The changing role of relievers and the relief they provide
There is no denying that the changing conception of what it means to be a starting pitcher in the modern game has had the greatest impact on what it means to be a reliever, and how teams construct their bullpen.
In 2016, 23% of starts lasted into the 7th inning or beyond. Pitchers averaged 95 pitches per start. By 2026 those numbers were reduced to 9% and 84, respectively.
Starters are rarely allowed, let alone asked, to pitch beyond the sixth inning, and often end up pitching less than that. The average in 2026 was a hair over 5 innings per outing.
The success and durability of starters are no longer measured by innings per outing having been replaced by the number of total appearances: taking the ball every sixth day.
Relievers have always been asked to provide relief (an insightful banality, that one). Two things have changed.
* Relief is required more often and earlier than ever.
* As the role has expanded, it has also become significantly more structured, as relievers fall into ever more well defined specific roles, each defined by a distinctive task and set of expectations.
Let's consider aspects of both. First, why the increased reliance on relief pitching earlier and earlier in games?
Let's use the analytics as a proxy for what the underlying causal factors are.
Apparently, the relevant analytics indicates that:
* Starting pitchers make the greatest positive impact on the game on average by pitching with maximum available effort for however long they can sustain that effort.
* Whatever strategic advantage, if any, the starting pitcher is able to create over the opposing team's line-up on average dissipates rapidly after the second time through the line-up.
The result is, more often than not, an early call to the bullpen.
Maintaining the initial competitive advantage requires replacing the starter with a reliever (and then another and invariably others to follow as the task changes during the course of the game).
The conventional view is that (especially) the first relievers called into service should offer something different than the starter: perhaps a different combination of pitches or a different sequencing of the same pitches, perhaps a different arm angle, and so on.
The underlying thought is that just when the offense has figured out the starter, replace him with someone else who offers a new and distinctive challenge.
I like to call this the video-game strategy, because it is exactly as how one would envision creating a video baseball game.
Like much conventional wisdom, there is some truth in it, but less than one is asked to believe. After all, hitters have 'books' on all pitchers and if there is something new on offer, it is only a matter of time before the word spreads and a method of attack develops.
Whatever the explanation-- maximum effort leaving starters with less in the tank and thus rendering them effective for shorter periods of time, or simply an effort to take advantage of presenting hitters with different challenges throughout the game and thus not giving them a chance to get comfortable in the box -- the striking fact is that the vast majority of games are turned over to the 'Pen' around the time the game is barely halfway completed.
(We will set aside the irony of the fact that teams look to have a stable group of starters, while juggling their bullpens regularly on a yearly basis.)
The unhappy fate of Middle Relievers
Given their typical entry point into the fray, it is only fitting that the first group out of the pen have are typically referred to as 'middle relievers.'
That may be no more than coincidence, but apt nonetheless.
I prefer to characterize those who take over from the starters by their primary task or functional role, which is primarily either to buy time for their team's offense either to cut into a deficit they face or to an extend a lead they have attained.
In a sense they are brought in either to affirm continued control of the game or to establish it if the starter has failed or to re-establish it if it has been lost or is slipping away.
It's actually hard to imagine a more significant role for a reliever to play; and it should come as no surprise that the outcomes of a statistically significant number of games is determined during the time middle relievers are on the mound.
What is harder to square with the importance of the role they play is the compensation they tend to receive for the work they are being asked to perform.
Why are middle relievers undervalued?
Here's my take. Every year, there is an abundance of potential middle relievers available through free agency. The supply vastly exceeds the demand, thus driving prices down. The relatively low price they can command is naturally understood in the market as reflecting their value, that is, their relative importance or contribution.
They are viewed more or less as commodities, which are resources, services or assets that are differentiated from one another largely by price. In the market price is often identified with value, and so it is the fate of middle relievers to be undervalued and undercompensated.
In my view, the pricing of middle relievers is an unreliable signal of value that attentive GMs and FO personnel should, can, and sometimes do, exploit. Doing so was the KEY factor in the outsized positive performance of the Mets bullpen last year.
Arguably, it was Stearns' greatest achievement in roster construction. Unfortunately his eye for talented middle relievers is not matched by a talent for secondary position players.
The specialists
Until recently we thought of specialists as pitchers brought into games to face a particular hitter or two, often a lefty on lefty matchup, or a super high velocity pitcher against a hitter with a known deficit in catching up with fastballs, or a ground ball expert with the lead runner on third and less than two outs; and so on.
This has changed with the three batter rule to some extent, but not completely. Specialists are better thought of as maximum effort performers that feature an outsized advantage in particular circumstances, combined with a competence to complete an inning's worth of work if need be.
Built for purpose, specialists are typically not workhorses. They have distinctive skills that play in short bursts and cannot be called upon to face a diversity of batters, more than a day or so in succession, and almost never for more than an inning at a time.
Raley was a specialist in this sense; and for comparison, Brozaban was a paradigm of the middle reliever. Minter was, by my lights neither, nor was he the sort of high leverage back of the bullpen arm. He was a kind of B/B+ at all three, but an A at none of them. Handy but not essential in my view.
The back of the bullpen
Ironically, perhaps, back end of the bullpen relievers have much the same role as middle relievers in that they have to keep the game where it is, but because they enter later in the game, it would be odd to think of them as buying time. Or if you like, you can think of them as buying time, the time they are buying is more precious, the danger of falling short in their mission more consequential. They are paid accordingly.
Closers have the privilege of pitching in the most pressure packed circumstances and are paid accordingly. They are the insurance a team pays in order to minimize the probability that all the effort the team has put into the game to this point is no wasted.
I am not convinced that the data would support the narrative around closers as there is almost certainly an argument for distributing the risk among the group at the back end of the bullpen.
The typical bullpen has 7 or 8 pitchers: 3 at the back, 2 or 3 in the middle and 2 specialists deployed as needed. When there are 8 relievers, one can triple as long reliever, mop up man and spot starter from time to time.
So who should we hope to see in the Mets bullpen next year -- who fits in what role?
We can pencil Williams in as one of the high leverage relievers. I am not sure he should be the closer but then again I think that role designation is more restrictive than helpful.
I would much prefer Morejon as the closer. I am very high on Loisaga who has found himself again as a high leverage righty who presents a different challenge to hitters than both Williams and Morejon. He is also an ex-Yankee and Stearns can't resist signing at least one ex-Yankee for the bullpen every year.
Like every group, there are questions about all three of these pitchers. Morejon hasn't closed in the past (but only because the Padres have the best closer in the league). Williams has been up and down, recently more down than up. Loisaga had a great year, but has had a previous injury history.
There are other combinations that make sense. If, as I suggested in my previous post, the Mets pursue Morejon as a top tier starter, they might plausibly pursue Alex Vesia as a late innings reliever.
I am sure there are other potential options available, and perhaps at some point next year Lambert will earn a spot at the back of the pen.
I am not counting Senga among this group for two reasons. First, I believe his performance at the end of last year has increased his trade value.
Second, if he is not traded, I don't believe that his performance late last year is likely to be repeated; certainly it would be unwise to count on it. I don't see him having the mentality or the physical durability to show up as often as someone at the back of the pen must. He is not a workhorse. He would be a high priced specialist, but is more suited to that role temperamentally and physically.
For me, Lavender is the other specialist on the staff. In addition to getting lefties out in critical circumstances, he has the demeanor to give good innings over and over again, and not allow the games in which he fails to do so bother him.
That's five, which leaves two more openings, both middle relievers. Over the course of the season, I see several pitchers performing in this role: Garrett and Megill, but not until they are both healthy. Nunez and Duarte have made a case for consideration. I am sure there are others who will earn a shot over the course of the season.
If Manaea is not traded or released, he is likely to be a 6th (spot) starter, long reliever and a lefty jack of all trades in the pen.
I am not a believer in Yan yet. The one thing you cannot afford to have in the pen is someone who offers too many free passes, and right now Yan's command is volatile.
Conclusion
I don't think it is possible to feel as good about the Mets bullpen going into next year as we did about how the bullpen performed last year before it was dismantled. But then again, I don't think we felt as good about that bullpen going into the year last year as we did about them just prior to their being dismantled.
We would certainly have reason to feel as good about this projected bullpen (or modest variations of it) as we did about last year's prior to the season starting: better in fact.
I am not predicting that Stearns will see things as I do, but I would predict that he will fashion a bullpen that complements the starters and forms a strong foundation for the team going forward.













