10/13/10

Hello, They Must Be Going…Part Two (aka “Be Careful What You Wish For…”)


When last we left our heroes...(always wanted to open with that!)...or, in this case, those we THOUGHT were going to be the saviors of the franchise, Omar & company had a fresh start at reinventing the team and taking it into a new (and hopefully exciting) direction. Now, six years later, 2 collapses, a year of unbearable injuries and another that just wasted our time, the "heart" of the team remains David Wright & Jose Reyes, two players that Omar had nothing to do with drafting (and who, under his watch, have had seasons of regression and, in Reyes' case, survived being moved to a different position), but the cupboard is far from bare. The one area that Omar took that was supposed to differentiate him from other MLB GM's (and by association, the Mets) was the alleged "leg up" in his being able to sign and scout Latin American talent, especially talent from the Dominican Republic.

Under Omar's watch, an academy was created in the DR, and a number of Latin players were signed to large bonuses, including Francisco Pena (C), Deolis Guerra (P), Carlos Gomez (OF), Fernando Martinez (OF), Wilmer Flores (SS) & Juan Urbina (P); to date, Pena's been mostly a bust, Guerra came in handy in the deal for Santana, as did Gomez, although neither has come close to reaching their "potential" (and as a Mets' fan, don't you HATE that word- "potential"), F-Mart has been injured and has seen his "star" fall precipitously, Flores remains a work in progress, although one who still possesses huge upside, and Urbina, Omar's last, large international signee, also shows great promise at the still tender age of 17. A handful of prospects, most of whom haven't (or won't) pan out have come through the system, but hardly what we would consider a "pipeline" or, if you stay with that analogy, that pipeline needs one HELL of a great plumber- STAT!!

What the minor league system DOES have is a heck of a lot of interesting players, although the majority of whom seems to comprise either middle infielders or outfielders, two areas the Mets' have not exactly been known for developing either quantity OR quality in the past, and both areas provide roadblocks to the point where neither Mack nor I could accurately project which outfielders, second basemen or shortstops will be playing at which level. Jordany Valdespin, Justin Turner, Wilmer Flores, Reese Havens and Josh Satin will all vie for positions up the middle from AA on up, as long as the major league-projected combo of Tejada/Murphy does the trick. In the outfield, Kirk Nieuwenhuis, Lucas Duda, Nick Evans, Sean Ratliff and the almost-forgotten Fernando Martinez will be competing for a back-up spot in the majors, as well as for AAA Buffalo spots.

In sum, regarding player development, the new general manager (the topic of part 3) will have to make some very quick decisions, not just about the major league roster, but about the placement/development of a substantial amount of prospects and suspects, and which is which. Not an easy job when there is clearly a ton of (here it comes) potential coupled with an even greater amount of questions. This is clearly an even greater dilemma then assembling the major league roster will be, as the new GM will have little to no familiarity with the organization's minor league talent and coaching staffs and so essentially the 2011 season will become a huge opportunity for growth and will require the new GM to finally begin to separate the "wheat" from the "chaff"...

Speaking of the major league roster, let's put aside some of Omar's more questionable decisions from the past (re-signing Scott Schoeneweis instead of Darren Oliver; Brian Lawrence as their 5th starter during a pennant race in '07; the bouncing around of star pitching prospect Jenrry Mejia this season) and realize that Omar was far better at signing the star free agents (Beltran, K-Rod, Pedro) and harvesting fringe stars (Pagan, Dickey) then he was at assembling an entire, balanced 25-man roster.

As easy as it was to blame Jerry Manuel for questionable strategies, we also have to remember that he didn't exactly play with a full roster, to the point that Ollie Perez actually ensured a 24-man roster would remain in place until the September call-ups. That falls squarely on the shoulders of the General Manager, and again, in spite of the spark that an Angel Pagan and RA Dickey brings, the fact that John Maine, Perez, Fernando Nieve, Ryota Igarashi, Gary Matthews Jr, Mike Jacobs, Frank Catalanatto, Fernando Tatis & Alex Cora were being counted on to comprise one-third of the opening day roster that Omar put in place ensured no more than a 4th place finish, or just about where they ultimately ended up when the season finished. However, by the end of the first month of the season, the roster began to feature the likes of Ike Davis, Ruben Tejada and Josh Thole, as well as Chris Carter and Bobby Parnell, who both should have begun the season in the show and finally ended up getting there, although too late to play a larger part in the team's success.

In September, every starting player except for Carlos Beltran was homegrown, which DID provide a lot of hope for the future. In addition to hope, it also brought the frustration that comes with knowing that an entire season of Carter, Parnell, Thole, or Davis might have resulted in enough extra victories to split the difference between fighting to stay at .500 versus fighting for a wildcard spot. And therein lies the biggest issue behind the problems that plagued Omar's tenure - he tried to compete too soon, spent too much money on bad contracts too soon in order to compete, due to pressure from ownership, the media, fan-base, etc - and, at the same time, rebuild nearly the entire organization from the ground up, from executive staff and coaches to players at every level, something with which he had never been tasked to do before (he inherited the majority of the Montreal/Washington system). Unfortunately, the organization didn't realize that New York fans recognize the difference between meaningful and meaningless rebuilding programs - remember 1982-1985, anyone, versus, say, 2001- 2004 - and instead of stocking the team with tons of talented young players as the primary focus, the focus was too deeply split between bringing in top tier, top-salaried talent (Pedro, Beltran, Delgado), in order to contend instantly while constantly "robbing Peter to pay Paul" in the form of lost draft picks (free agent compensation) or foregoing the chance at better picks in exchange for instant, non-lasting contender status. It's true that no one would have stood for a Rays-like rebuilding process, where losing was the sole distinguishing feature of the organization; it's also true that a gradual, lasting progression, similar to what Theo Epstein and company created in Boston would have been embraced to the point that the timing of the opening of the new stadium would have probably coincided with fielding a very competitive team that would remain in contention year after year, making all of our frustrations moot points. The fact is, Epstein has had a phenomenal cast of talent evaluators surrounding/working with/mentoring him, while the Mets were left with the smack-down challenges of Tony Bernazard and a cast of largely forgettable executives surrounding Omar. So we have to stop JUST blaming Omar - it truly took a village to get to this state, and that village is the property of the ownership group.

In part 3, we'll discuss the future of the current roster, as well as suggestions to help turn the organization around as we all hope for a sustained period of prosperity the likes of which the team hasn't seen in a long, long time.

No comments: