We closed by asking how much of New York’s roster took shape under David Stearns.
Answering that requires examining the larger assignment he inherited. Stearns was expected to stabilize an organization trying to accomplish several difficult things simultaneously, while making it more successful on the field.
Four jobs at once
From the beginning of Steve Cohen’s ownership, the Mets faced four connected assignments:
The season would not pause while the organization rebuilt itself.
Cohen could authorize spending immediately. Developing players, establishing leadership and improving organizational decisions would take longer.
Experienced major leaguers helped bridge that gap. But the bridge itself required constant maintenance. Contracts expired. Players aged. Injuries created openings. Successful acquisitions became more expensive to retain.
Whenever an internal replacement was unavailable, the Mets needed another external answer.
The investment was sustained. Leadership kept changing.
The ownership-era record captures both the financial commitment and the changes among those responsible for turning it into wins.
Dollar figures in millions.
¹ Alderson was team president; Scott served as acting GM. Porter departed before the season; Alderson resumed GM duties in September.
² Stearns assumed control after the 2023 regular season.
³ Financial figures remain estimates. Andy Green replaced Carlos Mendoza in June.
CBT payroll uses tax-accounting values, including contract AAVs and benefits. Payroll plus tax is not actual cash spending. Totals use unrounded figures.
Cohen was pursuing immediate success while still establishing the leadership capable of sustaining it.
Stearns was supposed to connect the pieces
Stearns’ arrival offered the prospect of a more durable arrangement.
His Milwaukee experience suggested he understood how to compete while developing players, replenishing talent and managing difficult roster decisions.
The expectation in New York was compelling: combine those capabilities with Cohen’s financial resources.
That would give the Mets greater capacity to retain successful players, purchase coverage and absorb mistakes.
It also raised the pressure. Stearns was the experienced executive expected to bring stability while winning. Organizational development and immediate competition remained simultaneous obligations.
Some progress is tangible
The emerging young group gives the Mets something substantial to build around.
As Part 4 discussed, Benge, McLean, Scott and Ewing supplied affordable production. Fair attribution still matters: McLean, Scott and Ewing entered the organization before Stearns; Benge was drafted under his administration.
Developing inherited talent deserves credit. So do acquisition, rehabilitation, promotion and deployment decisions.
But those contributions must be evaluated alongside the surrounding roster.
The 2024 run demonstrated that the Mets could compete deep into October. The next two seasons demonstrated that they had not established a dependable way to return.
Stearns’ teams have gone 246–240, with one postseason appearance.
Stabilizing through change
There is a tension here. Stearns was expected to stabilize the organization while changing its players.
Some turnover was necessary. Continuity cannot mean preserving an unsuccessful roster indefinitely.
However, every new player, position and role creates adjustment work. A collection of individually defensible moves still has to function together.
That is where my own preseason assessment was too confident. I underestimated how many favorable outcomes needed to align for the 2026 roster to work.
The same scrutiny belongs in evaluating management: how much uncertainty did the construction require the team to overcome?
Where the assignment stands
Cohen supplied financial capacity. The organization has developed useful young players. Stearns has provided continuity at the top of baseball operations.
Those are meaningful ingredients.
Milwaukee demonstrated that organizational strength could survive a leadership transition. New York is still trying to demonstrate that its current leadership can make competitive seasons dependable.
The final installment returns to the question that opened this series: how effectively does an organization turn its resources into sustained winning?
For the Mets, the next proof needs to come in the standings.
Sources: MLB records and leadership announcements; final CBT assessments reported by AP/ESPN; FanGraphs’ November 18, 2026 payroll estimate.

6 comments:
Saw this: The Mets have interest in Japanese RHP Kaima Taira and plan to have a Zoom meeting soon with the four-time NPB All-Star.
I can picture the Mets participants in the call saying, does anyone know what he’s saying?
“That is where my own preseason assessment was too confident. I underestimated how many favorable outcomes needed to align for the 2026 roster to work.” We all tend to do that. Thinking back to Pete Alonso, I was OK with him going because of the five-year deal, knowing that the first year or two might be very strong… As long as they got a reasonably effective replacement at lower cost, and put the money to pitching. The problem is, they got Polanco. I know that at this time last year, I wrote an article, noting that Lindor, Alonzo, Soto, and Nemo – pardon the spelling – played almost every game in 2025 and combined, scored over 400 runs and drove in over 400 runs. You have to be very careful to dismantle that, especially when you’re bringing in an injury, prone player or players. It’s probably a correct conclusion to say that players who in frequently get injured tend to get fewer injuries going forward than do players who are frequently injured. Polanco being a case study.
If this was a soft drink company, it would be Tab.
Bad ownership
Bad management
Poor drafting
Sub-par development
There have clearly been some positive changes in the organization throughout the Stearns tenure. Everyone in the top of the organization was over-optimistic in thinking that this franchise could be turned into a sustainable winner in 5 years. It takes deliberate actions and also some luck. They got the first part, not the second. The need to "win now" certainly compromised some of the decisions and set the time line back. Now the CBA negotiations can add an unpredictable variable.
For better & for worse, the Mets are even more desperate to field a winning playoff team in 2027. The must take the step Jules has defined - playoff bound & a full season of winning baseball & playoff contention or there is yet another total reboot. The reboot will not come with “permission” to tear down & totally rebuild. Especially if they sign Skubal.
Let’s hope for the best this offseason - once the CBA resolves.
The issue is that spring training (or whatever it will be called this year) will not be normal & like the WBA & this year with all the new faces - we just can’t get into a normal rhythm. That will be unfortunate.
Here's a research project for someone. Find a historical positive advocacy of what David Stearns has done in charge of the Mets front office.
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