminster/Okotoks, AB, Canada; 6'1", 215 lbs) is a
left-handed relief pitcher whose primary arsenal centers on a mid-90s rising
four-seam fastball, a slider, and a changeup. Baseballsavant.mlb
He converted from a two-way/position player background (college at Indian Hills CC, Alabama, and Louisiana-Monroe) and signed with the Brewers out of independent ball in 2022. He spent time in the Brewers system before joining the Marlins organization in 2024, reaching Triple-A (Jacksonville) and posting strong strikeout rates with elevated walk rates.
His WHIP in 2025 and 2026 in the minors? Very high…1.79 and 1.77.
In
2026 he split time between Double-A Pensacola and Triple-A Jacksonville
(roughly 5.17 ERA overall in the minors that year with 69 K in 47 IP). He
elected free agency in early November 2026 and was reported signed by the Mets
to a two-year minor-league deal with a big-league spring training invite. X
Pitch repertoire
Four-seam fastball —
Primary pitch (often 45–70+% usage). Velocity typically 94–95.5 mph (peaks
higher). Strong induced vertical break (~15–17 inches) gives it “ride”/rising
action; arm-side run in the 7-inch range; spin ~2100–2200 rpm. Stuff grades
solid (around average to slightly above in models).
Slider — Secondary pitch
(roughly 25–35% usage). Velocity usually 83–86 mph. Features glove-side
movement (horizontal break varying by sample, often several inches) with modest
vertical break; higher spin (often 2200–2400+ rpm). Used as a put-away/miss-bat
offering.
Changeup — Tertiary pitch
(more common in some seasons, ~8–18% usage). Velocity typically mid-to-upper
80s (around 86–89 mph). Shows arm-side fade/run and some drop; useful for
velocity separation and against opposite-handed hitters.
Occasional sinker or curveball appearances
in limited samples, but the core is the 4-seam + slider + change mix.
He works primarily as a multi-inning or late-inning reliever, generating solid whiff rates (especially in lower levels/AFL) but dealing with command/walk issues at higher levels.
The fastball’s vertical life is a standout trait for a lefty, pairing well with the breaking ball and change for deception.
Data is limited to minor-league tracking (no extensive MLB
sample).
Now the 2026/2027 off season is indeed a strange one without a traditional Rule V Draft the risk in losing players not currently on the 40-man roster is somewhat minimized. No one knows how this lockout-induced mechanism will be reintroduced if and when the 2027 season begin. For now it is only conjecture to recommend what the Mets could or should do given the uncertainty of how prospects will be treated.
Earlier this week we examined some of the implications of what the do-nothing front office will do regarding the first base vacancy. Now it’s time to do the same exercise with second base.
Right now incumbent Marcus Semien who has been an All Star, won a Silver Slugger and won a Gold Glove more than once for each award. He has a highly credible career and when he does retire not only will he have a very healthy bank account but he’ll also have a mantle full of performance awards. It’s a fine story and a great legacy.
Of course, you could write that same story for many other players who in their prime were among the best in the game and then their subsequent diminished output as they aged and their former strength and agility seemed to begin to abandon them.
Semien’s last good season was in 2023. By anyone’s measure that was three full years ago. Then he hit .276 with 29 HRs and 100 RBIs. It wasn’t his best season of his career but it was one any player would be proud to have on the back of his baseball card.
After that the decline began. In 2024 he scaled down his totals considerably. His batting average dipped to just .237. The run production numbers were respectable — 23 HRs and 74 RBIs — but also down from his 2023 level of performance.
In 2025 it got markedly worse. The batting average slipped to just .230 and the run production plummeted. The HR total was just 15 and he drove in just 62.
He was traded to the Mets in what can best be described as a financial mitigation transaction. Brandon Nimmo was going to earn more money on the remainder of his contract than Semien would and with Semien’s track record it was questionably reasonable to expect that a change of scenery and better health could make it all a reasonable deal.
That outcome, of course, did not happen. For the Mets last year Semien hit just .215 with the same 15 HRs as he did the previous year but the RBI total slipped down to just 49. Having plummeted in the performance metrics now for three straight years it would appear Semien is indeed in his twilight years as a baseball player.
Now unsurprisingly David Stearns has publicly proclaimed Semien will get the opportunity to be the everyday second baseman as the club desperately attempts to extricate themselves from the cellar they owned for the 2026 season. Hmmn...
There are alternatives that exist. Outfielder AJ Ewing has ample time at the second base position. Finding another outfielder is probably easier than finding an offensively productive second baseman. The problem is that Ewing is at least competent and sometimes better playing alongside Juan Soto and Carson Benge. As a second baseman he’s not going to make anyone remember the skill of Doug Flynn in the field.
Then there are the younger minor leaguers.
Behind him you have Mitch Voit whose primary position is not second base. He could likely move there but he has even less pro experience than Rojas.
The other newcomer, Emilien Pitre, is a natural second baseman and is a couple of years older. He’ll likely begin the year in Syracuse as well, but his contact hitting skill and stolen base abilities make him into a viable future infield option.
So here we go again...settling for the convenient and certainly not the best option. Part of it is a vain attempt to justify yet another bad deal made by Stearns but part of it is acknowledgment that the alternatives are either not good enough yet to justify benching a guy owed $46 million for the 2027 and 2028 seasons. It is unfortunate but salary often dictates playing time.
MACK –
RELIEF PITCHING
We talked RED relievers
last week.
Here are the first of two BLUE prospect
breakouts:
The spin and rating will come at the end of these three
reliever posts.
MLB/Mets – Dedniel Nunez –
(30) – RHRP – 2030 FA – 2015 IFA –
2026 - MLB/Mets
– 18-apps, 0.1-WAR, 2-1, 3.32, 0.89, 19.0-IP, friggin 0-BB, 20-K
Nunez’s career came to an abrupt halt on 7-14-2025 when he
went under the knife for TJS on his right elbow. He returned to the mound in
August 2026, got off to a slow start (10-apps, 5.23), but once again put it all
together in September (8-apps, 1.04, 0.46, 8.2-IP, 1-ER, 0-BB, 10-K). This is
the pitcher he was before the injury and this is why he has earned a BLUE prospect rating. The only thing preventing
his from returning to a rating of RED is
time and proof his elbow is healed.
MLB/Mets – Jonathan Pintaro –
(28) – RHRP – 2032 FA – UDFA 2022 –
2026 - MLB/Mets
- -0.3-WAR, 22-apps, 2-3, 5.28, 1.37, 30.2-IP, 16-BB, 30-K
If Nunez is a hair away from being a RED prospect, then Pintaro is a thinner hair away from GREEN. His sub-par 2026 stats speak for himself.
His best was as a starter and I assume the Mets made him a reliever due to just
too many current starters at this level. Me? I would reinstate him to a starter
role in the first half of 2027 and play him at the AAA level. I’m a fan of him,
which might be coming into play here. Trust me. He’s just hanging on in this
role.
MLB/Mets – Daniel Duarte –
(29) – RHRP – 2028 FA – 2013 IFA –
2026 – MLB/Mets
– 1.1-WAR, 24-apps, 2-0, 2.12, 0.81, 29.2-IP, 7-BB, 30-K
Duarte pitched well in 2023 for Cincinnati (31-apps, 3-0,
3.69), but was shut down for most of the 2024 season and the entire year of 2025
season, due to right elbow surgery (UCL revision). He then signed a
minor-league contract with the Mets and began the road to recovery (AAA/Syracuse
– 24-apps, 3-2, 4.75). Things really took off in May when he was promoted to
the Mets (24-apps, 2-0, 2.12). Duarte is now considered a major league reliever
and, frankly, is developing into a damn good one. Look for him to be in Queens
come April.
AAA/Syracuse – Zach Franklin –
(27) – RHRP – 10th rd. 2013 –
2026 – AAA/Syracuse:
13-apps, 0-0, 1.72, 1.02, 15.2-IP, 6-BB, 15-K
Franklin came to the Mets last season, along with RHP Gabe Davis, for 36-yr old rental Huascar Brazoban. Davis produced a 2.53-ERA for
AA/Binghamton and Brazoban produced a 4.40-ERA for the White Sox. Big trade win
here for David Stearns. Franklin pitched 46 outings
at the AAA level so, I assume, he will get a shot in the spring to go to
Flushing next spring. If not, he’ll return to Syracuse and sit by the phone.
AAA/Syracuse - Garrett Stratton –
(23) – RHRP – 20th rd. 2025 –
2026 – AAA/Syracuse
– 4-apps, 0-0, 6.75, 1.69, 5.1-IP, 3-BB, 5-K
AA/Binghamton – 23-apps, 1-4,
1.52, 0.71, 29.2-IP, 2-BB, 38-K
Forget the cup of coffee in Cuse’. He’s just imitating so
many other pitchers that dominated at the AA level, only to be overwhelmed
early with the new ball, new umps, and new zone at AAA. What he did last season
for A+ Brooklyn (21-apps, 2.73) and the B-Mets. He had 48 total appearances in
2026 so I don’t expect to see him in winter ball. Look for him to return to AAA
and begin his quest to someday hit Queens.
AA/Binghamton – Carlos Guzman –
(28) – RHRP – 2015 IFA –
2026 – AAA/Syracuse: 5-apps, 1-0, 8.68/1.82, 9.1-IP, 5-BB,
11-K
AA/Binghamton: 40-apps, 6-2,
3.17, 1.20, 48.1-IP, 22-BB, 63-K
Originally signed by the Mets as a minor-league free agent
in 2023. K/9 ratio was very high at the AA level for a guy that tops off at 96.
He earned his BLUE stripe here based on what he did last season for the B-Mets.
Like Stratton, I give him a pass for his sub-par results last season in Syracuse.
For now.
AA/Binghamton – Ryan Dollar –
(23) – RHRP – UDFA 2025 –
2026 – AAA/Syracuse
– 1-app, 1-0, 0.00, 0.50, 2-IP, 0-BB, 4-K
AA/Binghamton – 31-apps, 3-2, 3.32,
1.39, 38.0-IP, 26-BB, 49-K
Dollar sets his table with a 90+ cutter, then a 95+ 4-seamer.
Generates a high K/9 ratio. Good whiff rates, though command has become an issue
at higher levels. “Dollar Bill” is just starting out but should open up in
Syracuse come spring. Could be a keeper.
December 2nd is the scheduled first day for the lockout.
Today is November 19th.
That’s 13 days until lockout day.
Normally, you start to see progress by now. Certain portions
of disputes are agreed to. Both parties are having constructive conversations.
They’re not sharing a turkey drumstick, but it looks like a work stoppage will
never happen.
In this case, this is a single issue surrounded by secondary
disagreements. The main issue is a salary cap. The owners want one, the players
don’t.
So, I would expect if this is going to be solved that both
parties would be meeting every day in a common room and meeting together with
reporters at the end of the day.
So, what are the two parties saying right now:
Owners:
Rob Manfred said there is
"plenty of room for compromise" with the MLBPA, but MLB will not
compromise on a salary cap and floor.
"The owners want a deal with a salary cap and
floor."
Players:
Statement from MLBPA Interim Executive Director Bruce Meyer:
“There can be no clearer example of the league’s lack of
seriousness than their insistence that they will not negotiate over the
economics outside of a radical change to the system that would dramatically
reduce overall player compensation for all categories of players and strip
fundamental rights from players like the ability to have truly guaranteed
contracts.
There should be no illusions about the owners’ true
motivation in pushing for this system. They want to make more money in profits
and franchise values by artificially suppressing player salaries.”
Me to you?
Stop worrying about the Rule 5 Draft. There ain’t gonna be
one.
We closed by asking how much of New York’s roster took shape under David Stearns.
Answering that requires examining the larger assignment he inherited. Stearns was expected to stabilize an organization trying to accomplish several difficult things simultaneously, while making it more successful on the field.
From the beginning of Steve Cohen’s ownership, the Mets faced four connected assignments:
Assignment | What it required |
Win now | Field competitive MLB teams and reach the playoffs. |
Build durable leadership and infrastructure | Establish continuity and capability in baseball operations, scouting, analytics, coaching and development. |
Build and develop the farm system | Accumulate talent and turn successive groups into productive major leaguers or useful trade assets. |
Continually replenish bridge talent | Replace departing, declining or injured players while waiting for internal solutions to develop. |
The season would not pause while the organization rebuilt itself.
Cohen could authorize spending immediately. Developing players, establishing leadership and improving organizational decisions would take longer.
Experienced major leaguers helped bridge that gap. But the bridge itself required constant maintenance. Contracts expired. Players aged. Injuries created openings. Successful acquisitions became more expensive to retain.
Whenever an internal replacement was unavailable, the Mets needed another external answer.
The ownership-era record captures both the financial commitment and the changes among those responsible for turning it into wins.
Dollar figures in millions.
Season | GM / POBO | Manager | Record | Postseason | CBT payroll | Tax | Payroll + tax |
2021 | Alderson / Scott¹ | Luis Rojas | 77–85 | Missed | $207.7 | $0.0 | $207.7 |
2022 | Billy Eppler | Buck Showalter | 101–61 | Wild Card exit | $299.8 | $30.8 | $330.6 |
2023 | Billy Eppler² | Buck Showalter | 75–87 | Missed | $374.7 | $100.8 | $475.5 |
2024 | David Stearns | Carlos Mendoza | 89–73 | Reached NLCS | $347.7 | $97.1 | $444.8 |
2025 | David Stearns | Carlos Mendoza | 83–79 | Missed | $346.7 | $91.6 | $438.3 |
2026³ | David Stearns | Mendoza / Green | 74–88 | Missed | $358.1 | $100.9 | $459.1 |
Total | 499–473 | Two appearances | $1,934.7 | $421.3 | $2,355.9 |
¹ Alderson was team president; Scott served as acting GM. Porter departed before the season; Alderson resumed GM duties in September.
² Stearns assumed control after the 2023 regular season.
³ Financial figures remain estimates. Andy Green replaced Carlos Mendoza in June.
CBT payroll uses tax-accounting values, including contract AAVs and benefits. Payroll plus tax is not actual cash spending. Totals use unrounded figures.
Cohen was pursuing immediate success while still establishing the leadership capable of sustaining it.
Stearns’ arrival offered the prospect of a more durable arrangement.
His Milwaukee experience suggested he understood how to compete while developing players, replenishing talent and managing difficult roster decisions.
The expectation in New York was compelling: combine those capabilities with Cohen’s financial resources.
That would give the Mets greater capacity to retain successful players, purchase coverage and absorb mistakes.
It also raised the pressure. Stearns was the experienced executive expected to bring stability while winning. Organizational development and immediate competition remained simultaneous obligations.
The emerging young group gives the Mets something substantial to build around.
As Part 4 discussed, Benge, McLean, Scott and Ewing supplied affordable production. Fair attribution still matters: McLean, Scott and Ewing entered the organization before Stearns; Benge was drafted under his administration.
Developing inherited talent deserves credit. So do acquisition, rehabilitation, promotion and deployment decisions.
But those contributions must be evaluated alongside the surrounding roster.
The 2024 run demonstrated that the Mets could compete deep into October. The next two seasons demonstrated that they had not established a dependable way to return.
Stearns’ teams have gone 246–240, with one postseason appearance.
There is a tension here. Stearns was expected to stabilize the organization while changing its players.
Some turnover was necessary. Continuity cannot mean preserving an unsuccessful roster indefinitely.
However, every new player, position and role creates adjustment work. A collection of individually defensible moves still has to function together.
That is where my own preseason assessment was too confident. I underestimated how many favorable outcomes needed to align for the 2026 roster to work.
The same scrutiny belongs in evaluating management: how much uncertainty did the construction require the team to overcome?
Cohen supplied financial capacity. The organization has developed useful young players. Stearns has provided continuity at the top of baseball operations.
Those are meaningful ingredients.
Milwaukee demonstrated that organizational strength could survive a leadership transition. New York is still trying to demonstrate that its current leadership can make competitive seasons dependable.
The final installment returns to the question that opened this series: how effectively does an organization turn its resources into sustained winning?
For the Mets, the next proof needs to come in the standings.
Sources: MLB records and leadership announcements; final CBT assessments reported by AP/ESPN; FanGraphs’ November 18, 2026 payroll estimate.