The 2025 Mets season is often waved away as bad luck — injuries, underperformance, and a pitching staff that collapsed faster than anyone expected. But that explanation only scratches the surface. What 2025 actually exposed were structural weaknesses in how risk, insurance, and player capital were managed, and those lessons now appear to be shaping David Stearns’ approach going forward.
The Insurance Failed — All at Once
The Mets entered 2025 believing they had layered protection:
Veteran starters as baseline stability
Trade-deadline capital as a secondary backstop
Elite prospects as a last-resort buffer
On paper, this made sense. The problem wasn’t recklessness — it was correlation. When Senga, Montas, Channing, Megill, and Manaea both broke down, the primary insurance failed simultaneously. The deadline market then punished desperation, forcing the Mets to overpay for “certainty” that largely didn’t convert into performance. Once both layers were gone, the organization had no choice but to break glass and promote multiple minor-league starters earlier — and under far worse conditions — than planned.
That wasn’t youth aggression. It was systemic failure.
Delayed Promotions Made the Collapse Worse
2025 also revealed the hidden cost of being too conservative with prospect timelines.
McLean likely should have been promoted earlier to absorb lower-leverage innings. Tong probably should have reached AAA sooner to expand the viable depth pool. And in hindsight, Senga and Manaea may have needed longer rehab windows, even if that meant earlier prospect exposure.
By delaying those moves, the Mets preserved the appearance of veteran insurance while weakening their actual resilience. When the collapse came, every remaining option was more expensive, more volatile, and more damaging.
The lesson is simple but uncomfortable: early, intentional promotion hedges risk better than late, forced promotion.
Why This Explains the New Direction
Viewed through this lens, Stearns’ current approach doesn’t look ideological. It looks corrective.
Develop and promote elite prospects earlier to hedge age, health, and salary curves.
Extend only truly elite talent long-term, trading length for lower annual value and capturing surplus in prime years.
Trade solid players before free agency, while their value still reflects certainty, then replace them internally.
Use free agency selectively — for generational anchors or short-term timing gaps, not roster construction.
This isn’t about getting younger for the sake of youth. It’s about increasing the yield on player capital and avoiding another season where insurance evaporates all at once.
Looking Ahead to 2026
If this framework is executed cleanly, 2026 should look different — not necessarily louder, but more resilient. Expect a roster with fewer aging bets, earlier and more intentional prospect integration, and less reliance on midseason panic fixes. There may be volatility, and the optics won’t always be comfortable, but the underlying structure should be stronger.
The real test won’t be whether everything works immediately, but whether the Mets can absorb injuries, slumps, and inevitable misfires without the entire system breaking again. After what 2025 exposed, that — more than any single signing or trade — is the bar Stearns has to clear.
13 comments:
Agreed - top prospect pitchers McLean and Tong were slow-walked, especially Tong. Lambert, too.
I know in my heart that Stearns has begun the process of build a world class baseball team that will succeed for many years.
The problem is, when you do this to a very popular current team regardless of past results, your current fan base is going to really hate you short term
he seems to not be letting the shit around him affect his judgement.
he also seems to have the long-range backing of his boss man
Thank you for this blue print. As I read the section “a new direction”, it’s ironic that late last night I read the article on Tarik Skubal in The Athletic and what Detroit should do. While the writer had a good premise, his research was terrible and he didn’t offer a conclusion. In the comments though, smarter readers morphed one that I could live with if I was a Tigers fan. After Valdez sets the market for AAV, go higher and longer. If he doesn’t sign, trade him. He may not want to wait until after the new MLBPA agreement is made because who knows what will happen, and so he accepts. Based on that, I think as $43MM is the highest ever AAV for a pitcher, offer him $44MM times the years you want to give and see if he wants to stay. But, that isn’t my bed to make. I just don’t know if I want to roll those dice with my prospects if then they want to trade him.
As I read the section about veteran insurance, I think Stearns did a bad job there. My reasoning isn’t the typical Montas bashing that he couldn’t foresee, it was Blackburn. In 2024, Blackburn came mid-season and was no big deal. As he needed surgery in October, his rehab would be through the winter with no lab work or throwing. Hence, he wouldn’t have strength in March or improve. Had he cut him when he should have and used that roster spot on a healthy veteran, they had at least a healthier and more prepared arm in June when they needed it.
My questions to you have to do with the collapse and slow promotions. It’s obvious he wanted to keep their rookie status to get a draft pick if they get RoY. As Stearns is known to be an aggressive promoter and “wants to keep challenging players” do you feel that the clubhouse toxicity made him want to avoid exposing these kids until he had to? Do you think a breakup of this core was coming no matter the result? And based on your premises and his word that Benge could break camp with the team, isn’t it fair to say that Williams would soon be close behind - if he isn’t traded which I just can’t see him still around since the infield is clogged up?
Mack, Cohen said he wanted this when he first bought the team. He just didn’t have the right leadership yet. And I believe in his plan too and wonder why long time fans that have seen the failures don't want something done about them.
Great questions. Here is my take:
Re: Blackburn - agree it was strange to keep him when they could have cut him & signed someone similar that was at least healthy. Maybe they did see something deeper but his health also caved in.
The young promotions: going into last year, all the reclamation projects with Montas & Manaea (& Megill) I suspect Stearns was looking to really watch & learn about the talent (especially the pitching) & let the new lab start working. They also do not have the coaching (mlb level) optimized to effectively bring up young players (see: Baty, Vientos, Mauricio, Acuna). So why bring up the pitching talent until the proper coaching support infrastructure is set up. That is taken care of now. (In fact, that was his first move).
Finally, there was definitely something cultural going on. Likely the residual effect of all the managerial, front office & coaching churn over the last 5 years.
So much to do but Stearns is actually doing it!
@RVH. Really good piece as usual; and @TexasGus. Very insightful questions -- especially about exposing young players to the environment in the clubhouse. Rational investment requires risk management and risk management requires insurance. I've identified Bellinger's value to the Mets as an insurance policy. Insurance runs the risk of moral hazard -- taking undo risks because your costs should things go south are covered by insurance. On the other hand, most people, even those who are insured, do not engage in unjustifiably risky activity. Stearns is not likely to.
I do believe the core would have been dismantled even had the team made the playoffs or even had they won the world series, though of course Diaz would have stayed, his leaving ostensibly caused by his wanting to win. The team needed what I call a 'recentering.' Right now, the center has Soto and Lindor with the expectation that McLean will be part of it as well. Do not expect any long term contracts (the usual signature request of top tier free agents) unless the FA is seen as part of the core.
The concept of a core or a center calls for clarification. It is not enough that a player perform well to be part of the core. Think of the core as something that has gravitational force: pull. It keeps everything else not only in motion but in harmony, both as to performance and attitude. It creates stability at the heart of an enterprise. Stability is not measured simply by time but by the nature and scope of disturbances: disturbances are few, minimum magnitude and relatively brief. Members of the core are sufficiently diverse as to be complementary, thus able to exert influence over everyone else in different ways
Weight, pull, influence, harmony, stability, forward movement, self-regulation.and regard for others, mentorship and guidance
That's where the long term contracts go; not to chasing numbers.
Put the right core together with solid performers throughout the roster and a balanced team with leadership that is committed to putting players in the best position to succeed, with an open ear and quietly confident and reassuring demeanor and the wins numbers will come!
wins and numbers
Great piece, RV. I think that Stearns is hoping that Baty and Alvarez are part of the position player going forward, along with Soto, and (for now, at least, though he doesn’t really match up with their timeline) Lindor.
And that he’s betting on at least two and maybe three of Benge, Ewing, Williams (though I think he’s the most likely to be traded) and Clifford will join that group by ‘27. All four of those guys have at least some positional flexibility, which makes it easier to integrate them, as long as they don’t go outside of the org for long-term solutions at 1B, LF, CF, or 2B. I see Semien as a 1-2 year solution on a 3-year contract - which wouldn’t really fit except that taking that on opened up five years in LF - and with the resources to eat the back end of that deal.
Next year’s FA class is stronger than this one, and so another year of watching these young guys develop will determine whether there’s a longer-term signing that fills a longer-term hole that, at this moment, they don’t know if they have.
Pitching same, same. Pretty sure they’d love to have a ‘27 staff with one ace-type who isn’t in the org yet, surrounded by home grown, cheap, high-upside SP, with maybe a veteran (we’ll say Manea, since he’s signed for ‘27, but that could change) filling out the back end.
@that...: I agree with the basic sentiment about what Stearns hopes to see on the ML team in 27. I also believe that next year's FA class is better and their bargaining positions impacted by aspects of a likely collective action agreement that is hopefully hammered out without destroying much of the upcoming season. I believe Stearns is more sold on Alvarez growing into nearly everyone's projection of him; and that he is optimistic about Baty as well. I think Alvarez needs a swing mechanics rebuild and Baty has to shorten the length of his swing so that he can wait a little longer to improve his pitch recognition skills.
I've been trying to deal with the Mets fan who wants everything always and especially now, not to mention the ones who believe that a failure to spend big on FA this year means that Cohen has given up on next year.
Both views are mistaken, so I try my best to present ways in which one could go about putting a very talented team on the field next year, while following the organizational strategy and without creating barriers to the current plans and without foolish expenditures with long tails.
As you say, Stearns doesn't have enough information to know where the deep or problematic holes in the lineup will be in 2027 nor does he know which of his talented prospects are definite answers to the questions that team will face and which will be valuable trade assets.
But none of that precludes putting a really good team on the field. Everyone talks about the Dodgers in a way that would make you think that everyone on their team is an all star. So let's take a look. The four top outfielders were the two Hernandez, Edmonds and Pages. Freeman was injured part of the year and had a bit less than the stellar year we normally associate with him. Betts had an average year at best as did Muncie. The catcher was the only position player who performed at all star caliber. Ohtani obviously had a great year at the plate and the starting rotation was excellent overall. The bullpen - especially the backend of it -- was a tremendous disappointment at best. And yet they won the world series. They were more than the sum of their parts and the players like Muncie, Freeman and Betts who had overall down years, continued to be incredibly clutch performers.
You wrote:
“ I've been trying to deal with the Mets fan who wants everything always and especially now, not to mention the ones who believe that a failure to spend big on FA this year means that Cohen has given up on next year.”
I wish you the best of luck. Sometimes I think they’re just trolling, but…
People are going to have to understand (or not, I guess) that the horizon this FO is looking at goes long beyond ‘26. That they’re not going to sabotage that horizon for a marginal quick fix. And that while they’ll 💯 try to put a playoff competitive team on the field this season (not as high a bar as it used to be), they believe that the core that will carry them into a long-term window of WS contention is mostly already in the org, but not with the big club yet.
Couple that with what should be a much better FA class next offseason and a new CBA coming, there’s no reason to vary from this plan. I, for one, am happy rooting for a playoff spot this year while watching the kids take steps forward.
Adam, technically they don’t HAVE to understand. I read comments like:
Cohen owns a casino, he will be printing money.
The Mets are obligated to signing the best free agents with the money Cohen has.
Stearns wants to make this team the Milwaukee Mets. To which my response is, have the Mets been as successful as Milwaukee the last few years. The pullback is always that Milwaukee loses in the playoffs quickly.
I understand that frustration, but I think that it would be a mistake to risk the future vision - and worse, encumber it with guys/contracts that the team thinks it will regret over that timeline. They clearly believe strongly in their pipeline, and if they’re right, and spend as necessary/beneficial to supplement that once they know where it all stands, it’s smarter than blowing it up just to get marginally closer to the Dodgers in ‘26.
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