5/9/26

RVH - Strategy Without Execution Is Hallucination

 

By now, Mets fans understand the strategy.

David Stearns did not arrive in Queens trying to win a press conference. He arrived trying to build an organization. The long-term vision has always been clear: create a sustainable baseball operation capable of producing a consistent World Series contender, not just occasional spikes of relevance tied to owner spending.

That strategy makes sense.

Build the pipeline. Preserve flexibility. Avoid emotional contracts. Develop pitching internally. Layer the roster instead of chasing headlines. Create organizational depth that survives injuries, regression, and the randomness of a 162-game season.

In theory, it is exactly what modern baseball organizations should do.

But eventually, every strategy reaches the same unavoidable checkpoint:

What are the actual outcomes?

Because strategy without execution is hallucination.

And right now, the Mets are drifting into dangerous territory where fans are no longer judging the philosophy. They are judging the results.

That is fair.

Steve Cohen did not buy the Mets to oversee a five-year TED Talk about organizational design. He bought the Mets to build a perennial contender. Stearns was hired to turn baseball theory into baseball reality.

The problem is not that the Mets lack a plan.

The problem is that too many parts of the plan remain incomplete, delayed, inconsistent, or hypothetical.

Look at the current state of the organization honestly.

The lineup still leans heavily on expensive veteran stars to carry offensive production. The farm system has improved in reputation, but the number of impact major league contributors actually helping win games in Queens remains limited. Pitching development, supposedly the lifeblood of sustainable contention, still looks more aspirational than proven.

The organization talks constantly about depth, yet every meaningful injury still exposes structural fragility.

The Mets are better organized than they were three years ago. That part is undeniable. The baseball operation feels more rational, calmer, and more disciplined.

But disciplined process alone does not hang banners.

At some point, the farm system must produce real players. The pitching lab must produce real starters. The development system must produce real surplus value. The roster construction philosophy must produce October-caliber depth.

Not eventually.

Now.

Because the National League does not pause while the Mets continue building infrastructure.

The Dodgers execute. The Braves execute. The Yankees execute. Even organizations with lower payrolls consistently extract more production from younger, cheaper, internally developed talent.

That is the standard the Mets chose when they adopted this model.

And that comparison matters because Stearns is not being evaluated against the chaos that preceded him. He is being evaluated against the elite organizations the Mets are trying to become.

That is a much harder test.

The danger for the Mets is that the organization begins mistaking process improvement for competitive arrival.

Those are not the same thing.

Fans can see the distinction clearly. They hear about system alignment, development modernization, long-term flexibility, and organizational discipline. Then they watch a team that still struggles with lineup consistency, pitching stability, bullpen overexposure, and roster imbalance.

The disconnect creates frustration because the messaging sounds further ahead than the actual baseball outcomes.

And to be fair, some of this simply takes time. Building an elite baseball operation is harder than buying one in free agency. Drafting and development are volatile. Pitchers break. Prospects fail. Timelines slide.

That reality is true.

But eventually, “the process takes time” stops functioning as explanation and starts sounding like insulation from accountability.

The Mets are approaching that line.

Especially because this organization no longer operates under small-market constraints. Cohen’s financial power changes expectations entirely. The Mets are not trying to scratch out occasional Wild Card appearances. They are trying to become a dominant modern baseball organization with both financial muscle and developmental strength.

That combination should create enormous advantage.

Instead, the Mets still feel stuck between phases.

Not reckless anymore. But not fully realized either.

And that middle ground becomes uncomfortable after a while because fans can tolerate rebuilding, and they can tolerate contention, but they struggle to tolerate endless transition.

That is where execution becomes everything.

Execution means converting prospects into contributors. It means creating pitching depth that survives attrition. It means turning player development philosophy into actual WAR on the field. It means building a roster where injuries expose the bench instead of collapsing the structure.

Most importantly, execution means the organization’s stated identity starts appearing consistently in the standings.

Not in presentations.

Not in interviews.

Not in organizational language.

In wins.

The encouraging part for the Mets is that this is still recoverable. The organization is not broken. It is incomplete.

There is still enough talent, enough financial support, and enough structural competence to close the gap between philosophy and results.

But the timeline is changing.

The grace period attached to “the vision” is expiring - quickly.

Eventually, every organization has to stop describing what it is building and start showing it.

That is the next phase for David Stearns.

Because the strategy has already been explained.

Now comes the harder part:

Proving it works.


14 comments:

TexasGusCC said...

David Stearns did a good job building the structure, but he has done a bad buying the groceries. He has wasted more money than some teams have payroll. Everyine makes mistakes, but there are some mistakes that are obvious from the get go. And signings that were obvious risks. Also, he won’t promote from within unless it’s a last resort and that should keep younger free agents from signing minor league free agent contracts.

Too, Cohen bought the team because the owner of the Mets can use the Shea Stadium grounds to build a casino - and he will. We all knew that. Now New Yorkers won’t be going to Foxwoods and tourists can drop some coin as long as the politician dont ruin everything completely.

Mack Ade said...

I was a Senior Vice President of what now is I Heart Radio

Whatever Stearns has attempted to do has failed and, if he was one of my station managers turning out this kind of ratings or revenue, he would be tossed.

Simple

TexasGusCC said...

Disagree. He has done half the job very well, and half not as well. He needs a GM.

RVH said...

I just don’t know how much authority he & cohen would give a GM. They don’t even let their manager write the lineup or select from a fixed set of tactical choices for in-game decisions.

Mack Ade said...

Decisions coming from the geeks, determined by Stearns

Tom Brennan said...

The Mets’ grade always seems to be Incomplete.

Tom Brennan said...

Gus, he will promote every pitcher known to man, while developing the real arms. Minors veteran hitters I agree - only get called up when there are injuries.

Jules C-- The Cautious Optimist said...

Here's my take: I just don't know what to think. There clearly major failures of judgment that should not be dismissed. Let's take 3 of them: Montas was the worst, followed closely by Maneaa; then very likely Robert and Polanco. If Stearns is an analytics guy, then where was his use of analytics in each of these cases. I looked through the analytics and the biomechanics (both available to Stearns). You needed very little of either to be dubious of Montas, and there was no basis for the length or price of the contract. Maneaa would have been exposed based entirely on knowledge of the biomechanics of the move he had developed. I discussed this before. What works for someone like Sale biomechanically is problematic for someone with a build like Manaea. Sale is built like a kid who looks more like Gumby than the Jolly Green Giant. Injuries were inevitable. Rule number one in body movement pattern changes: it is not possible to change just one thing. Everyone knows that. You have to change all the pieces that make your fundamental change viable. If you don't you overexhaust or strain the complementary components. This is all bio-science which after all a part of data analytic approach. As for Robert and Polanco, their respective injury histories required almost NO analytics. And while I'm at it, even a cursory look at Peralta, who has pitched well enough this year to have had a better record, would reveal that he has lost juice on his fastball and averages under 6 innings a game, which is to say that it falls short of a desirable baseline everyone recognizes. At least they didn't rush to sign him to an extension.
Now let's look at how far they have missed when it comes to players in the organization. I will focus on the baby Mets: Baty, Vientos and Alvarez. All of them have swing issues and patterns that would be uncovered by modest levels of analytics and biomechanics. Baty's long and languid swing would lead to predictions or hypotheses about what he will hit well/poorly in terms of speed and location. Well low and behold, a cursory look at performance indicates that he is piss poor at contact with heat above the waist and off speed down and in. Not a single change in his movement pattern. Vientos is really an issue of pitch recognition, a steeper than desirable path (path determines low point in the swing and along with other things helps determine where you will have difficulty with pitches). I won't go into my suggestions as to ways of fixing this. I am concerned primarily by the absence of mechanical adjustments being advanced by coaching staff; frankly, i doubt they see the connections. Alvarez has poor sequencing that they haven't corrected. Where are the alleged 'analytics' in all this. I haven't studied Mauricio enough to have a view, but I certainly have seen him unable to hit right handed and unable to lay off or command anything inside and up.
Frankly, I have my concerns about deep the analytics really are, how broadly the analytics are conceived and whether the analytics are being appropriately interpreted given the science of movement patterns and the relationship between mindset and outcome, namely cognitive and neuro science of task learning and development.

Jules C-- The Cautious Optimist said...

I'm not done. There is a non-trivial difference between analytics in assessing players and analytics used to construct a batting order or filling out a roster. In a batting order there is the individual and the interactive aspects. I just will use an example drawn from work I have done as a reviewer of audio equipment.
I am asked to review a component, say an amplifier. What can I learn about the amplifier, by simply replacing the one that is in my current system with it? Very little actually. My system has a characteristic sound. I replace my amp with the one under review, and all I can really judge is nothing about the amplifier itself, and only about how it interacts with what I already have in my system. An audio system is a system. So too is a line-up. So I never review that way. I call the manufacturer and ask them to tell me what other components they use to test their products with and then ask them to provide those components or near equivalents to me during the review period. Because I want to hear the amplifier in the best setting for it. I want to inform the readers of how it performs when it is surrounded by what the designer had in mind, etc. And the same with a lineup. You don't put a lineup together by applying the analytics to individual players and choose accordingly. They play together and the analytics of individual performance may tell you precious little about the analytics of the whole. And the performance of the Mets holistically, from an offensive point of view, simply sucks
Ok, done for now

Jules C-- The Cautious Optimist said...

In short, while I like what RVH calls the 'structural elements' of the organization design, I am not so sure about the actual depths or breadth of the analytics being deployed in making some of the key baseball decisions. My own cursory look reveals genuine areas of concern. I am also distressed by a rumor I have heard repeatedly (which doesn't make it true) that there is a kind of universal approach to hitting mechanics being taught. This would show a total lack of understanding of movement patterns and a misapplication of any analytics or the proper marriage of the analytics with an understanding of biomechanics and cognitive and neuro science.
As I used to tell my undergraduate philosophy students: The only thing worse than no knowledge of philosophy at all or no curiosity about it is having just enough knowledge of it to be dangerous and a royal pain in the a...

RVH said...

They need better talent - on the field & in the front office

Viper said...

First of all, good read RVH.
I think that the cardinal sin of Stearns is giving too much value to a failed/mediocre players from other organizations while ignoring a similar player currently in-house.

Let me give you an example.
In 2023, Luis Robert Jr. hit 38 hrs, drove in 80 while hitting in the 260 range. He followed that by 2024/2025 with just 14hrs, with 35/53 rbi's and hitting in the 220 range. In 2026, he is already hurt again thereby bringing no value to the Mets.

In contrast, Mark Vientos in 2024 hit 27 hrs, drove in 80 runs while playing about 30 games less than Robert Jr. Vientos then had his worse year in 2025 and still produced 17 hrs and drove in 61.

Stearns formula E=MC2 says that Luis Robert Jr. will not break down and will hit not only 38 hrs but 40 and drive in 100 all while sitting on the bench and Mark Vientos doesn't deserve to be given another opportunity to see if he can be an actual answer at 1B. BTW, Mark is starting to look good at 1B or is it me?.

The same can be said about why Semien is here when Jett could have given the Mets similar production at minimal salary. Polanco I get even less.

In my view, any GM that cannot put together a highly competitive team while having one of the highest payrolls is not worth keeping. The prospects that he has given up vs what he has brought in is very poor. Trading Sproat will end up as a mistake especially one Peralta signs with another team.


Paul Articulates said...

Very well written. He gave his best shot. Somewhere along the organizational lines, something has failed that was an underpinning assumption in the plan. No one is hitting at any level in this organization. Find the root cause for that and fix it if you want the overall plan to work.

Gary Seagren said...

Big question now is who will answer for this mess when we miss the playoffs? Just how golden is DS who SC wanted badly? Also why do good/great organizations continually produce playoff caliber teams no matter what their budgets are and we continue to fail time and time again no matter who the owner or GM is. We are currently a AAA team and the gap to just be respectable is huge and with our playroll the playoffs should be guaranteed with no excuses. David Stearns FIX IT!