Reese Kaplan - Was Signing David Wrong?

Saying anything negative about David Wright is tantamount to spitting on the flag and declaring apple pie a sacrilege. He’s a homegrown talent, arguably the top offensive force ever to come up through the Mets farm system.  That he was the result of a supplemental pick received for Mike Hampton’s departure for the better school systems (and pitching hell) of Colorado makes it that much sweeter.  When his team friendly contract was expiring at the end of 2012 the nearly universal exhortation from the fan base was to sign him at any cost.  Not only is he the face of the franchise, but he has also recently been voted the face of major league baseball.

At times I felt I was the lone voice advocating parting ways with David Wright.  What I observed was his declining production over the past few years of his deal, but his past accomplishments would surely push his new guaranteed salary into heretofore unseen territories for a Mets batter.  Sure, Johann Santana got his back loaded deal that everyone similarly insisted was an absolute necessity.  No hitter withstanding, he missed about as much time as a Met than he played and his contract became one of several financial albatrosses that crippled the team’s ability to field a competitive roster. 

From 2005 to 2008 he was indisputably one of the top ten players in all of baseball.  During that four year period he averaged a slash line of .311/30/115 with 23 SBs and Gold Glove defense.  Wow!  No one could argue with that kind of production and if that’s what the team was going to be getting I’d be leading the charge to get him to sign on the dotted line.

Then in 2009 CitiField happened.  We all know how quickly Wright crumbled.  His stats for that season were highly respectable when it came to batting average -- .307 – but his power vanished.  He slugged but 10 HRs and 72 RBIs over the course of the full season.  There was one red flag, though – his strikeouts jumped dramatically to 140. 

The following year looked like he shook off some of the woes from 2009 and delivered a career low .283 average, but did provide 29 HRs and 103 RBIs to go along with 19 SBs.  All was right with the world again…or was it?  Those strikeout problems got even worse with 161 Ks tallied over the course of the season.

2011 saw Wright miss about 25% of his season to injury.  His 14 HRs and 61 RBIs were not all that impressive, particularly when his average dipped to just .254.  Some of that decline can be written off to playing through pain, but it was still a disturbing downward trend.

2012 was the make or break season for David Wright’s future in Queens.  As many players do in a contract year, he delivered.  It wasn’t classic early David Wright, but 21 HRs, 93 RBIs, 15 SBs and a .306 average were certainly more than respectable.  It was what you’d expect from a star player but still a significant drop-off from his 2005-2008 period. 

Now the reality of baseball is that all contracts (with the exception of locking up young players before hitting free agency) are an exercise in paying for past accomplishments.  However, baseball is also a business and before making a decision on David Wright’s ultimate salary offer the front office had to decide whether or not he was likely to rebound, remain consistent or decline in his post age-30 seasons. 

You must also consider the climate among the fans at the time.  Sandy Alderson and Terry Collins came in to great fanfare about righting the listing ship left by Omar Minaya and Jerry Manuel.  The Mets were in the midst of their Madoff financial woes and the media seemingly daily recited the condemnations about them being too broke or too cheap to do what was necessary to make the team competitive. 

Eventually a decision was made to ensure David Wright would be the Mets version of Derek Jeter, a team member for life.  The 8 year contract extension of $138 million covered the period of 2013 through 2020 when Wright was likely to go on his Chipper/Rivera/Jeter retirement tour.  In total value it was the largest deal they’d ever offered (though Santana’s nearly $23 million per year for 6 years was decidedly more costly).  At an annual average investment of over $17 million per season, it would appear that Wright indeed took something of a hometown discount in order to remain with the Mets.  His contract included public appearance and charitable contribution clauses, so it was as much about image as it was about ability.  That he also deferred some of the money interest-free also was music to the cash-poor Mets’ ears.

What did the Mets get for their sizeable investment?  Well, in 2013 Wright posted a rather embarrassing 18 HRs and 58 RBIs while hitting .307 and again missing a large number of ABs due to injury.  This season he’s off to a .283 start with 2 HRs and 25 RBIs through 41 games.   He’s on pace for close to 100 RBIs once again but unfortunately another low HR total more reminiscent of a Daniel Murphy than the face of the franchise. 

Another way they could have gone at the end of 2012 was to trade David Wright to accomplish two major goals – bringing in an influx of young talent to address the myriad of problems that existed in the outfield, at shortstop and in the bullpen – and freeing up $17 million per year to put towards multiple mid-tier free agent contracts like those given to Marlon Byrd and Mike Morse.  Rolling the dice on unproven youngsters is always a crap shoot, but there was no guarantee that Wright would continue to perform at his formerly high level of production.  Also in the pipeline you had some seemingly respectable hitters like Zach Lutz and Wilmer Flores plus Daniel Murphy (whose natural position was 3B) who could have stepped into the hot corner. 

Bear in mind that more 10-17 HR/60-80 RBI type seasons in the future are going to hamstring the spending as he would likely become untradeable.  So the question in 20-20 hindsight is did the Mets make a smart move or a panic move investing this much money into a player whose health and production have been in decline since 2008?