Cautious Optimist -- Mendoza and the Mets

 

The Mets are unwatchable

There are any number of reasons for watching or listening to a baseball game, ranging from pure entertainment to emotional commitment. Unfortunately, at the moment, none of these reasons apply to watching a Mets' game.  They are literally unwatchable.  Listening on the radio while driving should be prohibited by law, since doing so is likely unreasonably dangerous to other drivers, pedestrians, property, and to oneself.

If you disagree, you haven't been paying attention.  In the law, we use the phrase, res ipsa loquitur, (typically translated as 'the act speaks for itself') to describe situations like the ones the Mets are in.  The play on the field speaks for itself.

The Case for Replacing Mendoza

Unlike schoolyard play or political elections, baseball does not permit do-overs or a recount.  There are a number of factors that limit baseball teams from making wholesale changes to the roster all at once.   And while you can't fire the entire team, even if you would like to, you can always replace the manager. 

And doing so costs a lot less than than firing an SEC football coach. 

Speaking of which, if major league baseball had a transfer portal, how many current Mets players do you think would have entered it by now? 

Inevitably, the manager is a low cost scapegoat for a team trying to keep the fan base engaged.

Replacing Mendoza, however would not be a case of scapegoating. It would be unnecessarily harsh to say that he has earned his firing.  But it is not harsh to say that he has given the FO ample grounds for letting him go. His record in the first half of 2024 and the last half of 2025 was unacceptable.  If you put the first half of 2024 together with the last half of 2025, you get a pretty good picture of what 2026 is shaping up to look like. 

No one should believe that the Mets' current dismal performance is down to Mendoza's management alone. The players have contributed mightily as has Stearns.  Frankly, no one in the organization has given fans reason to think that changing the manager alone will stimulate a tectonic shift. 

It was always puzzling that while almost all of last season's coaching staff was let go, Mendoza was retained. The team's performance so far this year makes that decision virtually incomprehensible. The team is listless and frustrated, and Mendoza has failed to provide the spark or leadership to reverse course now, just as he was unable to put the brakes on (or even to slow down) the train wreck last summer. 

Kafka walked with a cane, as did Balzac.  Engraved on Balzac's cane was the expression: 'I overcome all obstacles.'  On Kafka's, "All obstacles overcome me.'

If the obstacles thrown his way have not quite overcome Mendoza, he has done little to show that he is ready to meet the moment.

The mistake may have been retaining Mendoza after last year's collapse. All that the FO can do now is stop the bleeding and limit its impact going forward.   Mendoza's contract expires at the end of the season and if he is not going to be extended, what's the point of letting the situation drag on. 

It's a bad look all around for the FO as well, as retaining Mendoza in the face of the team's currently embarrassing performance after last year's collapse would reasonably be understood as endorsing the job he has done while also, in effect, giving up on the season.  Accepting, if not endorsing a level of performance by the manager they would not accept in players or in themselves. 

As Bill Parcell's famously said, 'You are what your record says you are."

Is There A Case Against Letting Mendoza Go Now

The view that you are what your record says you are is best interpreted as a presumption and not a conclusion.  It may be generally true, but there are bound to be exceptions.  So something other than the record itself must provide countervailing reasons to keep someone whose record would suggest otherwise.

If there are countervailing considerations based on Mendoza's dugout performance that outweigh those adduced in favor of letting him go, I have not been privy to them.  I have certainly not seen them in person or on TV, and I'm good for over 100 games/season.  I have every reason to believe that his players like him and enjoy playing for him. I'm sure he's a good guy and probably an even better person. And, like others before him who have not performed well in their first foray into managing or coaching, he may well prove himself a good manager down the road -- if not quite to the level, say, of Bill Belichick. 

I don't believe the FO has seen anything that would make them believe he should be their manager long term. If they had, they would have extended him by now, and not left him hanging. I don't think they owe it to him (or to anyone) to give him the remainder of the season to prove himself, either.  

On the other hand, it is clear that they are reluctant to let him go -- just yet.  I don't know why they feel that way, but I have an interpretation of the current situation and its causes that might make their reluctance understandable, if not ultimately justifiable.   You be the judge.

Here's my take:

The story begins with this past offseason.  Many (maybe even most) Mets fans interpret Stearns' moves this past offseason as having two separate, but related, motivations.  The first of these was to break up the team's core because they weren't getting the job done.  The second was to replace that core with players who together and in concert with the remaining team would get the job done: in other words, lead the team to a deep playoff run.   Let's call this the conventional interpretation of what Stearns was up to.

Up to a point, I agree with the first part of the conventional view.  Where I differ is that there was more to letting this specific group of players leave or sending them packing.  I say that because there were other possible combinations of players within the core that, if let go, would have accomplished the same goal.  And some of those other players would have been easier to trade or could have netted a greater return in trades, or both.

Stearns picked these players, and not others, specifically, and for three related reasons.  One may well have had to do with club chemistry.  Another had to do with his view about which vet players would make better mentors to the players in the pipeline, soon to find themselves on the major league roster. The third, and perhaps the most important, had to do with time alignment with the coming influx of top prospects becoming ready for the majors

And it this latter point that leads to my rejecting the second part of the conventional view.  Fans have criticized the additions Stearns made to the roster on the grounds that they do not adequately replace the production of those who have packed their bags-- voluntarily or otherwise.  But this line of criticism is based on the assumption that the player moves were designed as replacements for the departed.  And that's the mistake.

Of course the newcomers replaced the departed, but only in terms of roster spots, not as direct replacements. The likes of Semien, Polanco and Robert Jr. were not brought in to replace anyone or to constitute a new core. 

They were brought in to help create a different kind of team that would contend for a championship over the next two years while forming a bridge to the infusion of the next group of core players, who were currently toiling in the minors, not yet ready for the majors, but, who would eventually form much of the team's core for a period of five to ten years thereafter.

Look at the deals. Polanco is on a two year deal, Semien on a three year deal; Robert Jr on a one year deal plus a team option; Peralta on a one year deal; and so on.  Even the deals they offered Tucker and Bichette were short term with opt outs likely to be exercised.  None of these deals and offers extended into the window when the first wave of new players of the Stearns era were expected to contribute significantly to the ballclub.  

Nor should one have any doubt that Stearns would have preferred to have Benge play in AAA for much if not all of this year as well, as his loading up outfielders with major league experience in Melendez and Tauchman, for example, not to mention the big swing he took at Tucker, would indcate. 

Even the trade with the Brewers fit the same interpretation of Stearn's motivation.  To compete over the next two years, the Mets needed better pitching and more of it.  They traded a good pitcher and a promising position player, but they had back-ups and alternatives to both just a year or two away from being able to compete for a role on the blg league club. And they received better pitching and more of it in return.

In talking about the next wave of players currently honing their craft in the minors, I have in mind position players like Ewing, Morabito, and Pena for a start, and pitchers like Santucci, Wenninger, Scott, Tong, Lambert, Ross and Thornton.  Others who might compete for roster spots and a role in the core are a bit farther off, like Voit and Suero, and others for a position on the roster include Clifford and Reimer.  

The process is designed to continue, and always be supplemented by the occasional well chosen free agent.  But it has to be started cleanly in order to create proper time alignment. The likes of Lindor, Soto and the young veteran Alvarez were to be among the veterans expected to mentor and integrate this wave of players into the major league team.

This offseason's additions are not replacements for Alonso, Nimmo, McNeil, and Diaz; they are the bridge to the actual replacements who are a year or two away.  

Still, I can understand a critic of the approach I attribute to Stearns arguing that Stearns could have (and should have) kept the players he let go and have them serve as the bridge to their replacements.  Why replace players you already have under contract who could act as a bridge to their actual replacements with other temporary replacements.  Isn't that one set of replacements too many?

I get the point, but its persuasiveness depends on factors that the critic is ignoring.  First of all, Nimmo had a long term contract that would ultimately have interfered with the plan to integrate the likes of Ewing and Morabito into the team.  I believe the Mets would have been happy to keep Alonso for three years, but he wanted (and received) a longer deal that also would have upset time aligning the new wave of players into the core.  And keeping them and McNeil would have done nothing to address the clubhouse chemistry issues.

If there was a whiff by Stearns, it was letting Diaz go without much of a fight.  Who knows if he would have won the battle with the Dodgers given Diaz's strong desire to play for them  Maybe he could have gotten more for Nimmo.  I am focusing on the overall picture/plan.  Some moves will work out worse/better than others.  The interpretation I offer may not be correct.  It is certainly not the only plausible one.  But it may be the most plausible one, and even if it isn't, it is plausible.  And if it captures to some degree what Stearns was thinking, it sheds light on where the Mets are now and how they got here. It also explains why they are reluctant to let Mendoza go.

How does this explanation figure in Mendoza's situation

In other posts I have argued that organizations are typically designed to solve for three issues: information, authority and accountability.  Successful ones find ways to link the three effectively.  Unsuccessful ones don't. Among those that don't the biggest gap is that between authority and accountability.

I think Cohen and Stearns are aware of the issues organizations face and that both see that the failure of this season is that the plan isn't working out.  The additions (and some of the existing players as well) have not contributed to making the team competitive. In fact, their collective performance may be so bad that Stearns will be forced to abandon to some degree his plan to keep players in the minors until they are absolutely ready.  In other words, both legs of the plan -- maintaining competitiveness while providing a bridge to the real replacements -- may fail miserably.

Whatever the explanation, the fact is that the risk of failure at this level was created by implementing the first step in the overall plan hatched primarily by Stearns with Cohen's approval.  I think their reluctance to let Mendoza go reflects their realization that they are partially to account for the situation in which Mendoza has been placed.  

Thus, they are reluctant to let Mendoza go because they believe that they have not put him in the best position to succeed, and the players they have brought in as a bridge to the future have to this point not performed as planned. It is not a defense of Mendoza, but more an acknowledgment that they took away some of Mendoza's best assets for reasons having to do largely with their long term plans, not Mendoza's potential success, and they are reluctant to have him pay the full costs of their decisions.

Well then, what should the front office do? 

Speaking only for myself, while there is blame enough to go around, decisions made today should reflect what one is hoping to achieve going forward.  

As leadership of the organization, Stearns and Cohen have a responsibility to put the team in the best position to succeed going forward.  They haven't done that this year, at least not to this point.  

If they are not going to fire themselves, how can they justify firing Mendoza?

But then what was their thinking last year when in effect they let the entire coaching staff go while keeping Mendoza?  If it meant that they thought that Mendoza was the right person for the job, then they should have extended him then.

They didn't.

I take that to mean that they weren't sure about his fit.  They were going to determine this year whether he is the right choice.  In effect they were trying to do three things at the same time: win, prepare for the future, and assess whether the manager is the person to lead the team in the future.  

Obviously, they did not believe that the first two years provided them with enough evidence to be confident in whatever judgment they could have made on Mendoza.  The problem for them must be that they don't believe they have enough evidence yet this year as they believe the team's performance now is probably more their doing than his.

I think they want to see a larger sample size in which Soto returns and the players they brought in perform as the back of their baseball cards suggest they should.  They want to see how that team performs so that they can disaggregate what Mendoza has contributed to the record from what the players and the FO have.

That is entirely reasonable, but only if your only goal right now is to make the best decision on Mendoza based on the most reliable evidence you can ascertain. 

But the FO cannot have only this one goal at this moment  They owe it to the fans to keep them engaged and give them a team that competes and deserves their entertainment dollar.  Right now the Savannah Bananas are significantly more entertaining and very likely nearly as competitive.  More importantly, decision makers never have all the information they would like to have: that's why there exist entire fields of study devoted to decision making under uncertainty.  Decision making under certainty or full information is theoretical not actual.

This is the actual world. The goal is not to make the FO comfortable in their decisions.  By taking on the roles they have, they have bought into risking discomfort about even some of the most important decisions they have to make.

We should recognize that for them this is a hard decision, even if it isn't for us.  But we should expect them to make it when it needs to be made, not when they are sufficiently comfortable in doing so.  And that time is now.

If they believe that there will be insufficient chance that maintaining the status quo will result in a season that would lead them to extend Mendoza at its conclusion, then they should release him now.   

Does replacing Mendoza guarantee a turnaround?

Of course not.

Is letting Mendoza go fair to him?

Wrong question.  The question is whether it is unfair to him.  It is not.  

Sometimes you are going to do things that are hard and painful.  Sometimes you have to do so even when you feel you are partially to blame for the situation other people, whose fate is in your hands, face. 

Always you have to look to the future and that means that sometimes you just have to move on.  This is probably one of those times.